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For more than a quarter century, Richard Rorty was one of the most controversial writers.  
Critics of Rorty have often clustered their remarks around distinct themes within Rorty’s body of 
literature.  Is Rorty’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth valid and what standard of 
validity could confirm that?  Does Rorty’s treatment of pragmatists such as William James and 
John Dewey accurately reflect their writings?  Is Rorty’s brand of liberalism defensible when it 
assumes no non-circular form of justification can be proffered?  These are the questions most 
often addressed by Rorty’s critics.  He responded to their objections for two decades.   
By taking a synoptic view of Rorty’s literary corpus, my goal is to change a few of the 
questions being asked and offer criticism of Rorty’s texts predicated on the validity of a new 
cluster of questions.  I offer a reading of Rorty’s political theories that places Rorty’s debt to the 
literary critic Harold Bloom’s concepts higher than his avowed affiliation with pragmatism.  I 
argue that in order to understand the nature of Rorty’s affiliation with pragmatism it is best to 
understand how Rorty was profoundly influenced by a cluster of Bloom’s concepts.  These 
concepts include, “belatedness,” “anxiety,” “influence,” “strong poet,” “precursor,” and 
“misreading.”   
I propose a reading of Rorty’s text which, when taken together, make Bloom’s influence 
on Rorty central.  I describe five features that make Rorty’s pragmatism peculiar. Next, I move 
to a discussion of Rorty’s exchanges with Donald Davidson revealing Rorty’s adaptations, 
contradictions, and peculiar allegiance to pragmatism.  Next, I explain that allegiance by placing 
Bloom as the central figure in the late development of Rorty’s writings on the division of the 
private realm of self-creation and the public realm of solidarity.  Finally, I discuss how Bloom’s 
concepts help explain how Rorty has wedged himself in a peculiar way between Rawlsian 
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liberalism and communitarianism.  Although Bloom is central, his centrality does not make 
Rorty’s writings more coherent.  Placing Bloom at the center explains some of Rorty’s 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
If Frederick Nietzsche wanted to be considered philosophy’s Hamlet, then we may want 
to consider Richard Rorty as philosophy’s Shakespeare.  Just as Nehamas argues, “Nietzsche 
created a character out of himself,”1 so too does Rorty.  At the height of his career, Rorty 
embraced a kind of poetic playfulness which opened itself up to both inconsistency and 
multiplicity.   
Marjorie Garber writes, “Every age creates its own Shakespeare.”2  Every age does this 
by finding in Shakespeare something right for that age.  What makes Shakespeare endlessly 
present is his multiplicity.  Shakespeare’s only coherence is the world of possibilities he 
unleashes.3  In Nietzsche’s words, “the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more 
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of 
this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be.”4  Richard Rorty presents himself as the stage writer for the 
philosopher-as-actor.  They all audition for philosophy’s Shakespeare.  Rorty’s writings are 
meta-philosophical, in that, they concern themselves with the conditions under which philosophy 
is either possible or relevant.  Unsatisfied with metaphilosophical criticism, Rorty wrote 
substantively and controversially about democratic discourse.  By the end of his career, Rorty 
knowingly embraced inconsistency.  He may have believed that inconsistency was akin to 
multiplicity and that multiplicity would keep his writings relevant in the future’s uncertainty.   
                                                           
1 Nehamas, Alexander. Nietzsche: Life As Literature. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 233. 
2 Garber, Marjorie. Shakespeare After All. (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 28. 
3 For a more an approach that tries to balance philosophical realism with something closer to Harold Bloom’s theory 
that Shakespeare is the strongest of ‘strong poets’ see, McGinn, Colin. Shakespeare’s Philosophy: Discovering the 
Meaning Behind the Plays. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006).  Note especially his reflections on Harold Bloom’s 
interpretation of Shakespeare (202-04).     
4 Nietzsche, Frederick. On the Genealogy of Morals reprinted in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter 
Kauffman. (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 555.  
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Nehamas has been reading Rorty and writing about him since Rorty wrote Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature.  At some time, around the publication of Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity, Nehamas lost track of Rorty.  In reviewing the latter publication, Nehamas notes 
that Rorty has “A touch of the poet,” and is “writing with vision.”5  However, Nehamas makes 
two errors in reviewing Rorty that I want to expose as part of my argument about recasting Rorty 
in the proper light.  First, Nehamas quotes Rorty who writes, “Since truth is a property of 
sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since 
vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.” 6  However, Nehamas criticizes it without 
considering the context within which it is presented.  Nehamas says in response to Rorty, 
“reasons don’t seem to be created in the same way words are,” but this is exactly what Rorty 
leaves open for us when he writes, “Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the 
human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there.  The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not.  Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.”7  Giving 
descriptions that can either be true or false is another way of saying that reasons can be true or 
false, but Rorty’s explanation of descriptions are that they can be true or false and their truth or 
falsity is appraised as such, not by checking them against the world or reality or the forms or 
nature or God, but rather by the way they fit within our vocabulary.  Our vocabulary as a whole 
is more or less useful in coping with the world.  This is something that Nehamas agrees with, yet 
seen in this context, Nehamas is objecting to Rorty’s phrasing of the syllogism in question.  Why 
– the question needs to be asked – does Rorty phrase it that way?   
Nehamas’ criticism capitalizes on the pithiness of Rorty’s syllogism: “since truth is a 
property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and 
                                                           
5 Nehamas, Alexander. “A touch of the poet.” Raritan 10, no. 1 (1990):104-25. 
6 Ibid., 110.; Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 9. 
7 Ibid., 110.; Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
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since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.”  Eight years earlier, before Rorty 
aligned with the poets against philosophers (something I will explain in chapter four), Nehamas 
was calling Rorty’s writings, “understated eloquence, argumentative depth and moral 
seriousness, with vision as well as with style.”8  Yet eight years later, Nehamas still refers to 
Rorty as someone who has a “vision,” but now Nehamas has reversed much of what he said 
earlier.  Instead of “depth and moral seriousness,” the Rorty of Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity “tends to take too many things at face value;” Rorty gives us a “hermeneutics of 
credulity.”9   
More than any philosopher of the twentieth century, Rorty has been reviled.  He recounts 
much of his criticisms in an autobiographical reflection: 
If there is anything to the idea that the best intellectual position is one which is attacked 
with equal vigor from the political right and the political left, then I am in good shape.  I 
am often cited by conservative culture warriors as one of the relativistic, irrationalist, 
deconstructing, sneering, smirking, intellectuals whose writings are weakening the moral 
fiber of the young.  Neal Kozody, writing in the monthly bulletin of the Committee for 
the Free World, an organization known for its vigilance against symptoms of moral 
weakness, denounces my ‘cynical and nihilistic view’ and says ‘it is not enough for him 
[Rorty] that American students should be merely mindless; he would have them 
positively mobilized for mindlessness.’  Richard Neuhaus, a theologian who doubts that 
atheists can be good American citizens, says that the ‘ironist vocabulary’ I advocate ‘can 
neither provide a public language for the citizens of a democracy, nor contend 
intellectually against enemies of democracy, nor transmit the reasons for democracy to 
the next generation.’  My criticisms of Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American 
Mind led Harvey Mansfield – recently appointed by President Bush to the National 
Council for the Humanities – to say that I have ‘given up on America’ and that I 
‘manage to diminish even Dewey.’ (Mansfield recently described Dewey as a ‘medium-
sized malefactor’.)  His colleague on the council, my fellow philosopher John Searle, 
thinks that standards can only be restored to American higher education if people 
abandon the views of truth, knowledge and objectivity that I do my best to inculcate. 
 Yet Sheldon Wolin, speaking from the Left, sees a lot of similarity between me 
and Allan Bloom: both of us, he says, are intellectual snobs who care only about the 
leisured, cultural elite to which we belong.  Neither of us has anything to say to blacks, 
or to other groups who have been shunted aside by American society.  Wolin’s view is 
                                                           
8 Nehamas, Alexander. “Can We Ever Quite Change the Subject?: Richard Rorty on Science, Literature, Culture, 
and the Future of Philosophy.” boundary2 10, no. 3 (1982): 396. 
9 Ibid., 123. 
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echoed by Terry Eagleton, Britain’s leading Marxist thinker.  Eagleton says that ‘in 
[Rorty’s] ideal society the intellectuals will be ‘ironists,’ practicing a suitably caviler 
laid back attitude to their own belief, while the masses, for whom such self-ironizing 
might prove to subversive a weapon, will continue to salute the flag and take life 
seriously.’ Der Spiegel said that I ‘attempt to make the yuppie regression look good.’ 
Jonathan Culler, one of Derrida’s chief disciples and expositors, says that my version of 
pragmatism ‘seems all together appropriate to the age of Reagan.’ Richard Bernstein 
says that my views are ‘little more than an ideological apologia for an old-fashioned 
version of Cold War liberalism dressed up in fashionable ‘post-modern’ discourse.’  The 
Left’s favorite word for me is ‘complacent,’ just as the Right’s is ‘irresponsible.’10 
 
All these criticisms that Rorty recounts are the ones that occur after the publication of 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  All of these criticisms relate to the political implications of 
Rorty’s post-philosophical proposals.  I call these proposals post-philosophical because Rorty’s 
criticisms of philosophy have given him a sensationalized status that he embraces.  An example 
of this embrace is shown by Rorty’s willingness to appear in the BBC Four documentary film 
dedicated to him titled, Richard Rorty: The Man Who Killed Truth.11  The sensational nature of 
documentary film making is usefully set in contrast to John Rawls’ criticism of such behavior.  
Rawls’ behavior was quite different, as recounted by his former student Samuel Freeman, “He 
[Rawls] regularly declined requests for interviews, and chose not to take an active role in public 
life.  He conscientiously avoided celebrity status.  Rawls believed that philosophers are normally 
misunderstood when they address the public.”12  In contrast to Rawls, Rorty has purposely 
conducted controversies towards him, as Charles Guignon and David Hiley note in their use of 
the metaphor of a “lightning rod” to describe Rorty’s effect.13 
                                                           
10 Rorty, Richard. “Trotsky and the Wild Orchid,” in Philosophy and Social Hope. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1999), 3-4. 
11 Recounted in, the first biography of Richard Rorty: Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The Making of an American 
Philosopher. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 25. 
12 Freeman, Samuel. Rawls. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5. 
13 Guignon, Charles and David R. Hiley. “Introduction: Richard Rorty and Contemporary Philosophy,” in Richard 
Rorty. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Edited by Guignon, Charles and David R. Hiley. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
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I said at the beginning that Nehamas lost track of Rorty.  The purpose of this essay is to 
track Rorty in a way that does not analyze any particular work of Rorty’s without considering the 
whole in which it partakes.  There are many consequences of this approach which manifest 
themselves in a cluster of different questions I hope to answer through this essay.  Why is 
Rorty’s pragmatism so peculiar?  Why does Rorty affiliate himself with pragmatism at all?  Why 
does Rorty write in different literary genres?  Why does Rorty sensationalize conclusions which 
seem much more mundane under different descriptions?  Why does Rorty drop some 
descriptions and pick up new ones when he has not changed the subject at all?    Why does Rorty 
call himself a philosopher and at the same time reject the title?  
Sifting through Rorty’s writings, I have concluded that the influence of Harold Bloom on 
Richard Rorty is more important than John Dewey’s influence on Rorty.  But this seems 
immediately wrong, considering that Rorty is understood as the reviver of pragmatism in the late 
twentieth century.  Most historians and philosophers agree that Rorty has a central place in 
reviving pragmatism.  Yet, I argue that in order to understand Rorty, it is better to understand 
how Harold Bloom has influenced him, rather than how John Dewey has influenced him.  Again 
this seems immediately wrong, because Rorty has the highest affections for Dewey calling him 
his “principle philosophical hero.”  Yet, I argue that to see why Rorty would even consider 
having a hero, it is better to understand Bloom’s influence on Rorty more than Dewey’s 
influence on Rorty.  Again this seems immediately wrong, because Neil Gross, Rorty’s principle 
biographer, presents Rorty’s intellectual development through 1982 (Rorty had already at this 
point written glowingly about Bloom) as having pragmatism as Rorty’s core intellectual 
interest.14  Yet, I argue that Rorty’s early writing on Bloom seem innocuous until it is set in the 
later context of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, and then later still in interviews where Rorty 
                                                           
14 See, Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher. 
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unfolds descriptions of Bloom that challenge the interpretation that Dewey is the “principle 
philosophical hero.”    
There is a fine line between arguing that Bloom is more important to understand Rorty 
than Dewey and arguing that Bloom is equally important to understand Rorty as Dewey.  As 
Donald Davidson will later argue disputing Rorty: “Importance is a hard thing to argue about.”  
Equalizing Bloom with Dewey seems contentious but less controversial than arguing that Bloom 
is more important in understanding Rorty than Dewey.  “Important” here means “influence” and 
this cannot be quantified.  I will be the first to admit that Rorty writes more about Dewey than 
about Bloom.  However, quantity is not indicative of centrality since what I am going to argue is 
that Rorty picked up a style and disposition from Bloom which he did not pick up from the 
pragmatists.  More narrowly, Rorty did not so much “pick up” a style from Bloom but rather, 
“crafted from.”  Rorty did not model a philosophical program by reading and adopting Bloom’s 
ideas but instead he crafted a self-image through Bloom, adopted some of the literary strategies 
(or confirmed his strategies by deferring to Bloom’s concepts), and extended Bloom’s ideas as 
far into the political realm as he thought they would go.  This extension is part of the meaning 
behind Bloom’s idea of “misreading.”  I argue that the more controversial Rorty became the 
more seriously he was considering and internalizing Bloom’s idea of misreading.  What is 
misreading?  Before I describe Bloom’s concepts, I want to elaborate and affirm the centrality of 
Bloom for Rorty. 
Rorty’s fame stems from his criticism of philosophy, Rorty’s infamy stems from his post-
philosophical proposals.15  After Rorty’s criticisms of philosophy are taken seriously (as I 
recount in chapter three) there is not much left for philosophers to do.  The epitome of what 
                                                           
15 This distinction is not a dichotomy.  It is just generally the case that he has been praised more for his work in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature than his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  Nehamas served as the example 
in earlier paragraphs.   
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philosophers are barred from doing if they take Rorty seriously is creating a philosophical 
research program.  The philosopher Paul Boghossian remarked on Rorty’s Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature that, “whatever there is that’s still worth doing in philosophy is best done by 
literary critics rather than philosophers.”16 Indeed, and if that is the case, then Harold Bloom 
wears the crown.  “Perhaps the Yale literary critic Harold Bloom does it best,” Rorty says in an 
interview, “[because Bloom helps] us see how we live in story after story after story.”17  Bloom’s 
ideas do not lend themselves to departmental research programs: “He [Bloom] doesn’t give 
anybody any work to do . . . and I admire that.”18  In another interview, Rorty says, “It is far 
from easy to imitate Bloom.  There are no little Bloomians.”19  What then is the meaning of 
Bloom concepts? 
Harold Bloom sets out in two books, The Anxiety of Influence and A Map of Misreading, 
to describe a phenomenology of poetry; or, to describe the history of poetry as the history of 
poetic influence.  Poets like John Milton and Ralph Waldo Emerson are not just creative.  
Creativity has a phenomenological, psychological, and historical dimension.  The sequence is not 
necessarily temporal.  René Arcilla summarizes a portrait of Bloom’s concept of strong poet in a 
compelling yet simple manner: 
According to Bloom, every poet was a reader before a writer, one who learned to 
appreciate poetry through the compelling work of one or more (but not indiscriminately 
many) precursors.  Such precursors impress the initiate with what it is possible to 
accomplish.  As soon as the reader of poetry is filled with the desire to write herself 
comparably accomplished poetry, however, her attitude to the precursors becomes 
                                                           
16 Quoted in, Ryerson, James. “The Quest for Uncertainty: Richard Rorty’s Pilgrimage,” in Take care of freedom 
and truth will take care of itself, Edited by Eduardo Mendieta. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2006,), 8. 
17 Rorty, Richard. “From Philosophy to Postphilosophy,” Interviewed by Wayne Hudson and Wim van Reijen. Take 
care of freedom and truth will take care of itself, 21-22. 
18 Rorty, Richard. “Toward a Postmetaphysical Culture,” Interviewed by Michael O’Shea. Take care of freedom and 
truth will take care of itself, 50. 
19 Rorty, Richard. “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies,” Interviewed by 
Edward Ragg. Take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself, 137.  Indeed, but there is a difference between 
being a little Bloomian and imitating Bloom.  Imitating Bloom is not possible once Rorty took seriously Bloom’s 
idea of “strong poet” and “misreading,” because in the very act of imitation is an act of overcoming.   
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charged with ambivalence.  On the one hand, her love of (a certain kind of) poetry 
remains bound to a formative love of the precursors’ poems; this love continues to shape 
her sense of what in her efforts could compel.  On the other hand, her sense of her own 
originality, her conviction that her poetry is not superfluous and can make a difference to 
some audience, depends on her ability to keep her precursors from completely 
anticipating her, alienating her from her own inspiration, and rendering her work a 
belated copy of what has already been done better.  Bloom calls this ambivalence the 
poet’s “anxiety of influence.”  He tries to show how strong poets, such as Milton, 
Shelley, Hardy, and others defeat such anxiety by contriving unconsciously, as in a 
dreamwork, to trope the sentences, perceptions, sentiments, and ideas of their precursors 
in new but equally compelling ways, much as one might symbolically gratify a repressed 
desire in an ingenious fashion.  Against the myth of genius who creates ex nihilo, he 
counterposes the conception of the “revisionary agonist,” one who struggles with her 
precursors to wrest innovative, “strong misreadings” of their work that she could claim as 
her own.20 
 
These themes are presented, in Bloom’s writings, as six tropes that the poet goes through on his 
way to creativity.  First, the poet writes in a corrective measure, implying the existence of a 
precursor and that the precursor swerved away from something sublime.  Second, the poet writes 
as a culmination of the precursor.  Third, in the exercising of the previous tropes of correction 
and completion the poet is enacting a “defense mechanism” which Bloom coins as a “breaking 
device.”  This third trope is the trope of repetition and discontinuity.  The poet is now so 
obsessed with correction and completion that the precursor emerges again and again in the poet’s 
writings and therefore repetition and discontinuity abound.  In the fourth trope, the poet produces 
a “counter-sublime” that he found within the precursor that the precursor specifically did not see.  
In the fifth trope, the poet now embraces his own revision and thus embraces his solitude of 
creativity.  However, in the sixth trope, the poet returns to the precursor and holds his poetry up 
against the precursor’s poetry in the kind of light that forces future readers of the precursor to 
                                                           
20 René, Arcilla V. For the Love of Perfection: Richard Rorty and Liberal Education. (New York: Routledge, Inc., 
1995), 94. 
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read the precursor in light of his successor.21  Poets who drive through these six tropes, or six 
“revisionary ratios,” are called “strong poets.”   
Bloom both collapses and expands those six tropes as he grapples with the nearly 
ineffable qualities of creativity.  Collapsing the tropes, Bloom summarizes them writing, 
Poetic influence – when it involves two strong, authentic poets, - always proceeds by a 
misreading of the prior poet, as an act of creative correction that is actually and 
necessarily a misinterpretation.  The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is to say 
the main tradition of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and 
self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, willful revisionism without which 
modern poetry as such could not exist.22  
  
On my reading of Bloom, the first two tropes of correction and culmination are constitutive of 
misreading.  This misreading reaches the closest point of concretization in the counter-sublime of 
the fourth trope.  In this fourth trope the poet has opened a door to his own creativity; he has 
walked through the door.  In the fifth trope the poet recognizes the solitude on the other side of 
the door and in the sixth trope he turns back to the door – realizing the door is the key – and 
determines to keep the door always open.  By doing this he is responsible for illuminating the 
room where the precursor resides.  The strong poet wants us to see the precursor through his door 
and by his light.  In A Map of Misreading, Bloom writes, “Poems . . . are neither about ‘subjects’ 
nor about ‘themselves.’  They are necessarily about other poems.”23   By turning around and 
forcing the door to stay open, the poet preserves his sense of autonomy while securing that we in 
the future will see the past through his door by his light.  The strong poet is rebelling against his 
precursor; angry that he first had to confine himself to the precursor’s room (Bloom’s concept 
for this is a “misprison”).  In the room, he suffers from a kind of anxiety called “belatedness.”  
                                                           
21 Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University, 1997), 14-
16.  Bloom titles these collectively as the “six revisionary ratios” and titles the first as “clinamen,” the second as, 
“tessera,” the third as, “kenosis,” the fourth as “daemonization,” the fifth as “askesis,” and the sixth as 
“apophrades.”  
22 Ibid., 30. The original quote from Bloom is in italics. 
23 Bloom, Harold. A Map of Misreading. (New York: Oxford University, 2003), 18. 
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This is the worry that the strong poet has arrived too late to create: the room is too large and 
beautiful and, in turn, too distracting that the strong poet has trouble making a door.  By staying 
in the precursor’s room too long the poet feels as if the room is suffocating him; his death is 
imminent and the room is to blame.  “A poem is written to escape dying,” Bloom muses, “Poems 
are refusals of mortality.  Every poem therefore has two makers: the precursor, and the ephebe’s 
[strong poet’s] rejected mortality.”24  He adds, “A poet, I argue in consequence, is not so much a 
man speaking to men as a man rebelling against being spoken to by a dead man (the precursor) 
outrageously more alive than himself.  A poet dare not regard himself as being late, yet cannot 
accept a substitute for the first vision he reflectively judges to have been his precursor’s also.”25  
Bloom fits within the “linguistic turn” of philosophical discourse which is typified by Wilfrid 
Sellars’ conclusion that “all awareness . . . is a linguistic affair.”26  To this effect, Bloom writes, 
“Influence as I conceive it, means that there are no texts, but only relationships between texts.”27 
 Richard Rorty is a misreader.  In chapter four I will argue that he knows he is a misreader 
but, in this regard, he does not exactly explain himself to us.  As Bloom notes, no misreader 
wants to admit to the process; Bloom here reveals a Freudian Oedipal moment as a (partial) 
analogy with the strong poet.28  When Rorty writes, “I see Davidson as rewriting in terms of 
language the same thing that James and Dewey did in terms of experience,” he is misreading.  
This becomes clear by the end of chapter four.  But there is more than one example in Rorty’s 
literary corpus.  I hope to map many of them.  While Rorty’s critique of philosophy requires him 
to marshal pragmatists and analytic philosophers who are critics of their own tradition (e.g. 
Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, and Davidson), his post-philosophical proposals are largely due to 
                                                           
24 Ibid., 19. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Quoted in Rorty, Richard. “Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy,” in Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 
1972-1980). (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xx. 
27 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 3. 
28 Ibid., 10, 90. See also, Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, 8. 
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his extensions of Bloom.  As I will argue, in chapter three and four for example, Rorty’s support 
of liberalism is parasitic on the desire to create the conditions for strong poets to flourish.  
Ironically, his strong affiliation with pragmatism is also due to his reading of Bloom.   
 In my second chapter, titled, “Rorty’s Peculiar Pragmatism,” I summarize five ways that 
make Rorty’s association with pragmatism peculiar.  These five peculiar facets of Rorty’s 
pragmatism are part of themes that his critics raise in objection to him.  These five are not all the 
facets which make Rorty’s pragmatism peculiar, but they are the five most outstanding ways that 
serve the purpose of casting doubt on the relative importance Rorty places on pragmatism.  By 
casting doubt on the relative importance of pragmatism, I hope to create an explanatory gap 
where the relative importance of Bloom’s influence fills to explain what Rorty is doing.    
Of the five peculiar facets, the first is that while Rorty’s pragmatism prioritizes practical 
political solutions, his writings show an aversion to detailing solutions.  The second peculiarity is 
that while Rorty is mostly responsible for the revival in academic interest in pragmatism since 
the 1980s, his writings show an aversion to detailed analysis of any of the original pragmatists 
(e.g. Pierce, James, Holmes, Dewey, etc.).  Third, while Rorty associates himself mostly with 
Dewey, who is Rorty’s “principle philosophical hero,” Rorty is a sharp critic of Dewey.  In fact, 
Rorty is critical of all the original pragmatists.  He explains that they all have inconsistencies.  
The fourth peculiar feature of Rorty’s pragmatism is that not only does he avoid detailed analysis 
of the original pragmatists (as in my description of his “second peculiarity”) but in addition, 
Rorty has written in more detail and shows more interest in continental philosophers particularly 
Heidegger and Derrida.  Lastly, by focusing on analyticity and language, Rorty’s pragmatism 
begins with a different critique of philosophy than the original pragmatists who focused on 
experience.  By following through with the “linguistic turn” in philosophy Rorty is often 
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described as a neo-pragmatist to differentiate the pragmatists interested in language philosophy 
from the original pragmatists like Dewey who focused on the nature of experience.  The aim of 
here is to cast doubt on the narrative that Rorty is best summarized by his affiliation with 
pragmatism.   
It will be clear by the end of the second chapter that the criticisms of Rorty’s pragmatism 
are well founded.  However, the consequence of this chapter should be to shift the kind of 
questions being asked about Rorty’s pragmatism from, “Why does Rorty appropriate John 
Dewey and the pragmatists in this manner?” to “Why does Rorty align himself with pragmatism 
at all?”  The answer to this question will become clear once the influence of Harold Bloom is 
viewed as central to Rorty’s philosophical development and political affiliations. 
In my third chapter, titled, “Rorty and Analytic Philosophy,” I argue that there is another 
important preface to explaining the central importance of Bloom on Rorty.  Rorty was not trained 
as an analytic philosopher analyzing language, but his writings on analytic philosophy are both 
more extensive than his writings on pragmatism (assuming the analysis of language and 
philosophical pragmatism can be seen separately for the moment), and they are an important 
filter in seeing how Rorty understands pragmatism.  In my third chapter, I primarily follow the 
published exchanges between Donald Davidson and Rorty.  Davidson is Rorty’s favorite analytic 
philosopher and his contemporary.   
The exchanges bring out a few points that are central to an understanding of Rorty’s 
philosophy and political affiliations.  First, the exchanges clarify the nature and detail of Rorty’s 
pragmatism.  More central to this chapter, the exchanges between these two philosophers clarify 
the nature and status of Rorty’s critique of truth.  Since pragmatists see themselves as critics of 
philosophical realism and respresentationalism, it is important to discuss the status of truth.  
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Rorty’s pragmatism has not been consistently expressed by his writings.  Instead, by tracking the 
exchanges between Davidson and Rorty, I describe the ways Rorty’s pragmatism has changed 
over the years by his reading of philosophers in the analytic tradition.  I will be discussing and 
explaining the details of Rorty’s critique of realism and respresentationalism.  The consequences 
of this chapter are three fold.  First, the centrality of language, which separates the neo-
pragmatists from the original pragmatists, is clarified by this discussion of Rorty’s critique of 
truth.  Second, and a consequence of the first, is that Rorty’s interest in metaphors (influenced 
here by both Davidson and Bloom) both defines his pragmatism and shrinks it.  Third, by 
tracking the exchanges between Davidson and Rorty, one question should emerge not previously 
asked in the literature on Rorty, “Why does Rorty express explicit requests for Davidson to 
affiliate himself with pragmatism?”   
So far I have created two questions that emerge from reading Rorty.  First, “Why does 
Rorty align himself with pragmatism at all?”  Second, “Why does Rorty express explicit requests 
for Davidson to affiliate himself with pragmatism?”  The only way to answer these questions is 
to focus on the way Harold Bloom has influenced Rorty.  I answer these questions in my fourth 
chapter, titled, “The Priority of Harold Bloom.”  In all of Rorty’s writings, Bloom is discussed 
most extensively in two pieces:  first, in an essay about literary criticism where Rorty describes 
many different kinds of literary criticisms and in concluding the essay he describes Bloom as 
emerging in the best light, and second, in Rorty’s book, Contingency, irony, and solidarity. 
Unlike the other authors Rorty discusses in his writings, Bloom is never criticized.  Rorty is 
critical of others, including fellow and former pragmatists, but not Bloom.  Like his treatment of 
Davidson, Rorty calls Bloom a pragmatist, though neither Bloom nor Davidson refer to 
themselves that way.  Rorty draws heavily on Bloom’s discussion of the “strong poet.”  This poet 
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desires to be creative but recognizes that creativity does not occur in a vacuum, instead, strong 
poets all struggle with strong precursors.  The relative genius and creativity of the strong 
precursor creates a condition in the strong poet known as belatedness: the feeling that he has 
arrived too late to be creative.  This belatedness constrains and directs the possibilities of 
creativity because the way strong poets create is by misreading their precursor.  Misreading is 
presented as an inevitable precondition for creativity. 
Rorty does a few important things with Bloom’s theories.  First, Rorty presents Bloom’s 
strong poet as the “archetypal,” “cultural hero,” in a “liberal polity.”  In other words, the strong 
poet requires liberalism: a distinction between the public realm of solidarity and unity and the 
private realm of self-creation, in order to flourish.  The purpose of politics, then, is to create a 
space of privacy for self-creation.29  Rorty adds that this space where self-creation flourishes will 
inevitably cause suffering and reacting, adjusting, and reducing this suffering is the aim of the 
public realm of solidarity.  In addition, Rorty says the strong poet uses words in a new way (here 
is where the importance of Davidson’s discussion on metaphors comes in) and this new way is 
presented as an experiment (here is where the importance of the pragmatists becomes relevant).  
The consequence is that Rorty’s pragmatism is only interested in the conditions of 
experimentation with new vocabularies.  Explaining that, helps set in context the five ways that 
Rorty’s pragmatism is peculiar.   
The second important thing that results from Rorty’s use of Bloom’s concepts is related 
to the Bloomian theory that strong poets need strong precursors in order to appraise their relative 
                                                           
29 For a critique, predating Rorty, that politics should not be a means to an end of creating conditions for a private 
realm of self-creation see Arendt’s argument that politics is the meaning of its own end.  In other words, the 
meaning of politics is the action in speech and deeds of sustaining the space of freedom for the sake of the 
continuation of politics itself; see Arendt, Hannah.  “Introduction into Politics,” in The Promise of Politics, ed. 
Jerome Kohn. (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 93-200. 
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creativity.  In other words, Rorty has a “felt need”30 to associate himself with pragmatism.  The 
reason why Davidson writes that he is dumbfounded by Rorty’s insistence on calling both 
Davidson and himself a pragmatist is because Davidson does not have Bloom on his radar.  That 
is why Davidson is confused at the felt need Rorty has with associating the two of them with 
pragmatism.  The third important thing that results from Rorty’s use of Bloom’s concepts is that 
Rorty’s association with pragmatism has communitarian implications (I discuss this in the fifth 
chapter).  The fourth important thing that results from Rorty’s use of Bloom’s concepts is that 
Rorty is engaged in misreading.  Misreading, for example, requires Rorty to avoid a detailed 
discussion of the original pragmatists.  Ironically, Rorty does to Bloom what Bloom says poets 
do to each other: Rorty misreads Bloom’s discussion of misreading.   
In my fifth chapter, titled, “Rorty’s Wedge between Liberalism and Communitarianism,” 
I describe Rorty’s peculiar affiliation with both liberalism and communitarianism.  To do this, I 
draw on Rorty’s essay on John Rawls and Michael Sandel’s writing on Rawls.  Sandel, a 
communitarian, is critical of Rawls in a way Rorty is not.  His criticism can just as well be 
leveled against Rorty.  Rorty, in an important sense, misreads Rawls for his own purposes.  In 
order to explain this misreading, I use Sandel’s term, “the unencumbered self” to describe what 
the Rorty of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity has in common with the Rawls of A Theory of 
Justice.  Sandel describes Rawls’ self in the original position behind the veil of ignorance as an 
unencumbered self in the Kantian tradition.  I want to argue that Rorty’s version of Bloom’s 
strong poet is an unencumbered self in the pragmatist tradition.  This strong poet both distances 
himself from the original pragmatists while claiming the newness is an inheritance and part of a 
tradition.  Rorty misreads Rawls in a way that Rawls later explicitly rejects.  Rorty’s desire to 
reread A Theory of Justice as if it were meant to be part of the later works of Political Liberalism 
                                                           
30 “Felt need” is my phrase. 
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and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement is the same desire as the one Rorty has to incorporate 
Davidson into the pragmatist tradition.  This desire is explained by Bloom’s psychology of the 
strong poet:  the strong poet needs strong precursors to use and misuse in order to have influence.  
In addition, the “political liberalism” which Rawls later coins to describe his shift away from his 
earlier book, A Theory of Justice, leaves public discourse morally impoverished, according to 
Sandel.  Some of the very things that Sandel diagnoses as a problem for Rawls’ political 
liberalism are the same things that Rorty’s liberalism suffers. In the final chapter, I conclude that 
Rorty’s writings are profound yet inconsistent.  Coherence, though, on Rorty’s reading, is 








Chapter 2:  Rorty’s Peculiar Pragmatism 
 
 As the historian John Pettegrew notes, Rorty is in large part responsible for the revival of 
the study of pragmatism.1  Pragmatism began to decline immediately after World War II as 
American philosophy departments began to shift their interests towards positivism and the 
philosophy of science indicative of a legacy from Britain.  The philosopher, Richard J. Bernstein, 
has described the decline in the interest in pragmatism reaching its lowest points through the 
1950s and 1960s.2  Bernstein describes Rorty at the center of the revival of pragmatism: 
It was primarily due to the provocative intervention of a single individual that the interest 
in pragmatism began to change.  Richard Rorty, a philosopher from Princeton who made 
his reputation as a bright, analytic philosopher, began to question the foundations and 
pretensions of analytic philosophy.  He shocked many of his colleagues when he declared 
that Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey were the three most important philosophers of 
the twentieth century.  Analytic philosophers might concur with his judgment about 
Wittgenstein, just as Continental philosophers might endorse Rorty’s judgment about the 
significance of Heidegger.  But virtually no one (except a few dedicated followers) would 
have even dared to claim that Dewey was one of the most important philosophers of the 
twentieth century.  Since the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979, 
Rorty has identified himself (and his controversial views) with the pragmatic tradition.3 
 
The historian, James T. Kloppenberg, describes Rorty as the “Trojan Horse of analytic 
philosophy,” because Rorty “attacked the citadel of philosophy from within.”4  Rorty, however, 
was not trained as an analytic philosopher but began studying and publishing in that vein after he 
                                                           
1 Pettegrew, John. ed.  “Introduction,” in A Pragmatist’s Progress? Richard Rorty and American Intellectual 
History. (Boston Way, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 1. 
2 Bernstein, “The Pragmatic Century,” in The Pragmatic Century: Conversations with Richard J. Bernstein. Edited 
by Davaney, Sheila Greeve, and Warren G. Frisinia.  (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 2006), 2.  
Neil Gross, however, would dispute this narrative about pragmatism.  Gross writes that the idea that pragmatism was 
in decline is a “founding myth of the recent revival of interest in American pragmatism.”  He argues that, “An 
analysis of date on philosophy dissertations shows that this was not the case and that Yale [where Rorty received his 
doctorate] was an epicenter of pragmatist activity.”  Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The Making of an American 
Philosopher, 140. 
3 Ibid., 2-3.  Bernstein continues by arguing that the story of Rorty as the central figure in the revival of pragmatism 
is complicated by a larger trend within analytic philosophy of criticizing the epistemological foundations of analytic 
philosophy.  This trend is largely the same that Rorty describes in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).  Here Rorty describes trends that link Sellars, Quine, 
Kuhn, Wittgenstein, and Davidson, with Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, and Gadamer.    
4 Kloppenberg, James T., “Pragmatism:  An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?” in A Pragmatist’s 
Progress? Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History, 26-27. 
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began teaching at Wellesley and then at Princeton.  Bernstein’s argument that Rorty has 
identified himself with pragmatism since 1979 is slightly misleading.  Rorty began to trumpet 
pragmatism as early as 1961, where in a published essay titled, “Pragmatism, Categories, and 
Language,” Rorty wrote, “Pragmatism is getting respectable again.  Some philosophers are still 
content to think of it as a sort of muddle-headed first approximation to logical positivism . . . But 
those who have taken a closer look have realized that the movement of thought involved here is 
more like a pendulum than like an arrow.”5  Rorty’s former student, Cornel West, has written 
that after 1961, and “For the next seventeen years, Rorty labored in the academic vineyard 
attempting to convince fellow philosophic analysts . . . that some form of pragmatism lay 
waiting.”6  At this early point in Rorty’s career, his initial interest in pragmatism were related to 
the way, for example, Charles Sanders Peirce may have predated Wittgenstein’s critique of 
positivism.  As West describes Rorty’s development, “After 1972, Dewey moves to the center 
stage in Rorty’s writings . . . Rorty conducts a kind of crusade to resurrect the image and impact 
of Dewey in contemporary philosophy.”7    
  One initially surprising consequence of Rorty’s foremost place in the revival of 
pragmatism is that while partly responsible for this revival, he has not been considered an 
authority on pragmatism.  Pettegrew writes, “Pragmatism is flourishing both through and in spite 
of Rorty.”8  More specifically, Bernstein writes, “There is now a virtual industry of scholarship 
showing how Rorty misunderstands, distorts, and betrays the pragmatic tradition.”9  Rorty is 
quoted everywhere as saying that John Dewey was his “principle philosophical hero.”  Rorty 
would have us believe that to understand him it would be profitable to understand Dewey.  
                                                           
5 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language.” The Philosophical Review. Vol. 70:2 (April, 1961), 197. 
6 West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 194. 
7 Ibid, 198. 
8 Pettegrew, John. “Introduction,” in A Pragmatist’s Progress? Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History, 1. 
9 Bernstein, “The Pragmatic Century,” in The Pragmatic Century, 3. 
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Indeed, that is true, but my argument is that to understand Rorty it is best to understand Harold 
Bloom first.   
 In order to argue that the influence of Harold Bloom on Rorty is more important than the 
influence of Rorty’s favorite pragmatist, I need to point out the peculiarities of Rorty’s 
pragmatism.  By casting doubt on the relative importance of pragmatism, I hope to create an 
explanatory gap that the relative importance of Bloom’s influence fills to explain what Rorty is 
doing.   I argue there are five features of Rorty’s pragmatism that make his pragmatism both 
controversial and negligible.  Of the five peculiar facets, the first is that while Rorty’s 
pragmatism prioritizes practical political solutions, his writings show an aversion to detailing 
solutions.  The second peculiarity is that while Rorty is mostly responsible for the revival in 
academic interest in pragmatism since the 1980s, his writings show an aversion to detailed 
analysis of any of the original pragmatists (e.g. Peirce, James, Holmes, Dewey, etc.).  Third, 
while Rorty associates himself primarily with Dewey, who is Rorty’s “principle philosophical 
hero,” Rorty is a sharp critic of Dewey.  In fact, Rorty is critical of all the original pragmatists.  
He explains that they all have inconsistencies.  The fourth peculiar feature of Rorty’s pragmatism 
is that not only does he avoid detailed analysis of the original pragmatists (as in my description 
of his “second peculiarity”) but in addition, Rorty has written in more detail and shows more 
interest in continental philosophers particularly – Heidegger and Derrida.  Finally, by focusing 
on analyticity and language Rorty’s pragmatism begins with a different critique of philosophy 
than the original pragmatists who focused on experience.  By following through with the 
“linguistic turn” in philosophy Rorty is often described as a neo-pragmatist in order to 
differentiate the pragmatists interested in language philosophy from the original pragmatists like 
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Dewey, who focused on the nature of experience.  The aim of this chapter is to cast doubt on the 
narrative that Rorty is best summarized by his affiliation with pragmatism. 
 The first peculiarity is that his pragmatism does not lead to anything very practical.  An 
ironic note about his writings is that as a philosophical pragmatist and a liberal who argues 
“Nothing would do more to resurrect the American left than agreement on a concrete political 
platform, a People’s Charter, a list of specific reforms,” Rorty does not write a sustained 
treatment of a list of specific reforms.10  The closest Rorty gets to a specific platform is not so 
much a list of reforms but rather a list of beliefs conducive to producing “humanistic 
intellectuals.”11  This criticism, that Rorty’s pragmatism values practice but that Rorty’s 
pragmatism is impractical, is leveled against Rorty by a fellow pragmatist, Richard Posner.  
Posner summarizes Rorty’s disposition towards practical solutions as at times vacuous and at 
other times clearly wrongheaded.   
Rorty thinks that all we need to understand our social problems is a muckraking 
journalist’s vocabulary that will equip us to talk about the rich ripping off the poor, the 
strong trampling on the weak, the excessive greed of the upper class, the selfish 
indifference of the middle class, and the control of government and the media by thugs 
and millionaires.  For some purposes this vocabulary is adequate, as Orwell, a great 
journalist, proved.  But it is an impoverished vocabulary for the description and solution 
of our social problems, which is why Orwell’s advocacy of democratic socialism falls so 
flat today . . . I see no evidence that Rorty, or his critics on the left, have studied any of 
the political or social or economic problems about which they write.12 
 
                                                           
10 Rorty, Richard.  Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 99.  In an endnote, He says only that the first reform on the list would be campaign 
finance reform; see Ibid., 149. 
11 See his brief essay, “The Humanist Intellectual: Eleven Theses,” in Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1999),127-130.  It is interesting to note that Rorty’s list for humanistic intellectuals 
presupposes the capabilities in Nussbaum’s list of “Central Human Capabilities.”  See, Nussbaum, Martha. 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 76-78. 
12 Posner, Richard. “What are Philosophers Good For?” in Overcoming Law. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), 457-58. 
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Posner says Rorty’s writings show a “deficient sense of fact, which is related to Rorty’s lack of 
interest in science, and therefore in social science, and therefore in economics.”13  Rorty calls 
vocabularies “tools,” invoking the instrumental nature of the way we describe the world.  Posner 
writes that “economics is the instrumental science par excellence” and sees an important 
consequence that Rorty misses.14  Rorty, who calls for social experimentation without nuance, is 
naive according to Posner who argues that “social experimentation should not be thought 
costless, or always cost-justified.  The deeper point is that a pragmatist ought to be interested in 
the results of previous experiments, and not just in more experimenting.”15  Not only is Rorty 
calling for more experimentation but he is calling for specialists to become generalists.  Rorty’s 
ideal utopia is filled with dilettantes who use vocabularies as tools and know enough 
vocabularies to come to the conclusion that each vocabulary refers back to itself, accepting that 
there is no way of getting between the vocabulary and the “World” in a way that corresponds in a 
philosophically interesting way.  Posner writes about the problems of Rorty’s dilettantes and 
Rorty’s own shortcomings:   
Rorty hopes that philosophers might become “all-purpose intellectuals”…but is 
insensitive to the limitations of generalist social criticism in an age of science, including 
social science.  The problem is not that Rorty has no proposals.  He has many, such as 
universal health insurance, a prohibition against political candidates’ buying time on 
television, and an end to local financing of public education.  They are not practical 
proposals, however, not only because they have no political support but also because 
Rorty does not expound them in sufficient detail to make them persuasive.  They raise 
complicated issues and invite multitudinous objections, which might or might not be 
answerable; but to describe and defend each proposal in a few sentences, which is 
Rorty’s approach, is useless.16 
    
                                                           
13 Ibid., 444. 
14 Ibid., 15. 
15 Ibid., 454. 
16 Posner, Richard. Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) 341-
42.  Richard J. Bernstein is an example of someone between Posner’s rigidity and Rorty’s aloofness.  Bernstein’s 
The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11 (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005) is a brief 
yet focused look on the way a cultural embrace of pragmatism would change the dynamics around the way we use 
terms like “evil.”  Bernstein does not propose socioeconomic solutions.   
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While Rorty’s pragmatism calls for generalization, Posner’s pragmatism calls for specialization, 
particularly in the fields of economics and social science.  Rorty’s response would be that Posner 
wrongly privileges two vocabularies.  Posner would respond that the two vocabularies he 
privileges are privileged not because they correspond to the world in the kind of representational 
way that is true, final, and complete.  Instead, he privileges them because they are the best 
vocabularies for predicting, controlling, and explaining.  Posner, as a pragmatist, does not 
believe the question as to whether, for example, predictability is indicative of truth-conditions 
has a practically important answer.  Posner’s criticisms did not distract Rorty.  Rorty said once in 
an interview, “I’ll tell you one line you could use for a title which I intend to use as a blurb for 
some book sometime.  Richard Posner has always said that philosophically I’m on the right 
track, it’s just that I had no sense of concrete economic or socioeconomic policy: ‘Rorty is still 
talking about ‘oligarchy’ and ‘the bosses.’’  I want to use that.”17 
In Achieving Our Country, Rorty argues that the “cultural left,” are “spectators” in the 
sense that they theorize about the inevitability of domination and power in the realm of politics 
and consequently remove themselves from political activism.  The American cultural left has 
been reading too much Foucault, according to Rorty.  In their reading of Foucault on the topic of 
power they attach the connotation of “repression” with power.18  Their fear of being repressive is 
part of why political activism has lost its luster.  This new political left has lost the ungrounded 
hope of Dewey.  The consequence is that leftist intellectuals no longer associate their political 
concerns with the poor and laboring class.  Rorty calls for a revival of the “reformist left,” who 
                                                           
17 Rorty, Richard. Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies.  Interviewed by Nystrom, Derek and Kent Puckett. 
(Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002), 66. 
18 See Rorty’s description of the interpretation of Foucault making him ineffectual for pragmatist politics as a 
precursor to Achieving Our Country in “Method, Social Science, and Social Hope,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, 208. 
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associated with the poor and working class during the Progressive Era.19   However, whereas 
Rorty wanted to live the life as a leftist reformist, he never wrote extensively (or even briefly yet 
substantively) on leftist reformist literature.  I will discuss Achieving Our Country again later. 
Rorty’s contemporaries, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, argue in their book 
Deliberation Day for a comprehensive and strategic reevaluation of democratic electoral 
deliberation processes.  When Ackerman and Fishkin write, “This is an essay in realistic 
utopianism,”20  they mean utopian in a sense agreeable with Rorty who also describes what he 
considers to be a realistic utopia.21  Discussions revolving around the conditions for a 
“Deliberation Day” or the conditions for the flourishing of liberal ironists are what John Rawls 
would call one of the roles of political philosophy.  Rawls calls this role the “realistically 
utopian:  that is, probing the limits of practicable possibility.”22   
Rorty, however, has nothing to say about creating appropriate conditions or procedures 
for democratic deliberation apart from the rather abstract conclusion that claims of metaphysical 
truth automatically end conversations.23  Rorty would rather give us pithy maxims like “take care 
                                                           
19 For broad and recent histories of the kind of leftist politics Rorty lionizes see Trachtenberg, Alan. The 
Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); and McGerr, 
Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920. (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2003). 
20 Ackerman, Bruce, and James S. Fishkin. Deliberation Day.  (New Haven: Yale UP, 2004), 13.  As a critic of 
Ackerman’s earlier works, Michael Walzer might demur, arguing a restated form of his essay, “A Critique of 
Philosophical Conversation,” where he notes that Ackerman designs the flow of a deliberative narrative to the extent 
that “The whole purpose of the construction or design is to produce conversational endings.”  See Walzer, Michael. 
“A Critique of Philosophical Conversation,” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory. Edited by David 
Miller. (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2007), 22.  Rorty would agree with Walzer about the need to reject 
designed or idealized conversations in so far as these designs structure the ending of conversations.  Rorty affiliated 
himself with the endlessness of conversation as far back as 1979 in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 389.  
However, the design of Deliberation Day is neither an ideal speech situation, nor a hypothetical situation.  It fits 
with “real-world standards,” and it is a designed and organized opportunity for debate rather than a “designed 
conversation” (Walzer’s term).  See Deliberation Day, 182-184. 
21 Rorty’s realistic utopia is achieved when a country is populated by his “liberal ironists” who doubts the finality of 
their  vocabulary and therefore all democratic conclusions are provisional until a new and better (better for them but 
not necessarily better for humanity) vocabulary is created.  See Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
xvi. 
22 Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4. 
23 See Rorty’s essay, “Religion as Conversation-stopper” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 168-174. 
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of freedom and truth will take care of itself,” rather than write in any sustained way on liberal 
issues like homelessness and poverty.24   
 Rorty is largely responsible for the revival in academic interest in pragmatism but since 
the 1980s, his writings show an aversion to detailed analysis of any of the original pragmatists 
(e.g. Peirce, James, Holmes, Dewey, etc.).  This is the second peculiarity of Rorty’s pragmatism.  
Indeed, there are swarms of critics of Rorty concerning his interpretation of pragmatism.  It is 
sufficient for my purposes to point out that whereas Rorty is described by many as “America’s 
leading pragmatist” he does not dedicate any extensive treatment to any of the previous 
pragmatists.  Rorty is utterly uninterested in the history of pragmatism.  His writings on 
pragmatism are different in nature than, for example, Louis Menand’s Pulitzer Prize winning 
book on pragmatism.25  The closer Rorty affiliated himself with pragmatism the less he wanted 
to be an academic specialist.  Menand writes, “He transformed himself, in short, from a 
philosopher into an intellectual.  In this his model has clearly been Dewey.”26  Rorty’s favorite 
philosopher and pragmatist was John Dewey,27 but Rorty’s writings on Dewey are puzzling to 
many readers.  Michael J. Sandel has argued that Rorty is doing “creative rewriting” of Dewey’s 
                                                           
24 For examples see the essay by Jeremy Waldon, “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,” and Thomas Pogge, 
“Migration and Poverty,” and Richard J. Arneson, “Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor,” in Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Edited by Goodin, Robert E., and Philip Pettit.  (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007). See also Ezorsky, Gertrude. Freedom in the Workplace? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2007). 
25 Rorty is uninterested in the way William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Oliver Wedell Holmes influenced 
each other as the idea of pragmatism came into being through their gatherings, aptly called the “metaphysical club;” 
see, Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club. (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). Menand edited a 
collection of writings by past and present pragmatists where he says that Rorty is a “far more exciting writer than 
Dewey” See, Menand, Louis. ed. Pragmatism: A Reader. (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), xxxiv. 
26 Menand, Pragmatism: A Reader, xxxiii. 
27 Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser write, “These two writers [Rorty and Richard J. Bernstein] have been battling 
for Dewey’s soul ever since they were students together at the University of Chicago in the 1950s.  See Benhabib, 
Seyla and Nancy Fraser. eds. “Introduction,” in Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein. 
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2004), ix.  This recount of pragmatism by Benhabib 
and Fraser is historically misleading.  First, this retelling does not match the narrative that Rorty’s student, Cornel 
West, recounts.  Second, it is not how Bernstein himself remembers the way the revival of pragmatism germinated.  
Bernstein writes, “When we were at Yale together, I do not ever recall discussing pragmatism with Rorty.  Coming 
from Chicago, we both were ‘taught’ that pragmatism represented everything that Chicago intellectuals thought was 
vulgar and decadent.  It was only in later years that Rorty and I discovered how much we had in common.”  See 
Bernstein, Richard J. “Richard J. Bernstein’s Response to Nancy Frankenberry,” in The Pragmatic Century, 99-100. 
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liberalism which borders on “hijacking.”28  Sometimes Rorty uses Dewey like a piece of 
furniture: something you sit on but it is not the thing itself that receives your attention.  An 
example would be his essay “Kant and Dewey: The current situation of moral philosophy” where 
Rorty only quotes Dewey one time throughout the entire essay.  In all Rorty’s essays it seems his 
longest sustained look at Dewey occurs in the essays, “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” and “Dewey 
between Hegel and Darwin;” his longest sustained look at William James is in the essay, 
“Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance,” and his longest sustained look at 
Charles Sanders Peirce is in his essay “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language.”29  Those four 
essays have a significant number of quotations from four founding pragmatists.  Quotations are 
important because they at least minimally allow those original pragmatists to speak for 
themselves.  Rorty began his essay “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism” by claiming,  
‘Pragmatism’ is a vague, ambiguous, and overworked word.  Nevertheless, it names the 
chief glory of our country’s intellectual tradition.  No other American writers have 
offered so radical a suggestion for making our future different from our past, as have 
James and Dewey.  At present, however, these two writers are neglected.30  
 
Ironically, Rorty continued to neglected those writers, in at least one sense of the word neglect, 
because nowhere in that essay does he quote those pragmatists.31   
Even more intriguing, Rorty never agrees with Dewey, James, or Peirce, in all they 
wrote.  This is the third peculiar facet of Rorty’s pragmatism; this third facet is parasitic on the 
                                                           
28 Sandel, Michael J. Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 192. 
29 Rorty, Richard. “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” in Consequences of Pragmatism, 72-89.; “Dewey between Hegel and 
Darwin,” in Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers Volume 3. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
290-306.; “Religion as Conversation-stopper,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 168-174; “Pragmatism, Categories, 
and Language.” The Philosophical Review. Vol. 70:2 (April, 1961), 197-223.   
30 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 160. 
31 This claim I am making, that Rorty nowhere quotes pragmatists in this essay, can be misleading, in that, he does 
quote James once at the end of the essay, however, this one quote is treated in fashion uncharacteristic of Rorty.  
James’s quote is given no citation (Rorty, unlike Harold Bloom, is deliberately consistent in citing quotations 
through his career).  So the point still stands that Rorty neglects these authors (at least in the sense that we are given 
no way to continue his research).  I am not claiming that Rorty is plagiarizing as a form of fraud; see Rorty’s fellow 
pragmatist on this point; Posner, Richard. The Little Book of Plagiarism. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2007).  
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second.  Dewey, Rorty writes, occasionally “came down with the disease he was trying to 
cure.”32  “The recurrent flaw in Dewey’s work,” Rorty writes, is Dewey’s “habit of announcing a 
bold new positive program when all he offers, and all he needs to offer, is criticism of the 
tradition.”33  Rorty here laments how Dewey affiliated himself with programs of “scientific 
method in philosophy” and “experimentalism in metaphysics.”34  Commenting on Rorty’s 
treatment of Dewey, Cornell West writes,  
This interpretation of Dewey’s intellectual style and sensibility reveals more about Rorty 
than about Dewey.  The fact that it was published while Rorty was writing Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature seems to indicate that Rorty is invoking the authority of Dewey 
in order to encourage and empower himself in his emerging antiprofessionalism . . . 
Dewey certainly saw himself as being closer to scientists than to artists.35 
 
As for William James, Rorty laments James’s “highly unpragmatic claim that ‘in our dealings 
with objective nature we obviously are recorders, not makers of the truth.’”36  Rorty also laments 
James’s definition of religion that, in Rorty’s words, “associates religion with the conviction that 
a power that is not ourselves will do unimaginably vast good, rather than with the hope that we 
ourselves will do such good.”37   
Susan Haack has called Rorty’s pragmatism, “vulgar pragmatism.”  She means to 
challenge Rorty’s status as an heir of the “classical pragmatists.”  She spends a considerable 
amount of time disputing Rorty’s writings on James.  She gives examples noting, 
In James’ urging that philosophers pay more attention to concrete truths and curb their 
obsession with abstract Truth, one might hear something akin to Rorty’s impatience with 
                                                           
32 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 88. 
33 Ibid., 78. 
34 Ibid., 80. 
35 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, 198-99.  Indeed, it is true that Rorty appropriates a literary Dewey 
and drops the scientistic and quasi-positivistic Dewey.  In that sense, West is correct, in diagnosising the origins of 
this kind of misreading (West does not use Bloom’s word “misreading”), West misses the source and instead draws 
a parallel.  West writes that this misreading is an “exemplary Emersonian instance of being provoked (not 
instructed) for purposes of personal empowerment,” 199.  The source is Bloom’s concept of “belatedness” which is 
the phenomenology of strong poets.  Bloom writes that Emerson is an exemplar.  I argue the same about Rorty.   
36 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 155. 
37 Ibid., 160. 
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anything supposedly grounding what is presently defensible.  But this would be to forget 
that James maintains that the notion of concrete truth depends on the notion of abstract 
Truth, and could not stand alone.  Again, in James’ defense of the “will to believe,” of the 
propriety of believing without evidence if belief will enable one to live one’s life better, 
one might hear something akin to [Stephen] Stich’s identification of “justified belief” 
with “belief that conduces to what one values.”  But this would be to forget that James 
also says, not only that this doctrine applies only to propositions, e.g., of a religious 
character, in principle incapable of settlement by evidence, but also that it is distinct 
from, and independent of, pragmatism.  It would also be to forget that, when he says that 
“the true is only the good in the way of belief,” James is stressing – exaggerating – the 
instrumental value of true belief.  James used to complain about critics who “put the 
silliest possible interpretation” on his words; now, it seems, the “friends” of pragmatism 
are doing the same.38 
 
By the mid-1980s, Rorty distances himself from Peirce by calling Peirce’s method “‘end of 
inquiry’ pragmatism.”  Earlier in Rorty’s scholarship, he strongly affiliated himself with Peirce.  
He wrote as late as 1979 that, “The only sense in which we are constrained to truth is that, as 
Peirce suggested, we can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all 
objections might be false.”39 Rorty quotes Michael Williams as challenging him that “we have 
no idea what it would be for a theory to be ideally complete and comprehensive…or of what it 
would be for inquiry to have an end.”40  In summary, what sets Rorty’s pragmatism apart from 
the original pragmatists is, at least in part, Rorty’s criticisms of the original pragmatists, which 
sets his own pragmatism as either restorative, culminating in, or novel to the narrative of 
pragmatism.41     
 Moreover, Rorty spends more time writing on thinkers associated with “Continental 
Philosophy” than on American pragmatism.  The fourth peculiar feature of Rorty’s pragmatism 
                                                           
38 Haack, Susan. “Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Project,” in Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher 
Responds to His Critics. Edited by Saatkamp, Herman J. (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), 147. 
39 Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,” in Consequences of Pragmatism, 165. 
40 Quoted in Rorty, Richard. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Volume 1.  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 130. 
41 Richard J. Bernstein would add here (possibly disagreeing with part of my sentiment), that pragmatism is and has 
always been the conflict of narratives and metanarratives about itself.  See Bernstein, Richard J. “American 
Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives” in Rorty and Pragmatism, 55. While that may be true, it seems no current 
pragmatist lionizes the past pragmatists as much as Rorty while at the same time demarcating himself as their 
philosophically consistent and non-contradictory successor.   
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is that not only does he avoid detailed analysis of the original pragmatists (as in my description 
of his “second peculiarity”) but in addition, Rorty has written in more detail and shows more 
interest in continental philosophers particularly Heidegger and Derrida.  A large portion of one 
of Rorty’s volumes of collected papers is dedicated to Heidegger, the results of which are “an 
abortive abandoned attempt to write a book about him.”42  Beginning in the 1960s and ending in 
1978, Daniel Dennett created a joke dictionary of philosophers’ names published for the benefit 
and amusement of the American Philosophical Association.  He solicited entries from members 
of the association.  The last edition of the dictionary had two entries for Richard Rorty.  The 
second entry was “a rortiori, adj., true for even more fashionable continental reasons.”43  What 
makes this entry amusing is that Rorty here is considered to be interested in European 
philosophy, not because he is pursuing Truth but because it is popular.  Also, this entry is 
amusing because of what is absent, which is Rorty’s connection to pragmatism.  Richard J. 
Bernstein says that Rorty’s political views are “little more than an ideological apologia for an 
old-fashioned version of Cold War liberalism dressed up in fashionable ‘post-modern’ 
discourse.”44  Indeed, Rorty once called himself a “postmodernist bourgeois liberal.”  At the 
time, he wrote that Dewey too, was a “postmodernist before his time.”  Rorty meant to use the 
word postmodern in only the sense that Lyotard meant it when writing that postmodernism was a 
“distrust of metanarratives.”45  This self-identification with postmodernism through continental 
                                                           
42 Rorty, Richard. Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical Papers, Volume 2.  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 1. 
43 Dennett, Daniel. “The Case for Rorts,” in Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert B Brandom. (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2000), 91. 
44 Quoted in Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 4. 
45 Rorty, Richard. “Postmodernist Bourgeoisie Liberal,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 199, 201. 
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philosophers increases the likelihood that Rorty’s pragmatism would be associated with 
Nietzschean perspectivism. 46    
For over a decade, the philosopher Roger Scruton has been affiliating Rorty with 
postmodernism.47  Scruton argues,  
Rorty eschews the old respectable pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey, and Quine, who 
attempted to reconcile theory with practice, and truth with success.  For him 
‘pragmatism’ is another name for the postmodernist project, which consists in the search 
for a community…[where] ‘We’ make up our minds as to the meaning of texts, by 
creating through our words the consensus that includes us.  There is no constraint on us, 
beyond the community to which we have chosen to belong.  And because there is no 
objective truth but only our own self-engendered consensus, our position is unassailable 
from any point of view outside it…The many ‘methods’ of postmodernist curriculum 
have one thing in common, which is that they do not argue for their political posture but 
assume it, and at the same time conceal that assumption deep within a protective carapace 
of nonsense.  In this respect they are theological, rather than scientific, theories:  theories 
designed not to establish some belief but to protect that belief from rational criticism.48 
 
Scruton continues by noting that Rorty would be without an argument to the Islamic Ummah 
who “expressly recognize consensus (ijma‘), as a criterion of, and indeed substitute for, truth, 
and is engaged in a never-ceasing endeavor to include as many as possible in its comprehensive, 
first-person plural, while punishing apostasy as a crime.”49  What keeps these communities from 
the good that follows from homogenization?  The answer to that question is discussed in my 
fourth chapter and it is related to Bloom’s concept of “strong poet.”  For now, it is sufficient to 
note that while Rorty has affiliated himself with postmodernism he does not consider himself a 
relativist in its self-refuting sense.  Rorty writes,  
Relativism certainly is self-refuting, but there is a difference between saying that every 
community is as good as every other as saying that we have to work from the network we 
are, from the communities with which we presently identify.  Postmodernism is no more 
relativistic than Hilary Putnam’s suggestion that we stop trying for a “God’s-eye view” 
                                                           
46 For a defense of Nietzschean perspectivism that does not, arguably, collapse into relativism, see Nehamas, 
Alexander. Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 65-68. 
47 Scruton, Roger. Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey. (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 105. 
48 Scruton, Roger. A Political Philosophy. (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 113-14, 
53-54. 
49 Ibid., 114. 
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and realize that “We can only hope to produce a more rational conception of rationality 
or a better conception of morality if we operate from within our tradition.”50 
 
The philosopher, Simon Blackburn, writes that it “sounds cheap” when Rorty denigrates his rival 
realists as referring to a God’s-eye view or “Nature’s own” vocabulary.51  “To many of us,” 
Blackburn adds, “the solution looks worse than the problem: language is not there to represent 
how things stand – how ridiculous!  It is as if Rorty has inferred from there being no innocent 
eye that there is no eye at all.”52 Thus the fourth facet of Rorty’s peculiar pragmatism is that his 
self-identification with postmodernism via continental philosophy dramatizes the likelihood that 
Rorty’s pragmatism will be equated with Nietzschean perspectivism and, consequently, 
relativism. 
By focusing on analyticity and language Rorty’s pragmatism begins with a different 
critique of philosophy than the original pragmatists who focused on experience.  By following 
through with the “linguistic turn” in philosophy, Rorty is often described as a neo-pragmatist to 
differentiate the pragmatists interested in language philosophy from the original pragmatists like 
Dewey who focused on the nature of experience.  The aim of this chapter is to cast doubt on the 
narrative that Rorty is best summarized by his affiliation with pragmatism.  Rorty began his 
philosophical career publishing articles in the vein of analytic philosophy.  Rorty’s seminal 
overview and critique of the correspondence theory of truth was his book Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, followed by Consequences of Pragmatism, and Objectivity, Relativism, and 
                                                           
50 Rorty, Richard. “Postmodernist Bourgeoisie Liberal,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 202. 
51 Wrongly, Blackburn lists Rorty’s use of “Nature’s own vocabulary” as if Rorty had not repudiated his use of that 
phrase.  In response to Charles Taylor, Rorty writes, “Taylor deplores my use of ‘rhetorical flourishes’ such as 
‘Nature’s Own Language’ to describe the view of my realist opponents . . . I am prepared henceforth to abjure all 
references to ‘Nature’s Own Language.’  I should insist, however that this was . . . just . . . saying that 
correspondence theorists need to have criteria for the adequacy of vocabularies as well as of statements, need the 
notion of one vocabulary somehow ‘fitting’ the world better than another.”  In other words, Newton’s vocabulary 
not only has to work better than Aristotle’s but has to represent reality more adequately.  Rorty does not think that 
representing reality more adequately can be given any sense.  See “Charles Taylor on Truth,” in Truth and Progress, 
85.  Exactly why Rorty rescinds his use of “Nature’s Own Language” is not discussed by Rorty, but it is part of my 
argument in chapter four. 
52 Blackburn, Simon. Truth: A Guide. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 153. 
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Truth.  Taken together, these works focus on the nature of language, the status of vocabularies, 
and the meaning of words.  Although focusing on language, Rorty believes he is doing nothing 
the original pragmatists would not agree with.  “Davidson seems to me to be doing the same job 
within the vocabulary of analytic philosophy (roughly, the vocabulary which has replaced 
“thoughts” by “sentences” and “ideas” by “words”) which Dewey did within an earlier 
philosophical vocabulary.”53  Many philosophers have argued that Rorty’s break with the 
analytic tradition in philosophy has never been clean and complete.54  Some call Rorty a neo-
pragmatist.55  This last feature of Rorty’s pragmatism can be captured by noting that he and 
fellow pragmatist Stanley Fish emphasize language, while the founding pragmatists emphasized 
experience.56  I pursue the implications of emphasizing language in an account of pragmatism for 
the next two chapters.   
 To conclude, I want to review the five facets that make Rorty’s pragmatism peculiar.  
First, recall his pragmatism prioritizes practical political solutions but his writings show an 
aversion to detailing them.  Second, while he is partly responsible for the revival in interest in 
pragmatism since the 1980s, his writings show an aversion to detailed analysis of any of the 
classical pragmatists.  Third, Rorty associates himself most with Dewey, who is Rorty’s 
“principle philosophical hero” yet he is critical of all the founders of pragmatism including 
                                                           
53 Rorty, “Inquirty as Recontextualization,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 103. 
54 Charles Taylor, for example, argues that Rorty is still trapped in the representationalism his purports to reject. See, 
Taylor, Charles. “Rorty and Philosophy,” in Richard Rorty Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, 168-171.  
55 Cornel West calls Rorty’s “neopragmatism a form of enthnocentric posthumanism;” see, West, The American 
Evasion of Philosophy, 205.  According to Kloppenberg, “West distances his position from Rorty’s pragmatism, 
which he judges as too narrowly focused on language and insufficiently attuned to the pressing need for political 
activism.”  Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism: Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?” in A Pragmatist’s Progress? 
Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History, 40. 
56 This argument is made by James Kloppenberg in his essay, “Pragmatism: An Old Name for some New Ways of 
Thinking” in A Pragmatist’s Progress, 19-60.  Rorty’s response would be that which he gave to Giovanna Borradori 
in an interview.  Rorty said, “I don’t think [the Linguistic Turn in philosophy] adds anything much to Dewey: it is 
just adapting what Dewey said for a different audience, for people with different expectations.” See, “After 
philosophy, democracy” in Take Care of Freedom and Truth will Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty, 
35.  In that same collection of essays, see also Rorty’s interview with Michael O’Shea, when Rorty says, “I see 
Davidson as rewriting in terms of language the same things that James and Dewey did in terms of experience” 53.    
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Dewey.  Fourth, Rorty has written in more detail about continental philosophers than of the 
pragmatists and has consequently been linked more directly to perspectivism than other 
pragmatists like Posner.  Finally, by focusing on analyticity and language, Rorty’s pragmatism 
begins with a completely different critique of philosophy than the original pragmatists who 
focused on experience.  In addition, there is debatably something new in shifting the focus from 
experience to language.  Taken together these five features create a peculiar relationship between 
Rorty and pragmatism.  In order to argue that the influence of Harold Bloom on Rorty is more 
important than the influence of Rorty’s favorite pragmatist, I needed to collect and describe the 
peculiarities of Rorty’s pragmatism.  By casting doubt on the relative importance of pragmatism, 
I hope to create a gap that the relative importance of Bloom’s influence fills. 
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This chapter is in part a digression and in part central to my argument.  It is not possible 
to understand anything Rorty concludes without seeing its context as either part of his criticism 
of philosophy or part of his post-philosophic proposals. Take one example of unpacking Rorty’s 
phrase, “take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself,”1 which typifies the idea that 
understanding anything Rorty concludes requires seeing its context as either part of his criticism 
of philosophy or part of his post-philosophic proposals.   
“Truth will take care of itself,” denotes Rorty’s belief that there is nothing 
philosophically interesting to say about truth.  Truth does not have any explanatory power that a 
pragmatist or instrumentalist theory of knowledge does not also have.  Truth will take care of 
itself because it will inevitably crop up with practical features in a community of language users.  
On Rorty’s reading of the history of philosophy, the threat the philosopher poses to the 
community is not the clarity with which he offers up ideas to a community; this the philosopher 
shares with the sophists. Nor is the threat the profundity the philosopher offers to a community; 
this he shares with the poets.  Instead, the philosopher offers reality, “Nature’s Own Language,” 
knowledge not opinion.  However – and here is Rorty’s controversial conclusion – there is no 
need for philosophers in a community who adjudicate claims based on a theory of truth.  Truth 
will take care of itself because it will inevitably crop up with practical features in a community 
of language users, and where philosophers go wrong is in beginning to ask questions about 
whether those practical features have features which transcend their use in their given context.  
                                                           
1 This phrase has become the title of a collection of interviews.  Rorty, Richard. Take care of freedom and truth will 
take care of itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty. 
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Stripping Rorty’s conception of truth to the simplest summary, Noëlle McAfee writes, “Truth is 
right here, in our midst.”2   
Theories of truth convey ideas about the basic structures of reality and the knowable (e.g. 
Plato’s Forms, Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas, etc.); subsequently, discussions about truth 
take the form of its own knowability, its epistemic status (e.g. Plato’s Myth of the Cave 
ascension, Cartesian methodology, etc.).3  But if truth will take care of itself, then truth is not a 
goal of inquiry.  “We are not conversing because we have a goal,” Rorty writes, “but because 
Socratic conversation is an activity which is its own end.”4  Because truth is not a goal, the only 
role left for the philosopher is one who “edifies.”  Rorty writes in 1979, “Edifying philosophers 
want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause.”5 Here it 
seems Rorty holds out some space for the philosopher.  Later, Rorty came to the conclusion that 
poets are better at edifying than philosophers, unless there could be a hybrid.  I will carry this 
latter point into my fourth chapter.   
Rorty’s rejection of truth is not the leisurely postmodern view of perspectivism.  Indeed, 
he has said infamously, “truth is what your contemporaries let you get away with.”  Crispin 
Wright has called this formulation “a mockery” for “maximal provocation” and Simon 
Blackburn has called it “deeply shocking.”6  It is easy to see in Rorty’s phrase, the idea of getting 
away with something as, to borrow a Wittgensteinian phrase, a “family resemblance” with the 
                                                           
2 Mcafee, Noëlle.  Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 165.  
3 For a discussion of how “our future may depend on how profoundly we manage to respond to Republic;”  See, 
Blackburn, Simon. Plato’s Republic: A Biography. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 161.  For a 
discussion on how our future may depend on whether we are able to “recover the idea of rationality that was current 
before Descartes,” meaning the rationality in Montaigne’s writings; see, Toulmin, Stephen. Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 200.   
4 Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,” in Consequences of Pragmatism, 172.   
5 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 370. 
6 Sartwell, Crispin. “The Provocateur’s Philosopher” LATimes.com, June 12, 2007.  
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-sartwell12jun12,0,3550603.story?coll=la-opinion-rightrail.  Blackburn, 
Simon. “Portrait: Richard Rorty.” Prospect http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=5545/ 
(accessed June 20, 2007).   
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idea of lying, cheating, and fraud.  In other words, the idea that “truth is what your 
contemporaries let you get away with” has a family resemblance to the kind of social 
consequences of fraudulent behavior that Machiavelli mused over.  Harvey Mansfield, 
explaining a Machiavellian tactic, writes, “Fraud creates and conceals a force against the existing 
order that does not seem to oppose it openly because the fraud does not seem to challenge the 
power of the ruling prince or government.”7   This family resemblance is brought out more 
explicitly by Jerry Weinberger who dismisses the pragmatists as ethical nihilists: “that if the truth 
of a proposition depends on the practical outcome, then truth and lying go hand in hand.”8  
Weinberger’s conclusion (among other things) is that “Men in general are not and never will be 
‘pragmatists.’”9   
Rorty does open himself up for criticism when he says, “truth is what your 
contemporaries let you get away,” and yet, Rorty’s rejection of truth is a sophisticated 
understanding of how language works.  Although it is sophisticated, it is not necessarily 
consistent, and although it is not always consistent it is still a profound reading of the trends in 
twentieth century philosophy.  It would not be enough to quote Rorty’s sensationalized 
conclusions and then offer criticisms on those quotations.   
Rorty Caught between Wittgenstein and Sellars 
 
Anglo-American philosophy was not Rorty’s concern when he graduated from University 
of Chicago with an M.A. in philosophy.  Rorty says, “My encounter with analytic philosophy 
                                                           
7 Mansfield, Harvey C. Machiavelli’s Virtue. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 62. 
8 Weinberger, Jerry. Benjamin Franklin Unmasked: On the Unity of His Moral, Religious, and Political Thought. 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 289.  Weinberger’s goal here in discussing pragmatism is to 
dispute Isaacson’s argument of affiliating Benjamin Franklin directly with the later development of pragmatism.   
Isaacson, Walter. Benjamin Franklin: An American Life. (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), 480.  
Interestingly, Rorty never incorporates Franklin into the pragmatic tradition.  Of the founding fathers, Rorty is only 
interested in Thomas Jefferson.  See, Rorty, “The priority of democracy to philosophy,” in Objectivity, Relativism, 
and Truth, 175-196.  
9 Ibid., 279. 
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took place at Princeton, when I was already teaching.”10  As Rorty’s biographer, Neil Gross 
writes, “[Rorty] became committed to a version of analytic philosophy around the time he 
defended his doctoral dissertation and . . . what enabled this to occur was Rorty’s encounter with 
the work of a philosopher – Wilfrid Sellars.”11  Rorty writes, “[Sellars] quickly became my new 
philosophical hero, and for the next twenty years most of what I published was parasitic on his 
ideas.”12  After organizing his thoughts on analytic philosophy, Rorty writes in 1982, “I think 
that analytic philosophy culminates in Quine, the later Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson – 
which is to say that it transcends and cancels itself.”13 In the previous chapter, I discussed five 
facets that make Rorty’s pragmatism peculiar.  The fifth facet was that Rorty can be called a 
neopragmatist to demarcate the sense in which he focuses on language while the classical 
pragmatists focused on experience.  I have not yet discussed the implications of this demarcation, 
but the influence of it is in analytic philosophy.  Rorty writes, “The Wittgenstein-Sellars-Quine-
Davidson attack on distinctions between classes of sentences is the special contribution of 
analytic philosophy to the anti-Platonic insistence on the ubiquity of language.”14   
In what follows, I am going to discuss first Wittgenstein, and then Sellars.  Finally, I will 
focus on Davidson.  First, I will discuss how Wittgenstein’s therapy of language-games can be 
pitted against atomistic representational theorists of language like Bertrand Russell.  Second, 
Wittgenstein brings to light ideas that, on a particular construal, may be related to the kind of 
conservatism that Rorty is uncomfortable with. Next in discussing Sellars, I note that Rorty 
overcomes the inherent conservatism of Wittgenstein by explicitly dropping the idea of 
                                                           
10 Borradori, Giovanna. The American Philosopher: Conversations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, 
Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, and Kuhn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 106-107.  See also, Rorty, 
Philosophy and Social Hope, 8, 12. 
11 Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher, 160. 
12 Quoted in, Ibid. 
13 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, xviii. 
14 Ibid., xix. 
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experience and only speaking about language.  Sellar’s influence on Rorty directly affects the 
status of Rorty as a neopragmatist, who focuses on language and not experience.  
Wittgenstein gave Rorty the idea that language was instrumental rather than 
representational; therefore the core of language could not be reduced to propositions mapping the 
world.  Wittgenstein writes, “If it is asked: ‘How do sentences manage to represent?’ – the 
answer might be: ‘Don’t you know?  You certainly see it when you use them.’  For nothing is 
concealed.  How do sentences do it? – Don’t you know?  For nothing is hidden.”15  Rorty 
followed Wittgenstein’s conclusion by focusing on the problem of fictional discourse for 
philosophers like Bertrand Russell. Rorty expresses Russell’s linguistic representationalism as 
“semantics as epistemology,” which creates problems that need answers for the possibility of 
referring to nonexistent objects like Sherlock Holmes.  “But if one holds a pure ‘language-game’ 
view of language, so that questions about ‘ties with the world do not arise,” Rorty writes, 
summarizing Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell, “then to know methods of verification would be 
to know all there was to know about the semantical features of statements.  Such knowledge 
would not be a matter of semantical theory, but simply ‘know-how.’”16  Simple know-how 
amounts to knowing how to play a particular language-game.  The implication of Wittgenstein’s 
language game is, according to Ray Monk that, “In most cases, Wittgenstein does not offer an 
argument, but rather a kind of therapy.”17  Philosophy arises from confusions about the everyday 
use of language and, in addition, from the temptation to fall into a trap: “a picture held us 
captive,” Wittgenstein famously remarked.  Rorty tries something similar in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature: “[This] book, like the writings of the philosophers I most admire, is 
                                                           
15 Quoted in Stroll, Avrum.  Wittgenstein. Oneworld Thinkers series. (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2002), 
90. 
16 Rorty, “Is There a Problem about Fictional Discourse?” in Consequences of Pragmatism, 114. 
17 Monk, Ray. How to Read Wittgenstein.  (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), 74. 
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therapeutic rather than constructive.  The therapy offered is, nevertheless, parasitic upon the 
constructive efforts of the very analytic philosophers whose frame of reference I am trying to put 
in question.”18   
As I mentioned in chapter one and will detail in chapters four and five, Rorty’s post-
philosophic proposals raise the most ire.  Just as Rorty’s post-philosophic proposals are 
controversial, in a similar vein, Wittgenstein’s proposals are unclear.   Wittgenstein’s biographer, 
Monk, writes, “What is required to free us from the picture that held us captive is an enriched 
imagination, and this cannot be given to us through argument, it must be acquired through, as it 
were, therapy.”19   Whereas Monk’s Wittgenstein is one who frees us by an enriched imagination 
as opposed to the picture that held us captive, Scott Soames’ Wittgenstein is one who frees us by 
looking at particular cases of language use carefully as opposed to the picture that held us 
captive.  Soames summarizes Wittgenstein writing, 
For the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, sentences and other expressions don’t have to 
stand in any special justificatory relation to the world or to experience in order to be 
meaningful; any expression for which there are socially useful agreed-upon conditions of 
correct application  qualifies as meaningful.  What philosophers need to do, he insisted, is 
not to construct models of what they think meaning must be, but to look carefully at 
particular cases to see what the conventions governing the correct application of our 
words really are.20 
 
Between Monk and Soames, Rorty sides with Monk’s Wittgenstein – the therapeutic philosopher 
– who wants to keep “space open for the sense of wonder that the poets can sometimes cause.”21   
This digression into Wittgenstein and his connection with Rorty illuminates two things.  
First, on Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein, philosophy as therapy is in competition with poets.  
Second, once language is seen as know-how, then, representation will not conceal and nothing 
                                                           
18 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 7. 
19 Monk, How to Read Wittgenstein, 78. 
20 Soames, Scott.  Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Volume 2. The Age of Meaning. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), xxi. 
21 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 370. 
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will be hidden.  Wittgenstein has another way of phrasing it: “Philosophy puts everything before 
us, and neither explains nor deduces anything, since everything lies open to view there is nothing 
to explain.  For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.”22 As Bernard Williams 
follows it, Wittgenstein’s understanding of language has “distinctively conservative” 
implications in two ways.23  According to Williams, first, 
Even if you do not think that the Wittgensteinian picture encourages an extravagantly 
organic picture of the synchronic state of society, it certainly encourages the view that 
changes in our thought and practice must essentially be piecemeal if they are to be 
comprehensible at all, and not merely arbitrary: even if society as a whole is not one 
organic item, each conceptual tendril in the interwoven mass is itself a living thing and 
can be directed in a certain way only if that is the way in which, in that context of social 
vegetation, it finds it easy to grow.24 
 
The second way Williams sees Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language bearing on conservative 
politics is that “it involves an undiscriminating acceptance of whatever conceptual resources of 
the society actually exist.”25  These two features of Wittgensteinian conservatism seem to 
emanate from Rorty’s alignment with campaigns, which he considers piecemeal reforms with 
finite goals, against movements, which he considers typified by Marxism and have the goals of 
transforming everything.26  The reason why Rorty affiliates himself with campaigns over 
movements is not because the former is more likely to work and the latter more likely to fail; it is 
because his criticism of movements is not based on success and failure rates, but rather because 
of a philosophical critique.  Rorty writes, “Movements are suited to onto-theological Platonists, 
campaigns to many-minded men of letters.”27  Rorty’s affinity for campaigns over movements is 
                                                           
22 Quoted in Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, 28. 
23 Williams, Bernard. “Pluralism, Community and Left Wittgensteinianism,” in In the Beginning was the Deed. 
Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. Edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 34. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 35. 
26 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 111-24. 
27 Ibid., 118.  Charles Tilly may respond that Rorty idealizes the rhetoric and distinction between campaigns and 
movements.  Tilly writes, “most social movements remain far more contingent and volatile than their mystification 
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Wittengstenian in consequence rather than a practically minded disposition towards successful 
and unsuccessful political action.28   
 If Williams is right, then Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy as representation and 
support of language-games as part of our prima facie working social practices would have tended 
to move Rorty towards, for example, the conservative direction of the philosopher Roger Scruton 
whose favorite philosopher is Wittgenstein.29  Another reason why it seems Rorty would have 
tended towards conservatism is that in both Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty quotes approvingly the conservative Michael 
Oakeshott because of Oakeshott’s openness to the continuation of a conversation in politics 
against “rationalism in politics,” and also because language does not represent the world but 
provides only with an “intimation.”30  I argue that Rorty avoids the conservative consequences of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy by undervaluing our practice and instead focusing on language. 
Wilfrid Sellars dichotomized language, on the one hand, and experience, on the other 
hand more vividly than Wittgenstein, and Rorty’s acceptance of Sellars’ critique of philosophy 
lead Rorty to repudiate the language of experience used by the original pragmatists.  Rorty 
quotes Sellars approvingly who concluded, “all awareness of abstract entities – indeed, all 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
allow,” in Tilly, Charles. Stories, Identity, and Political Change. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2002), 90. 
28 In other words, Rorty is not interested in whether the distinction between campaigns and movements can be 
empirically classified as a distinction between the use of nonviolent tactics, on the one hand, and violent tactics on 
the other; see, Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005).  Nor is Rorty distinction between campaigns and movements concerned more 
broadly with “contentious” tactics that are used in a struggle for control over diverse political and social institutions; 
see, Tarrow, Sidney. Power and Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); also see, Tilly, Charles. Social Movements: 1768-2004. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2004).  Thus, it seems most plausible that Rorty distinctions remain orientated toward the relationship 
between contingent, we-intentions, campaigns, on the one hand, and transcendent, inevitable, movements, on the 
other. 
29 Scruton, A Political Philosophy, ix, 103-4. 
30 See, Oakeshott, Michael. “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” in Rationalism in Politics.  
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 488-541, this essay influenced the final chapter in Rorty, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, 357-394, Oakeshott also influenced Rorty’s chapter, “The contingency of a liberal community” in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 44-69. 
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awareness even of particulars – is a linguistic affair.”31  Sellars’ conclusion grew out of a critique 
of the nature of experience as the “Myth of the Given.”  The myth of the given is the myth that 
experiential episodes (like qualia – “qualitative experiences”) 32 are given prior to and outside of 
any linguistic construal.  Charles Guignon and David Hiley provide a summary of Sellars’ 
critique of the “Given” writing that Sellars,  
draws a distinction between (1) awareness as discriminative behavior (the raw ability of 
sentient creatures to register inputs from the environment, a capacity common to humans 
and amoebas) and (2) awareness that involves the ability to notice what sort of thing 
something is (the ability of sapient beings to perceive something as such and such).  The 
first type of awareness is a matter of causal interaction with the world . . . [Sellars] holds 
that they have no role to play in grounding knowledge.  This is because knowledge, that 
is, justified true belief, always has a propositional structure.33 
 
Rorty concludes,  
 
Sellars is not offering a theory about inner episodes.  Rather, he is noting that the 
traditional, nonbehaviorist notion of “epistemology” is the confusion of an account of 
such episodes with an account of the right to make certain assertions . . . [thus] even the 
nonconceptual, nonlinguistic knowledge of what a raw feel is like is attributed to beings 
on the basis of their potential membership in [a given] community.34 
 
Consequently, and to return to the fifth facet of Rorty’s peculiar pragmatism, Rorty’s acceptance 
of Sellars’ psychological nominalism makes Rorty a neopragmatist distinct from a pragmatist.  
Rorty admits as much, writing, 
                                                           
31 Quoted in Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, xx. 
32 “Qualia” as “qualitiative experiences” is found in Searle, John The Rediscover of the Mind. (Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1992), 42.  For summary of the debate currently in the philosophy of 
mind between eliminative materialists such as Daniel Dennett and Searle’s position which rejects Sellars’s argument 
and takes qualia seriously – concluding with Searle remaking – “All I can do is remind the readers of the facts of 
their own experiences,” see Searle, John. The Mystery of Consciousness. (New York: The New York Review of 
Books, Inc., 1997), 130.  
33 Charles Guignon and David H. Riley, “Introduction: Richard Rorty and Contemporary Philosophy,” in Richard 
Rorty. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, 10. 
34 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 188.  For the political extension of this relationship between the 
knowledge of raw feelings and their attributability  only to potential members in a community see, Rorty, Richard. 
“Justice as Larger Loyalty,” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics. Philosophical Papers, Volume 4. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42-55.  As to Rorty’s idea that Sellars offers strictly no theory, see Rorty’s 
biographer who disagrees writing, “Unlike the later Wittgenstein, whose program for philosophy was largely 
deconstructive.  Sellars’ analysis had the added benefit of pointing the way toward new, constructive solutions to 
philosophical puzzles” in Gross, Richard Rorty: The Marking of an American Philosopher, 161. 
 42 
The new pragmatists differ from the old in just two respects . . . The first is that we 
pragmatists talk about language instead of experience, or mind, or consciousness, as the 
old pragmatists did.  The second respect is that we have all read Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin 
and Feyerabend, and have thereby become suspicious of the term ‘scientific method.’  
New pragmatists wish Dewey . . . had not insisted on using this term as a catchphrase . . . 
[The] switch from experience to language – has offered philosophy professors some 
fruitful ways to pose old issues of atomism vs. holism and representationalism vs. anti-
representationalism.35   
 
While at other times Rorty sees the difference between the experience-pragmatists and the 
pragmatists after the linguistic turn as using different reasons for different audiences,36 in fact, 
Rorty believes that the linguistic turn is part of the future of the end for representationalism.  
This is something that could have occurred with original pragmatist’s openness to discussing 
experience.  Rorty writes, 
Representation in the relevant sense is a matter of part-to-part correspondence between 
mental or linguistic and non-mental or non-linguistic complexes.  That is why it took 
what Bergmann called the “linguistic turn” to get the issue into proper focus.  For 
thoughts do not have discrete parts in the right way, but statements do.  Frege’s dictum 
that words only have meaning in the contexts of sentences will be seen by future 
intellectual historians as the beginning of the end for representationalist philosophy.37 
 
Rorty is a neopragmatist and he is not doing quite the same thing as the original pragmatists, 
despite what Rorty says elsewhere about following Dewey and James.38  Rorty’s affiliation with 
psychological nominalism does not stem from Wittgenstein, but rather from Sellars.  Rorty’s 
liberal politics is, in part, due to his priority that the way language can potentially be used (e.g. 
Davidson and Bloom on metaphors) over and against the way language is determined by social 
practices (e.g. Wittgenstein on language-games).  We need to turn now to Davidson’s influence 
on Rorty. 
                                                           
35 Rorty, Richard. “The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 95. 
36 “I don’t think [the Linguistic Turn in philosophy] adds anything much to Dewey: it is just adapting what Dewey 
said for a different audience, for people with different expectations;” see, “After philosophy, democracy” in Take 
Care of Freedom and Truth will Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty, 35. 
37 Rorty, “A Pragmatist view of contemporary analytic philosophy,” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 144. 
38 See Rorty’s interview with Michael O’Shea, when Rorty says, “I see Davidson as rewriting in terms of language 
the same things that James and Dewey did in terms of experience” in “Toward a Postmetaphysical Culture,” in Take 
care of freedom and truth will take care of itself, 53.    
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Rorty and Davidson on Truth 
 
The “take care of freedom,” in “take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself,” 
refers to freedom as the absence of constraints on inquiry.  There are, on Rorty’s radar, two kinds 
of pressure that restrict freedom.  One is cultural, the other is truth.  In what follows, I will deal 
with truth; in the fourth and fifth chapter I will address the cultural.  So I will return to “Take 
care of freedom,” in the phrase, “Take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself,” in 
chapters four and five.  I am going to offer a theory (in chapter four) on why Rorty opens himself 
up to sensationalism.   
In this chapter, however, I will trace the development of Rorty’s focus on analytic 
philosophy, emphasizing Rorty’s exchanges with the philosopher Donald Davidson.  Rorty was 
not trained as an analytic philosopher but his writings on analytic philosophy are both more 
extensive than his writings on pragmatism and they are an important filter in seeing how Rorty 
understands pragmatism.  In this chapter, I primarily follow the published exchanges between 
Donald Davidson and Rorty.  Davidson is Rorty’s favorite analytic philosopher and his 
contemporary.   
The exchanges bring out a few points that are central to an understanding of Rorty’s 
philosophy and political affiliations.  First, the exchanges clarify the nature and detail of Rorty’s 
pragmatism.  More centrally to this chapter, the exchanges between these two philosophers 
clarify the nature and status of Rorty’s critique of truth.  Since pragmatists see themselves as 
critics of philosophical realism and respresentationalism, it is important to discuss the status of 
truth.  Rorty’s pragmatism has not been consistently expressed by his writings.  Instead, by 
tracking the exchanges between Davidson and Rorty, I describe the ways Rorty’s pragmatism 
has changed over the years by his reading of philosophers in the analytic tradition.  I will be 
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discussing and explaining the details of Rorty’s critique of realism and respresentationalism.  
The consequences of this chapter are three fold.  First, the centrality of language, which separates 
the neopragmatists from the original pragmatists, is clarified by this discussion of Rorty’s 
critique of Truth.  Second, and a consequence of the first, is that Rorty’s interest in metaphors 
(influenced here by both Davidson and Harold Bloom) both defines his pragmatism and shrinks 
it.  Third, by tracking the exchanges between Davidson and Rorty, one question should emerge 
not previously asked in the literature on Rorty, “Why does Rorty express explicit requests for 
Davidson to affiliate himself with pragmatism?”   
Alan Malachowski’s book Richard Rorty is a typical approach to describing the 
relationship between Rorty and Donald Davidson.  Malachowski writes, “Rorty’s approach to 
truth is resolutely anti-theoretical and Davidsonian.”39  Although his book is meant as an 
introduction to Rorty’s themes, it betrays its reader by not giving any hint of the nuance and 
tensions between Rorty and Davidson.  Instead, Malachowski uses Davidson as a caricature 
within Rorty’s thought.  Indeed, Rorty has been deeply interested in everything Davidson writes.  
Bjorn Ramberg writes, “Through the 1980s Davidson remains a focal point of Rorty’s 
attention.”40  More illuminatingly, Stanley Fish writes, 
Not long ago I heard the philosopher Richard Rorty deliver a characteristically strong and 
polemical talk.  In the question period he was challenged on a central point and replied 
with a vigorous reassertion of his position.  But then he paused and said, “I’ve heard that 
Donald Davidson is working on an argument that would go in a different direction from 
mine, and anything Davidson puts forward I’ll have to take seriously.”  What this means 
is that internal to the web of Rorty’s beliefs is a belief in the importance of anything 
Donald Davidson says.  And even though Rorty doesn’t yet know what Davidson may be 
saying on this particular subject, he is poised to hear it with an attention and a deference 
he did not grant to the audience member who questioned him.  My point is that each of us 
has a Donald Davidson.41 
                                                           
39 Malachowski, Alan. Richard Rorty. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 76.  
40 Ramberg, Bjorn. “Post-ontological Philosophy of Mind: Rorty versus Davidson,” in Rorty and His Critics, 351.   
41 Fish, Stanely. The Trouble with Principle. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 282-283.  
By the end of my argument I hope that it is persuasive to believe that “Internal to the web of Rorty’s beliefs is a 
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Rorty’s foray into philosophy of mind specifically, spanned between 1965 and 1972, with the 
publications of such essays as “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental.”42  However, two years 
later, in 1974 Donald Davidson published, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.”43  And 
although Rorty was reading writers such as Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and others, by the 
time of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979, he dropped eliminative materialism. 
Instead Rorty offered a group of philosophers who perform “therapy” which is “nevertheless, 
parasitic upon the constructive efforts of the very analytic philosophers whose frame of reference 
I am trying to put into question.44   
According to Soames, there are three central ideas, concerning the status of truth that 
Davidson argues.   
First: 
It is possible to construct finitely axiomatizable theories of truth for natural languages 
that include among them logical consequences T-sentences that give the truth conditions 
for each sentence of the language under investigation.  These T-sentences are derived 
from axioms of the truth theory that specify the referential properties of words and 
phrases that occur in the language.  Thus, a statement of the truth conditions of each 
sentence is derived from more basic statements about referential properties of the words 




A theory of truth for a language of this sort gives the truth conditions of every sentence of 
the language, and so qualifies as a theory of meaning, or interpretation, for a language.46 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
belief in the importance of anything Harold Bloom says,” but before we conclude that, I need to discuss the sense in 
which Davidson is relevant to Rorty’s writings.  
42 In fact, Daniel Dennett makes a distinction between the Rorty who first propounded eliminative materialism and 
the later Rorty who read Donald Davidson and others, becoming a pragmatist.  Dennett’s argument is that Rorty 
should return to the early insights of eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind.  See Dennett’s “The Case 
for Rorts,” in Rorty and His Critics, 91-101. 
43 Davidson, Donald. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in The Essential Davidson. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 196-208. 
44 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 7. 
45 Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, 295-96 
46 Ibid., 296. 
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T-sentences are formally presented sentences in a syntax constructed by Alfred Tarski to express 
a theory of meaning with truth conditions but the truth conditions are not, themselves, a theory of 
truth.  By adopting Tarski’s formalism, Davidson’s discussions of truth have been focused on 
truth conditions within a particular language without drawing any conclusions about the nature 
of truth itself.47 Thus, “S is true in language (L) if and only if P” is one syntactical set of finite 
rules which potentially capture an infinite set of truth-sentences (it is not the only possible set of 
finite rules).48   
Third: 
 
We empirically verify that a proposed theory of truth for the language of a given group of 
speakers is correct by comparing the conditions, or situations, in which speakers hold 
particular sentences of their language to be true with the truth conditions assigned to 
those sentences by the theory being tested.  All other things being equal, the correct 
theory of truth for the language of a given community is the theory according to which 
the conditions in which the speakers actually hold sentences to be true most closely 
matches the conditions in which the combination of the theory with our theory of the 
world predicts the sentences to be true.  Roughly put, the correct theory is the theory 
according to which speakers of the language turn out to be true tellers more frequently 
than on any other interpretation of the language.49 
 
Consequently, in Davidson’s theory of meaning as a theory of truth, the empirically verifiable 
Tarski style T-sentences leave an important dimension to the word ‘true’ as part of the conditions 
of meaningfulness within a given language.  Rorty has been uncomfortable with that for two 
decades.50  For the rest of this chapter, I will discuss Rorty’s difference with Davidson and his 
eventual concession to a kind of philosophical realism.   
                                                           
47 “The difficulty Davidson faces is that meaning is a richer notion than truth.” Joseph, Donald Davidson, 97. 
48 “For example, the schema is: S is True if and only if p, where what replaces S is the name of a sentence in the 
language in which the schema is formulated.” Tanesini, Alessandra . Philosophy of Language A-Z. (Edinburgh, UK: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 31. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Indeed, whereas Rorty often conflates Davidson and Wittgenstein together (though not always), Anthony Kenney 
sees Davidson and Wittgenstein working in two different directions: the former sliding towards empirical science 
and the latter refraining and retaining philosophy-as therapy; see Kenny, Anthony. Philosophy in the Modern World. 
A New History of Philosophy. Volume IV. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 142-43. 
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In his essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” Davidson proposes three 
interlocking ideas which Rorty uses in varying ways: (1) rejection of the scheme/content 
distinction; (2) rejection of the strong skeptic or Cartesian skeptic, and (3) charity.  Davidson 
describes the scheme/content distinction as thus, 
The images and metaphors fall into two main groups: conceptual schemes (languages) 
either organize something, or they fit it (as in ‘he warps his scientific heritage to fit 
his…sensory promptings’).  The first group contains also systematize, divide up (the 
stream of experience); further examples of the second group are predict, account for, face 
(the tribunal of experience).  As for the entities that get organized, or which the scheme 
must fit, I think again we may detect two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the 
world, nature), or it is experience (the passing show, surface irritations, sensory 
promptings, sense-data, the given).51  
 
The distinction between schemes that do the fitting and the content that is fitted has the 
consequence that even if two groups had the same behaviors and social practices they could still 
have vocabularies that were different enough that something would be lost in translating between 
them.  This is the burden of intertranslatability.  Joseph, summarizing Davidson’s position 
explains that, “there can be no language that I cannot translate into my home idiom.”52   In 
addition, Davidson argues, that to have meaningful doubts and disagreement about any one 
thing, many shared background beliefs must be shared.  This point was predicted by Wittgenstein 
who writes, “the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt.”53  Wittgenstein’s argument makes radical subjectivity 
impossible but Davidson extends this argument into a question about realism and a shared world.  
Davidson writes to this effect arguing, 
What matters is this: if all we know is what sentences a speaker holds true, and we cannot 
assume that his language is our own, then we cannot take even the first step towards 
interpretation without knowing or assuming a great deal about the speaker’s beliefs.  
                                                           
51 Davidson, The Essential Davidson, 203. 
52 Joseph, Marc. Donald Davidson.  (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 178. 
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Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the ability to interpret words, the only 
possibility at the start is to assume general agreement on beliefs.  We get a first 
approximation to a finished theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of 
truth that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds those 
sentences true.54  
 
In order for some beliefs to be doubted many must be shared, but even more, an interpreter must 
start the interpreting process by projecting agreement about most of our beliefs to his 
interlocutor.  That process is called “charity.”  Davidson writes, “charity is not an option, but a 
condition of having a workable theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we might fall into 
massive error…charity is forced on us whether we like it or not.”55  Davidson concludes his 
essay writing,  
In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all 
schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth – quite the 
contrary.  Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual 
relativity, and truth relative to a scheme.  Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes 
by the board.  Of course truth-of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as 
objective as can be.  In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the 
world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our 
sentences and opinions true or false.56 
 
When Davidson adds, “Of course truth-of sentences remains relative to language” he refers to 
Tarski style T-sentences for a theory of meaning for a theory of truth.  This is the addendum that 
Rorty has been uncomfortable with for two decades.     
 Rorty believed that by buying into Davidson’s critique of the scheme-content distinction 
and by accepting the notion of charity it gave him enough realism to avoid a slide into linguistic 
idealism.  Rorty summarizes himself as follows, 
Davidson’s claim that a truth theory for a natural language is nothing more or less than an 
empirical explanation of the causal relations which hold between features of the 
environment and the holding true of sentences, seems to me all the guarantee we need 
that we are, always and everywhere, “in touch with the world.”  If we have such a 
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guarantee, then we have all the insurance we need against “relativism” and 
“arbitrariness.”  For Davidson tells us that we can never be more arbitrary than the world 
lets us be.  So even if there is no Way the World Is, even if there is no such thing as “the 
intrinsic nature of reality,” there are still causal pressures.  These pressures will be 
described in different ways at different times and for different purposes, but they are 
pressures none the less.57 
  
Rorty thinks that Davidson’s philosophy does not reaffirm the correspondence theory of truth 
and thus breaks with philosophy as the mirror of nature.  Rorty writes, “Correspondence, for 
Davidson, is a relation which has no ontological preferences.”58  Rorty takes early essays by 
Davidson like “Truth and Meaning”59 to be making, according to Rorty, a “crucial move” which 
Davidson writes as being the denial that “individual words must have meaning at all, in any 
sense that transcends the fact that they have a systematic effect on the meanings of the sentences 
in which they occur.”60  
 Rorty was convinced in 1979 that Davidson repudiated any sense of correspondence 
theory.  However, Davidson did not.  In his essay “A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge” first published in 1983, Davidson frustrated Rorty when he wrote, “The theory I 
defend is not in competition with a correspondence theory, but depends for its defense on an 
argument that purports to show that coherence yields correspondence.”61  What makes matters 
more complicated is how Davidson is in partial agreement with Rorty’s writings from 1979 in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  For example, Davidson writes, in this same essay, 
What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a 
reason for holding a belief except another belief.  Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the 
request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk.  As Rorty has put it, ‘nothing 
counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no way 
to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence.’  
About this I am, as you see, in agreement with Rorty.  Where we differ, if we do, is on 
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whether there remains a question how, given that we cannot ‘get outside our beliefs and 
our language so as to find some test other than coherence’, we nevertheless can have 
knowledge of, and talk about, an objective public world which is not of our own making.  
I suspect this question does remain, while I suspect that Rorty doesn’t think so.62  
 
Later that year, in 1983, Davidson and Rorty discussed together, in person, the notion of 
correspondence and pragmatism at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association.  According to an appendix that Davidson added four years later, in 1987, to his 
essay “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” he and Rorty came to a compromise.  “I 
agree,” Davidson wrote,  
to stop calling my position either a coherence or a correspondence theory if he would 
give up the pragmatist theory of truth; he has done his part; he now explicitly rejects both 
James and Peirce on truth.  I am glad to hold to my side of the bargain.  If it had not 
already been published, I would now change the title of ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth 
and Knowledge’ and I would not describe the project as showing how ‘coherence yields 
correspondence’.  On internal evidence alone, as Rorty points out, my view cannot be 
called a correspondence theory.63  
 
Davidson is right to say that Rorty rejects the pragmatist theory of truth emblematic of both 
James and Peirce.  Three years after Davidson published “A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge” and a year before Davidson added in his appendix how he and Rorty came to a 
compromise, Rorty published “Pragmatism, Davidson and truth” where he explicitly repudiated 
James and Peirce.  There, Rorty says that James’ error was,  
to assume that ‘true’ needs a definition, and then to infer from the fact that it cannot be 
defined in terms of a relation between beliefs and non-beliefs to the view that it must be 
defined in terms of a relation among beliefs.  But, as Hilary Putnam has pointed out in his 
‘naturalist fallacy’ argument, ‘it might be true but not X’ is always sensible, not matter 
what one substitutes for X (the same point G. E. Moore made about ‘good’).64  
 
Because Rorty follows Davidson’s advice to reject “calling true only the expedient in our way of 
thinking” Rorty is left without a sense of pragmatist theory – until he recasts the role of 
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pragmatism.  He follows his earlier remarks against James by supposing that James can be kept 
as making a “negative point.”  Now, a pragmatist’s proper role is as a critic, and nothing else.  
This is a misreading in exactly the sense that Harold Bloom meant it.  I will elaborate this point 
in the next chapter. 
For Rorty, as long as we “forget his [James’] occasional attempts to say something 
constructive about truth . . . we can then, I think, isolate a sense for the term ‘pragmatism’ which 
will consist simply in the dissolution of the traditional problematic about truth, as opposed to a 
constructive ‘pragmatist theory of truth.’”65  The question of course is, why if there are so many 
problems with pragmatism (e.g. focused on experience, were inconsistent by slipping into 
correspondence theory, were too scientistic, were proposing a positive view of pragmatism as 
true being that which is good by way of belief) does Rorty want to affiliate himself with 
pragmatism at all?  I will answer that in my fourth chapter.   
What Davidson may not have expected when he compromised with Rorty three years 
earlier was that by convincing Rorty to give up a “pragmatist theory of truth,” Davidson set 
Rorty to writing about a form of pragmatism which consists of making a negative point, and that 
negative point would find, according to Rorty, the perfect parallel in Davidson’s own writings.  
Pragmatism was thus Davidsonianism.  Rorty argues in “Pragmatism, Davidson and truth” that 
Davidson ought fully to embrace the term pragmatism as his own.  Davidson thought the request 
was eccentric and uncalled for, considering what Davidson was trying to accomplish. 
 In that essay, Rorty argues that there is a “sense of ‘pragmatism’ in which Davidson and 
James are both pragmatists.”66  The term ‘pragmatism’ has the four following tenets according to 
Rorty:  




(1) ‘True’ has no explanatory uses, (2) we understand all there is to know about the 
relation of beliefs to the world when we understand their causal relations . . . how to 
apply terms such as ‘about’ and ‘true of’ is fallout from a ‘naturalist’ account of linguistic 
behavior, (3) there are no relations of ‘being made true’ which hold between beliefs and 
the world, and (4) there is no point to debate between realism and anti-realism, for such 
debates presuppose the empty and misleading idea of beliefs ‘being made true.’67 
 
There are, however, certain features of Davidson’s philosophical agenda that Rorty leaves 
largely untouched.  Because Rorty wants to reconstitute good philosophy as a negative point of 
rejecting dualities like analytic/synthetic, scheme/content, reality/appearance, 
knowledge/ignorance, realism/anti-realism, empiricism/idealism etc., he wants to conceive of 
Davidson as simply making room for things like the kind of creativity the “strong poet” has in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  In order to do this, Rorty has to diminish the importance of 
the empirical dimension of the Tarski style T-sentences as playing a central role in the theory of 
meaning of a theory of truth for Davidson.  Rorty’s treatment of Davidson as a pragmatist keeps 
Davidson’s full program at arm’s length.  The full program Davidson conceives is one where 
there is still an important sense of “objectivity” and “truth” to philosophical endeavors.  Thus 
Davidson concludes his essay, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” that, “In giving up 
the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch 
with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.”68  
 In an interview with Giovanna Borradori published in 1991, Davidson discusses the 
history of pragmatism and his relationship to pragmatism in length.  In relaying a brief history of 
contemporary philosophy, Davidson sees an important role for pragmatism.  Davidson says, 
“The mixture of Kant and pragmatism goes back to Dewey, who picked it up directly in Europe.  
I see a sort of historical development for post-Kantian philosophy in Germany to pragmatism, as 
they are combined in Dewey and, to a certain extent, in Peirce.  This was then picked up by 
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Lewis and then Quine.”69  When asked about Rorty and the “neo-pragmatist” reading his work, 
Davidson said, “Owing something to pragmatism is not one of my obsessions.  I have the general 
feeling that I might well have been influenced by the pragmatists, and I certainly was by Quine’s 
and Lewis’ pragmatism.”70  This is a subtle backhand; Davidson is noting that owing something 
to pragmatism is one of Rorty’s obsessions.  But when asked whether he considers himself a 
pragmatist after reading Rorty, Davidson responds,  
I don’t particularly understand what Rorty means by that, because for him that’s a special 
kind of anti-metaphysical attitude.  At one time, he actually had a pragmatic theory of 
truth, and then dropped it.  I remember one of his articles, called “Pragmatism, Davidson 
and truth,” in which he explains what he means by calling me a pragmatist.  But part of 
what he has in mind is just that I seem to have dropped the attempt to get a certain 
definition of the notion of truth.  I’ve certainly dropped the idea that philosophers are in 
charge of a special sort of truth.  But I don’t think of that as being any more pragmatic 
than a lot of other positions.71  
 
Davidson is arguing, that not only is owing something to pragmatism one of Rorty’s obsessions 
but Rorty’s pragmatism (after 1983) is only a “special kind of anti-metaphysical attitude,” and an 
anti-metaphysical attitude is no more Deweyian than it is Nietzschean or Russellian.   
In 1995, Rorty published “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin 
Wright.”  Rorty wrote that the essay started out as a review of Crispin Wright’s book Truth and 
Objectivity but the review grew large.  Part of the reason it was such an over-sized review, was 
that Rorty took the time to review his previous tensions and agreements with Donald Davidson 
up to that point.  This time Rorty redescribed his 1986 article “Pragmatism, Davidson, and truth” 
in more succinct terms.  He said there he interpreted Davidson as saying “that the word ‘true’ 
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had no explanatory use, but merely a disquotational use, a commending use, and what I called a 
‘cautionary’ use.”72  Rorty continues, 
My underlying idea in that 1986 article was that the entire force of the cautionary use of 
“true” is to point out that justification is relative to an audience and that we can never 
exclude the possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to whom a 
belief that is justifiable to us would not be justifiable.  But, as Putnam’s “naturalist 
fallacy” argument shows, there can be no such thing as an “ideal audience.”73  
  
The question then between Rorty and Davidson, according to Rorty’s appraisal, is whether the 
word “true” plays any explanatory role in beliefs and meaning.  Rorty describes how in 1990, 
Davidson’s article “The Structure and Content of Truth” partly rebutted Rorty’s interpretation.  
Rorty says that Davidson would not consider himself a deflationist or a disquotationalist.  
Davidson goes on to define a “deflationist” as the view that “Tarski’s work embraces all of 
truth’s essential features.”74  Rorty responds by saying, “It is important to realize that what 
Davidson adds to Tarski, when he displays the connections between the concept of truth and 
those of meaning and belief, has nothing whatever to do with the question of whether, or how, 
we can tell when a belief is true.”75  
Rorty, here and again, sees the gist of Davidson’s argument as a repudiation of the 
correspondence theory of the “traditional view . . . that we anchor language to the world by 
giving meaning by ostension.”76  However, Rorty finally, in “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?” 
discusses a deeper and most important disagreement between himself and Davidson, but he 
relegates it to a footnote.  Rorty in his footnote again tries to characterize truth as having no 
explanatory role by rephrasing the notion of “explanatory use” along the more Davidsonian lines 
of “Avoiding the favoritism [that interferes with Davidson’s fundamental point that] truth is 
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automatically a theory of meaning and of rationality – as well as his doctrine that every 
intensional concept is intertwined with every other such concept.”77 
In the year 2000, one of Rorty’s previous students, Robert Brandom, edited a collection 
of critical essays of Rorty and Rorty’s responses titled Rorty and His Critics.  In that collection 
Davidson wrote “Truth Rehabilitated” to respond to Rorty’s deflationistic stance towards truth.  
Davidson begins by describing how Rorty mischaracterizes “any use of truth” as a metaphysical 
truth.  Davidson writes, “It is an error to think that if someone seeks to understand the concept of 
truth, that person is necessarily trying to discover important general truths about justice or the 
foundations of physics.”78  Davidson argues that truth can be objective but that does not make it 
a goal of inquiry.  He writes,  
Instead of giving up the traditional view that truth is objective, we can give up the equally 
traditional view (to which the pragmatists adhere) that truth is norm, something for which 
to strive.  I agree with the pragmatists that we can’t consistently take truth to be both 
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objective and something to be pursued.  But I think they would have done better to cleave 
to a view that counts truth as objective, but pointless as a goal.79  
 
But if truth as a norm is sent away, as in Davidson’s description of pragmatism, then 
Wittgenstein’s connection between language as true descriptions predicated on language 
practices is also sent away.  Now, instead of casting true descriptions in terms of language 
practices, Davidson casts true descriptions in terms of a systematic semantic analysis.  As Joseph 
notes, “unlike Wittgenstein (and like Frege) he [Davidson] is persuaded that a language must be 
amenable to systematic semantic analysis.”80  Thus, Davidson goes on to resubmit to Rorty the 
importance of Tarski’s truth definitions.  Davidson writes, “Tarski showed how to give explicit 
definitions of truth for languages satisfying certain conditions, but at the same time he proved 
(given some natural assumptions) that no general definition was possible.”81  Davidson uses 
Tarski to shore up the claim that truth is objective but not a goal of philosophical inquiry.  
Davidson concludes his essay writing, 
Correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture the thought that truth 
depends on how the world is, and this should be enough to discredit most epistemic and 
pragmatist theories.  Epistemic and pragmatist theories, on the other hand, have the merit 
of relating the concept of truth to human concerns, like language, belief, thought and 
intentional action, and it is these connections which make truth the key to how mind 
apprehends the world.  Rorty doesn’t much mind my saying that truth is one concept 
among a number of other related concepts which we use in describing, explaining, and 
predicting human behavior.  But why, he asks, say truth is any more important than such 
concepts as intention, belief, desire, and so on?  Importance is a hard thing to argue 
about.  All these concepts (and more) are essential to thought, and cannot be reduced to 
anything simpler or more fundamental.  Why be niggardly in awarding prizes; I’m happy 
to hand out golden apples all around.82  
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Although handing out “golden apples all around,” would have precluded the Trojan War,83 it 
does not satisfy Rorty.   In Rorty’s response, he challenges Davidson to be more 
“Wittgensteinian.”  When Davidson in his essay says that a Rortyian disquotationalist “cannot     
. . . pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special 
case where the metalanguage contains the object language,” Rorty responds by saying, 
“Wittgensteinians . . . think it pointless to ask whether the content of a concept has been 
exhausted unless we specify which uses of the word signifying the concept are to be included 
and which excluded.”84  Secondly, Rorty reminds Davidson, who is quoted as saying “truth 
depends on how the world is,” that such dictum runs the risk of reaffirming the scheme/content 
distinction and repudiating Davidson’s previous affirmation of triangulation (which is the theory 
that a theory of meaning is distributed between a common object of thought, at least two 
speakers, and one of those two speakers is the interpreter).85  Rorty sees the point of Davidson’s 
triangulation being that,  
you cannot get along with just holistic inferential relations between beliefs and statements 
(as coherence theorists tried to do) nor with atomic relations of being-caused-by (as 
realists fixated on perception still try to do).  You have to play back and forth between 
causation and inference in a way which does not permit any of the corners of a triangle to 
be independent of any of the others.86    
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Rorty, then, is left wondering why Davidson thinks truth has a crucial role to play in meaning.  
At this point however, it seems that Rorty and Davidson have responded to each other enough to 
infer that neither is much convinced by the other by what role truth should play.  Critics of Rorty, 
like Frank Farrell, who side with Davidson against Rorty are prone to ask at this point, “Why 
should we not conclude then that Rorty’s pragmatism has collapsed into some form of linguistic 
idealism?”87 
Rorty is susceptible to linguistic idealism until in the year 2000 when Bjørn Ramberg, 
who wrote “Post-Ontological Philosophy of Mind: Rorty versus Davidson,” surprised Rorty with 
his acuity when Ramberg emphasized the importance of agency to Rorty and brokered the 
tensions between normativity and objectivity, which was left underrepresented in the previous 
debates between Rorty and Davidson.  Unlike the previous eleven philosophers who challenged 
Rorty in Rorty and His Critics, Ramberg’s challenge actually earns two large concessions from 
Rorty.88     
 Rorty believes that Ramberg gives a good answer to one of the questions Rorty has had 
about Davidson for years:  
Why does it seem important to Davidson to think of a Tarski-type theory for a 
natural language as a truth-theory for that language rather than simply as a way of 
predicting regularities in the behavior of speakers of that language?  Why, given 
our agreement on the indefinability of ‘true,’ does Davidson object to my saying 
that there is nothing much to be said about truth.89  
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Rorty says that Ramberg “sets me straight.”90  For example, Rorty says that Ramberg, “tells me, 
in effect, that it was a mistake on my part to go from criticism of attempts to define truth as 
accurate representation of the intrinsic nature of reality to a denial that true statements get things 
right.  What I should have done, he makes me realize, is to grant Davidson’s point that most of 
our beliefs about anything . . . must be true of that thing – must get that thing right.”91  In 
particular, Rorty concedes, “I am going to have to stop saying, in imitation of Sellars, that ‘true’ 
and ‘refers’ do not name word-world relations.  Nor shall I any longer be able to say that all our 
relations to the world are casual relations.”92  Rorty, here, is making a concession “to my realist 
opponents,” but his concession is peculiar.  He continues, 
I shall instead have to say that there are certain word-world relations which are neither 
causal nor representational – for instance, the relation “true of” which holds between 
“Snow is white” and snow, and the relation “refers to” which holds between “snow” and 
snow.  These relations, however, do not hold between that sentence and what 
philosophers like to call “reality as it is in itself,” but only between those expressions and 
snow.  No snow, no truth about snow, because nothing to get right . . . What is true in 
pragmatism is that what you talk about depends not on what is real but on what it pays 
you to talk about.  What is true in realism is that most of what you talk about you get 
right.93 
 
If, however, pragmatism is “what it pays you to talk about” then Rorty has returned to a form of 
pragmatism which he rejected in 1983 where he refused to “say something constructive about 
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truth.”94  In addition, where Rorty wrote once, “It is important to realize that what Davidson adds 
to Tarski, when he displays the connections between the concept of truth and those of meaning 
and belief, has nothing whatever to do with the question of whether, or how, we can tell when a 
belief is true,”95 he now has to repudiate that.  After reading Ramberg, Rorty concedes that ‘true 
of’ and ‘refer to’ are now word-world relations.  Thus in total, the realism Rorty picked up was 
the pragmatism he already rejected.  This contradiction was neither recognized nor played a role 
in his later writings on Sellars where, again, Rorty returned to writing about Sellars in the exact 
same way he wrote all along.96 
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Chapter 4: The Priority of Harold Bloom 
 
I want to return to the phrase “take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself.”  
Truth will take care of itself if truth serves merely a cautionary use, a disquotential use, and a 
commending use as part of our social practices.  However, crucial for Rorty is that truth has no 
explanatory use.  This is why Rorty conceded to Davidson in 1983 to drop the pragmatist theory 
of truth and retain pragmatism as making a negative point about what we ought to avoid.  Under 
pressure by Ramberg and the saliency of Tarski style T-sentences Rorty returned to a theory of 
“true of” and “refer to” corresponding to word-world relations.  While nothing can be said about 
Truth-itself, particulars in the world can be spoken of in ways that are either true or false.  The 
ones that are true statements are not statements cast into eternity as a phrase never to be reframed 
or recast better.  Instead, the litmus test for true and false statements will be “what it pays you to 
discover.”1  In other words, Rorty adds later, “Utility for human happiness is all that 
distinguishes” the salience of more or less accurate reporting about the world.2  We cannot get 
reality right, but we can get particulars more or less right on the test of “relative efficiency at 
accomplishing various purposes.”3  This is exactly a return to the pragmatist theory of truth 
Rorty rejected in 1983.  The difference between his earlier concession and his later return is that 
his earlier concession that pragmatism makes only a negative point found its way into much of 
his later writings.  Rorty’s return to a pragmatist theory of truth was a tactical admission which 
did not manifest itself in his later writings.  Why was Rorty not forthcoming about his return?  
Other questions remain from the last chapter.  As Davidson alluded, why is Rorty obsessed with 
                                                           
1 Rorty, “Response to Bjørn Ramberg,” in Rorty and His Critics, 374. 
2 Ibid., 376. 
3 Ibid., 375, 
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owing something to pragmatism?  In order to answer that, I will have to add a psychological 
dimension (e.g. explaining drives and motivations) as I continue to address Rorty’s texts. 
This chapter will add another dimension absent from the previous chapters: a 
psychological explanation to account for some of Rorty’s conclusions.  This is not an anomaly.  
Jürgen Habermas and John Searle have both done so.  Habermas has written that, “The 
existential background to Rorty’s neopragmatism is his rebellion against the false promises of 
philosophy.”4  Even more, Habermas details Rorty’s “program” arguing that it springs “more 
from the melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician, driven on by nominalist spurs.”5  Rorty 
was in no way hostile to this psychological account.  He responds to Habermas writing, “The 
initial sections of Jürgen Habermas’ paper provide a very sympathetic and perceptive account of 
the motives which led me to hold my present philosophical views.  I understand the course of my 
own thinking much better after reading this account.”6  By exclaiming that he learns more about 
himself by listening to others describe him, Rorty participates in the personal drama theorized by 
Aristotle who describes friends as our greatest external goods, in part because, they can 
straighten and mold us.7  John Searle, however, links Rorty’s denial of realism not with a 
philosophical position but with a “basic urge to power.  Searle writes, 
I think there is a much deeper reason for the persistent appeal of all forms of antirealism, 
and this has become obvious in the twentieth century: it satisfies a basic urge to power.  It 
just seems too disgusting, somehow, that we should have to be at the mercy of the “real 
world.”  It seems too awful that our representations should have to be answerable to 
anything but us.  This is why people who hold contemporary versions of antirealism and 
reject the correspondence theory of truth typically sneer at the opposing view.  Richard 
Rorty, for example, refers sarcastically to “Reality as It is in Itself.”8 
 
                                                           
4 Habermas, Jürgen, “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,” in Rorty and His Critics, 31. 
5 Ibid., 32. 
6 Rorty, Richard. “Response to Jürgen Habermas,” in Rorty and His Critics, 56. 
7 See, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. trans. Joe Sachs. (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 1168a28-
1172a18. 
8 Searle, John. Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 17-18. 
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According to Habermas, Rorty’s existential background is a rebellious melancholy, while 
according to Searle, Rorty’s existential background is a rebellious machination.  Assuming the 
legitimacy of providing psychological dimensions to account for philosophical explanations, I 
will proceed in this chapter with my own.   
 I want to return to Rorty’s slogan, “take care of freedom and truth will take care of 
itself,” and focus in this chapter on the clause, “take care of freedom.”  In the last chapter, I 
described how the idea that truth will take care of itself is problematic.  In this chapter, I want to 
describe the implications and necessary provisions that go into taking care of freedom.  Here is a 
greater context within which the quote becomes meaningful: 
My claim that if we take care of freedom truth will take care of itself implies that if 
people can say what they believe without fear, then,…the task of justifying themselves to 
others and the task of getting things right will coincide.  My argument is that since we 
can test whether we have performed the first task, and have no further test to apply to 
determine whether we have performed the second, Truth as end-in-itself drops out.9 
 
As we have already seen, Rorty admits that there are further tests to apply to determine whether 
we have performed the proper test for the proper subject matter.  He can slip back into this 
refrain because he still rejects the idea that anything can be said on behalf of Truth as an end-in-
itself.   
 What I want to focus on, however, is the arguments surrounding the claim that “we can 
test whether we have performed the first task,” the task of taking care of freedom.  As I 
mentioned at the beginning of chapter three, taking care of freedom has two dimensions: one of 
them is related to truth, the other is related to culture.  Chapter three traced the problems 
surrounding truth.  In this chapter I will turn to the cultural dimension of freedom.   
 My central argument is that in order to understand Rorty, it is more important to 
understand how Harold Bloom has influenced him, than how John Dewey has influenced him.  
                                                           
9 Rorty, Richard. “Response to James Conant,” in Rorty and His Critics, 347. 
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Bloom did not influence Rorty’s critique of philosophy from within the analytic tradition.  That 
critique draws on the pragmatists and analytic philosophers like Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and 
Davidson.  In this way, my emphasis on how central Bloom is for Rorty does not contradict 
Rorty’s principle biographer’s account of Rorty’s intellectual development, because that account 
ends at the same time that Bloom’s influence begins.10   
 In order to see how central Bloom is for Rorty, I need to propose that three items of 
Rorty’s writings need to be read together.  First, of all the essays in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, the only one that foreshadows a transition in Rorty’s interests is his essay, 
“Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism.”  I propose to begin here.  
This essay anticipates two later works.  First, it foreshadows Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
and second, it cannot be read apart from Achieving Our Country.  These three texts are 
historically chronological and, when read together, show a development in Rorty’s thought 
which is best explained by the influence Bloom.   
 In “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” Rorty compares 
the “Yale School” of literary criticism in the twentieth century to the philosophical idealists in 
the nineteenth century.  But Rorty does even more; he compares the Yale School, which includes 
Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartmann, J. Hillis Miller, and Paul De Man, with the “post-
structuralist” thinkers of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and the historian Hayden White, 
and the social scientist Paul Rabinow.  By the essay’s end, Rorty aligns himself with Harold 
Bloom. 
 First Rorty notes a few similarities between the textualists and the idealists.  They both 
are ambivalent towards the importance of natural science and they both think that “problems, 
                                                           
10 See Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher.  
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topics, and distinctions are language-relative.”11  The textualists, according to Rorty, have, like 
him, taken the linguistic turn.  The textualists are the “spiritual descendents of the idealists,” 
who, unlike the idealists, are not making a “metaphysical thesis.”  Instead, phrases like Derrida’s 
“there is nothing outside the text” should be read “cryptically and aphoristically” to mean “truth 
as correspondence, language as picture, literature as imitation – ought to be abandoned.”12  The 
textualists cannot claim to have discovered something new about language, because discovery is 
just one more metaphysical return.  One of the great qualities of the textualists, according to 
Rorty, is that they want to shift around our central focus.  They want to shift “literature to the 
center, and to treat both science and philosophy as, at best, literary genres.”13   
The difference, on Rorty’s account, between the sciences and literature is that the former 
requires argument before a new theoretical term can be introduced while the latter prides itself 
on its openness to new theoretical terms.  “We do not want works of literature to be criticizable 
within a terminology we already know,” writes Rorty.  Rorty then introduces the term, 
“romanticism,” which denotes a historical period and a literary disposition that Rorty has 
affiliated himself with ever since.  He writes that romanticism is the thesis that “what is most 
important for human life is not what propositions we believe but what vocabulary we use.”14  
Romanticism is not a metaphysical thesis but an evaluation of the moral value of metaphysical 
theses.15  Therefore, “objectivity becomes merely conformity to rule, merely going along with 
the crowd, merely consensus.”16 
                                                           
11 Rorty, Richard. “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, 140.   
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 141. 
14 Ibid., 142.  Shortly thereafter, he shifts from “what propositions we believe” to which ones are true by adapting 
romanticism’s thesis as “not which propositions are true but rather which vocabularies are useful.” Ibid., 148.   
15 Michael Sandel would argue here that this moral evaluation of values inevitably implies a metaphysical 
construction of the person as an “unencumbered self,” which I discuss in chapter five.  
16 Ibid., 143. 
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The thesis of romanticism, according to Rorty, that exclaims it is not which propositions 
are true that matters, but which vocabularies are useful to our purposes, is the thesis that unites 
Frederick Nietzsche and William James.17  Thus, “Pragmatism is the philosophical counterpart of 
literary modernism, the kind of literature which prides itself on its autonomy and novelty rather 
than its truthfulness to experience or its discovery of pre-existing significance.”18   
This thesis also unites Harold Bloom with pragmatism.  Rorty quotes Bloom who offers a 
“strong misreading” of literary texts.  “The critic asks neither the author nor the text about their 
intentions,” Rorty writes explaining Bloom’s concept, “but simply beats the text into a shape 
which will serve his own purpose . . . He does this by imposing a vocabulary – a ‘grid,’ in 
Foucault’s terminology – on the text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in 
the text or by its author, and sees what happens.”19  According to Rorty, Bloom’s concept of 
“strong misreading” is simply the pragmatist method of usefulness dictating content.  What 
makes it a misreading, according to Rorty, is that “the critic asks neither the author nor the text 
about their intentions.”  This is of course, not what Bloom means by strong misreading.  Yet, and 
ironically, Rorty is too good at strong misreading to discuss strong misreading in terms that are 
not his own.  I will argue this point shortly.  However, returning to the text, it is clear that Rorty 
does not think that Bloom is providing a theory of strong misreading but is actually engaged as a 
strong misreader.  “[Bloom] prides himself . . . on being able to get more out of the text than its 
author or its intended audience could possibly have found there . . . He is in it for what he can get 
                                                           
17 That James thought Nietzsche insufferable, comparing him to a “shrieking” dying rat, does not give Rorty pause 
except for the caveat that Rorty adds saying they spoke in “different tones of voice.”  On Rorty’s reading James’ 
dismissal of Nietzsche is irrelevant for their broader commonalities.  See, James, William. “Conscription on the 
[Religious] Topic,” from The Varieties of Religious Experience, reprinted in The Writings of William James. A 
Comprehensive Edition. ed. John J. McDermott. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 749. 
18 Rorty, Richard. “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, 153. 
19 Ibid., 151.   
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out of it.”20  The textualists add one thing to pragmatism which the pragmatists did not already 
conceive.  This addition is in fact another way of putting Rorty’s description of strong 
misreading: “that a person’s own vocabulary of self-description is not necessarily the one which 
helps us understand him.”21 Thus the textualists add to the pragmatists an “extra metaphor.”22 
Rorty concludes two things after adopting (and adapting) Bloom’s concept of misreading 
which are both related.  First, Rorty writes, “the serious objections to textualism, I think, are not 
epistemological but moral.”23  This objection, that misreading is morally objectionable will find 
its counterpart in the way Rorty relegates misreading to the private sphere of self-creation in his 
later book, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  The distinction between the public realm of 
solidarity and the private realm of self-creation is alluded to in the essay on textualists, Rorty 
writes, “Put in the pragmatist’s own preferred cost-accounting terms, it says that the stimulus to 
the intellectuals private moral imagination provided by his strong misreading, by his search for 
sacred wisdom, is purchased at the price of his separation from his fellow-humans.”24  The 
second thing Rorty concludes is that he has “no ready way to dispose” of the moral objection that 
strong misreadings are a form of “isolation from common human concerns.”  What Rorty 
proposes is that we focus on Bloom as a strong textualist rather than someone like Foucault.  
“Bloom is a pragmatist in the manner of James,” Rorty writes, meaning, Bloom preserves our 
“sense of a common human finitude by moving back and forth between the poet and his 
poem.”25  Foucault’s strong textualism, on the other hand, is, according to Rorty, a kind of 
“inhumanism” that is “designed to eliminate the author – and indeed the very idea of ‘man’ – 
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21 Ibid., 154. 
22 Ibid., 155. 
23 Ibid., 156.   
24 Ibid., 158. 
25 Ibid. 
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altogether.”26  Rorty just dismisses Foucault in this essay, but in another essay, “Method, Social 
Science, and Social Hope,” Rorty describes the problem with Foucault who, “is attempting to 
transform political discourse by seeing ‘power’ as not intrinsically repressive – because, roughly, 
there is no naturally good self to repress.”27  Discourse, on Rorty’s reading of Foucault, is just a 
“network of power-relations.”28  The concept of power needs to be freed from the connotation of 
repression.  Other than Dewey (who Rorty mentions in “Method, Social Science, and Social 
Hope,” as an alternative to Foucault), Rorty offers Harold Bloom.  
The manner in which Rorty concludes his discussion on Bloom is one that differs from 
the way he concludes any other essay on any of the pragmatists.  At the end of Rorty’s essay on 
textualism, he concludes with a provocative foreshadowing of his late writings.  Rorty writes that 
he has every wish 
. . . to praise Bloom’s sense of our common human lot.  But I do not know how to back 
up this preference with argument, or even with a precise account of the relevant 
differences.  To do so would involve a full-scale discussion of the possibilities of 
combining private fulfillment, self-realization, with public morality, a concern for 
justice.29 
 
Anticipating a “full-scale discussion of the possibilities” is the closest thing to a philosophical 
program that Rorty has ever had.  Alexander Nehamas noticed as much writing in the year Rorty 
published Consequences of Pragmatism; he writes, “It is obvious…Rorty has generated a 
program.”30  The implications are that this program will reveal itself when Rorty takes on a full-
scale discussion; Nehamas writes, “Ultimately, then, there is a strong political element in Rorty’s 
                                                           
26 Ibid. 
27 Rorty, Richard. “Method, Social Science, and Social Hope,” in Consequences of Pragmatism, 208. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Rorty, Richard. “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism,” in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, 158. 
30 Nehamas, Alexander. “Can We Ever Quite Change the Subject?: Richard Rorty on Science, Literature, Culture, 
and the Future of Philosophy,”412. 
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pragmatism.”31  Rorty, at this point in his career, had not written anything substantive about 
politics or culture.  He was still working out the implications of his initial critic of philosophy 
and his own brand of pragmatism.  What is clear is that the seeds of Rorty’s post-philosophical 
proposals were set in Harold Bloom’s garden.   
 Summarizing the previous discussion reveals two points.  First, Rorty thinks that 
misreading carries with it a “moral objection” and the only way to resolve the problems it 
produces is to initiate a full-scale discussion that combines self-realization, which is a form of 
private fulfillment with a public concern such as justice.  Second, by couching his future 
discussion in this light, Rorty suggests that his reading of Bloom has made an important 
impression on him.  This becomes clear because Rorty’s later emphasis on autonomy has its 
origins in Bloom’s sweeping and romanticized description of autonomy.   
 Slightly less than a decade later, Rorty decided, in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, 
that the “full-scale discussion of the possibilities of combining” turned into a full-scale 
discussion on the possibilities of dividing ourselves and our corresponding behavior between two 
realms.  The first realm is the private space of self-creation and the second realm is the public 
space of solidarity.  These two do not need to be brought together.32   
 The private realm of self-creation is where our eccentricities are allowed to flourish.  The 
most eccentric are not those who behave outrageously but who find some intellectually 
stimulating way to break out of their given mold and create.  The paradigm is the poet and an 
example would be Emerson, who wrote, “The poet does not wait for the hero or the sage, but, as 
                                                           
31 Ibid. 
32 Commenting on his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty said, “I was…urging that there was nothing 
wrong with letting people divide their lives along the private/public line.  We don’t have a moral responsibility to 
bring the two together.  It was a negative point, not a positive recommendation about how everybody should 
behave.” Rorty, Richard. Against Bosses, Against, Oligarchies, 62-3.  
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they act and think primarily, so he writes primarily what will and must be spoken.”33  The poet’s 
readiness makes him predisposed to use “freer speech.”34  In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
the freer speech of the poets have immortalizing implications:  “A sense of human history as the 
history of successive metaphors would let us see the poet, in the generic sense of the maker of 
new words, the shaper of new languages, as the vanguard of the species.”35  In other words, the 
freer speech of the poets is a framing speech for the non-poet.  The freeness of the poet 
determines the speech for his successors.   
 What makes the poet free is desire to change the subject rather than argue the subject.  In 
“Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics,” Rorty argues by proposing that we should 
think of three ways of acquiring new beliefs.  The first is by perception, which is an intruding of 
new beliefs by rearranging old words; the second is by inference, which is a kind of shuffling 
and comparing beliefs that can create new ones; and the third is by metaphor.  Perception and 
inference leave our language unchanged but not metaphors.  Metaphors are a voice “from outside 
logical space, rather than an empirical filling-up of a portion of that space.”36  Rorty writes 
elsewhere, “when a metaphor is created it does not express something which previously existed, 
although, it is caused by something that previously existed.”37  The task of intellectuals, 
according to Rorty is to “help their fellow citizens live with the thought that we do not yet have 
an adequate language.”38  Therefore, “the most appropriate foundation of a liberal democracy is a 
conviction by its citizens that things will go better for everybody if every new metaphor is given 
                                                           
33 Emerson, Ralph W. “The Poet,” in The Portable Emerson. Edited by Carl Bode. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1981), 244. 
34 Ibid., 254. 
35 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 20. 
36 Rorty, Richard. “Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics,” in Essays on Heidegger and Others. 
Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 13.   
37 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 37. 
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a hearing.”39  One of the problems, at this point, is that Rorty idealizes democratic discourse by 
expecting/hoping that “every new metaphor is given a hearing.”  As Michael Walzer points out, 
there are many constraints on democratic discourse that are part of the shoddy and unorganized, 
yet pervasive background of public discourse.40  He concludes, “There is no setting in the 
political world quite like the jury room, in which we don’t want people to do anything except 
deliberate.”41  Yet, Walzer would agree that poets as metaphor-creators are not hostile to 
democracy.   The activity of philosophers is seeking foundations and universalizing.  Therefore 
they cannot be fully attached to any community, “The poet must prove himself a citizen there; 
the philosopher must prove that he is not a citizen anywhere.  The poet needs fellow citizens, 
other poets and readers of poetry, who share with him a background of history and sentiment.”42  
In a community of philosophers, everything one of them writes must be explained, but the poets 
who use metaphors ought to be heard, but what is overheard need not necessarily be explained.  
This is why constraints on deliberation are acceptable to a community of poets but unacceptable 
for a community of philosophers.  The first problem for Rorty’s connection between metaphors 
and democracy is Rorty’s conviction that democracy can function in a way that gives every new 
metaphor a hearing.  This cannot be done according to Walzer, and yet, the poet, not the 
philosopher, can find a home in a democracy.  He can make his home here because he can accept 
the possibility that his metaphor may not receive identical attention from his peers; his hearing 
may not be as long as others or be heard by as many people.  For the philosopher, this is 
                                                           
39 Ibid. 
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41 Ibid., 144. 
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insufferable, for the poet this is understandable considering that his truth can only be intimated 
but “never directly implemented.”43   
Where do the metaphors come from?  Rorty’s answer is that they come from “strong 
poets.”  Rorty uses Bloom’s concept of strong poets to relate back to his own notion that poets 
are the “vanguard of the species” because their succession of metaphors are the most compelling 
features of human history.  Harold Bloom sets out in two books, The Anxiety of Influence and A 
Map of Misreading, to describe a phenomenology of poetry; or, to describe the history of poetry 
as the history of poetic influence.  Poets like Milton and Emerson are not just creative.  
Creativity has a phenomenological, psychological, and historical dimension.   
Following Bloom closely, there appears to be themes presented in six tropes that the poet 
goes through on his way to creativity.  First the poet writes in a corrective measure, implying the 
existence of a precursor and that the precursor swerved in a way that creates an opportunity for 
the poet.  Second the poet writes as a culmination of the precursor.  Third, in the exercising of 
the previous tropes of correction and culmination, the poet is enacting a “defense mechanism” 
which Bloom coins as a “breaking device.”  This third trope is the trope of repetition and 
discontinuity.  The poet is now so obsessed with correction and completion that the precursor 
emerges again and again in the poet and therefore repetition and discontinuity abound.  In the 
fourth trope, the poet produces a “counter-sublime” that he found within the precursor that the 
precursor specifically did not see.  In the fifth trope, the poet now embraces his own revision and 
thus embraces his solitude of creativity.  However, in the sixth trope, the poet returns to the 
precursor and holds his poetry up against the precursor’s poetry in the kind of light that forces 
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future readers of the precursor to read the precursor in light of his successor.44  Poets who drive 
through these six tropes, or six “revisionary ratios,” are called “strong poets.”  Bloom both 
collapses and expands those six tropes as he grapples with the nearly ineffable qualities of 
creativity.  Collapsing the tropes, Bloom summarizes them writing, 
Poetic influence – when it involves two strong, authentic poets, - always proceeds by a 
misreading of the prior poet, as an act of creative correction that is actually and 
necessarily a misinterpretation.  The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is to say 
the main tradition of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and 
self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, willful revisionism without which 
modern poetry as such could not exist.45  
  
On my reading of Bloom, the first two tropes of correction and culmination are constitutive of 
misreading.  This misreading reaches the closest point of concretization in the counter-sublime of 
the fourth trope.  In this fourth trope the poet has opened a door to his own creativity; he has 
walked through the door.  In the fifth trope the poet recognizes the solitude on the other side of 
the door and in the sixth trope he turns back to the door – realizing the door is the key – and 
determines to keep the door always open.  By doing this he is responsible for illuminating the 
room where the precursor resides.  The strong poet wants us to see the precursor through his door 
and by his light.  In A Map of Misreading, Bloom writes, “Poems…are neither about ‘subjects’ 
nor about ‘themselves.’  They are necessarily about other poems.”46   By turning around and 
forcing the door to stay open, the poet preserves his sense of autonomy while securing that we in 
the future will see the past through his door by his light.  The strong poet is rebelling against his 
precursor; angry that he first had to confine himself to the precursor’s room.  In the room he 
suffers from a kind of anxiety called “belatedness.”  This is the worry that the strong poet has 
                                                           
44 Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University, 1997), 14-
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arrive too late to create: the room is too large and beautiful and, in turn, too distracting that the 
strong poet has trouble making a door.  By staying in the precursor’s room too long the poet feels 
as if the room is suffocating him; his death is imminent and the room is to blame.  “A poem is 
written to escape dying,” Bloom muses, “Poems are refusals of mortality.  Every poem therefore 
has two makers: the precursor, and the ephebe’s [i.e. strong poet’s] rejected mortality.”47 He 
adds, “A poet, I argue in consequence, is not so much a man speaking to men as a man rebelling 
against being spoken to by a dead man (the precursor) outrageously more alive than himself.  A 
poet dare not regard himself as being late, yet cannot accept a substitute for the first vision he 
reflectively judges to have been his precursor’s also.”48  Bloom fits within the “linguistic turn” of 
philosophical discourse which is typified by Wilfrid Sellars’ conclusion that “all awareness…is a 
linguistic affair.”49  To this effect, Bloom writes, “Influence as I conceive it, means that there are 
no texts, but only relationships between texts.”50 
 Rorty does some fascinating things with Bloom’s concepts.  First, I argue that Rorty 
deeply bought into the notion of misreading, so much so that he actually wants to misread Bloom 
on the topic of strong poets who are misreaders.  For example, Rorty describes only three 
features of the strong poet in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  He notes that the strong poets 
suffer from anxiety – the worry that they will be a copy if they do not create, Rorty relegates to a 
footnote that every strong poet deliberately misreads his precursor in order to assert himself, and 
Rorty notes that strong poets require and carry their precursors.  However, Rorty drops the 
analytic details that Bloom describes as part of the phenomenology of poetry and thereby shrinks 
the strong poet’s dynamic.  For example, Rorty praises Bloom for arguing that poets are parasitic 
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49 Quoted in Rorty, Richard. “Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy,” in Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 
1972-1980). (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xx. 
50 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 3. 
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on precursors but he leaves behind important elements of misreading.  One thing he leaves 
behind is the counter-sublime – the notion that the strong poet finds in the precursor something 
the precursor was unaware of and does not belong to the precursor.  Another thing he leaves 
behind is that part of the strong poet’s desire to make future readers read the precursor in light of 
the strong poet.  Rorty shrinks Bloom’s strong poet, writing, 
The fear in which Bloom’s poets begin is the fear that one might end one’s days in such a 
world, a world one never made, an inherited world.  The hope of such a poet is that what 
the past tried to do to her she will succeed in doing to the past: to make the past itself, 
including those very causal processes which blindly impressed all her own behaving, bear 
her impress. Success in that enterprise – the enterprise of saying “Thus I willed it” to the 
past – is success in what Bloom calls “giving birth to oneself.”51 
 
This is a confused paragraph because Rorty is caught between dictating Bloom’s ideas and 
misreading them.  He ends by misreading.  The strong poet wants the past to be seen in his light, 
not simply to break with the past.  When Rorty says, “she will succeed in doing to the past,” he is 
reporting Bloom; when Rorty says, “to make the past itself,” he is expanding on a misreading; 
when Rorty says, “bear her impress,” he is reporting Bloom; when Rorty says, “Thus I willed it,” 
he is expanding on a misreading.   So, at the same time that Rorty shrinks the strong poet, Rorty 
makes him expand.  The way Rorty expands the strong poet is by, ironically, making the word 
‘poet’ into a metaphor for any genre where vocabularies change.  In other words, a poet can 
mean Emerson or Isaac Newton.  Rorty writes, “I assume that Bloom would be willing to extend 
the reference of ‘poet’ beyond those who write verse, and to use it in the large, generic sense in 
which I am using it.”52  Bloom would not.   
Bloom does accept Rorty’s addendum that strong poets, like Nietzsche, can recognize 
their own contingency.  But Bloom could not accept that the strong poet be understood across 
disciplines into, for example, the physical sciences.  The point Rorty misses is that while he may 
                                                           
51 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 29. 
52 Ibid., 24. 
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be right that the differing methods between the physical sciences and literary tradition are not 
differences between ‘in touch with truth and reality’ on the one hand, and ‘opinions’ on the 
other, that does not mean that the dynamics of strong poets can exist across genres and still retain 
their metaphoric power.  Someone working in a laboratory may suffer a form of anxiety that he 
has not produced a discovery but he does not struggle with a precursor in the same way a poet 
does.  Einstein was not struggling with Newton in the same way that Emerson was struggling 
with Shakespeare.  Locke was not struggling with Hobbes in the same way Ptolemy was 
struggling with Aristotle.  Machiavelli was not struggling with Roman history in the same way 
Thomas Kuhn was struggling with scientific history.  When Rorty drags the metaphor around in 
that way, it loses meaning.  This is why Rorty’s strong poet in the previous paragraph is so 
confused: he cannot decide where he wants to will-something-new (make the past itself) or will-
it-new-by-recasting-the-past (do to the past what the past did to him).  The former can be applied 
to many different genres (e.g. a Kuhnian paradigm shift), but only the latter is Bloomian and the 
metaphor will not allow itself to be reapplied without changing its meaning. 
Alternatively, if Rorty was knowingly trying to change the meaning of ‘strong poet’ by 
changing its use, then, within a Bloomian reading, Rorty is purposefully misreading Bloom’s 
concept of strong poet. In other words, Rorty is using Bloom’s concepts against him.  René 
Arcilla agrees, noting that the discussion about Bloom’s influence on Rorty, 
incidentally, casts further light on how Rorty reads and appropriates for his purposes the 
work of Descartes, Davidson, Gadamer, and others.  It shows why it would be beside the 
point to accuse Rorty, without further ado, of misreading these authors.  Indeed, the 
argument extends to him the liberty to (willfully) identify Harold Bloom’s strong poet 
with the self in general, and with himself, and other wondering philosophers.53 
 
                                                           
53 René, Arcilla V. For the Love of Perfection: Richard Rorty and Liberal Education, 95.  Arcilla considers the idea 
that Rorty adopts misreadings as a reason to discuss something else, and for the rest of Arcilla’s book he imports 
Rorty’s critique of philosophy “to reenvision the scene of liberal education in a multiculturally pacifistic context” 
(132).  I consider the idea that Rorty adopts misreadings as a reason to discuss exactly that.   
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Unlike Arcilla, who does not give this thought a pause but instead turns away, I want to see the 
full implications of misreading. 
 Another way Rorty adapts Bloom’s concepts is by dropping the aesthetic connection 
between the meaning the strong poet produces and the tactics he uses.  This plays out in an 
important way.  Rorty presents metaphors as limitless and communities as infinitely revisable.  
Infinite revisions make contingency goes all the way down.  All is potentially flux, while 
(following Wittgenstein and Davidson) not everything can be in flux all at once.  Ontology 
shifts.  Bloom would not push this point.  The aesthetic, the sublime is part of his wall which 
buffers contingency’s push; Bloom writes to this effect noting,  
You cannot get beyond Hamlet54, which establishes the limits of theatricality, just as 
Hamlet himself is a frontier of consciousness yet to be passed.  I think it wise to confront 
both the play and the prince with awe and wonder, because they know more than we do.  
I have been willing to call such a stance Bardolatry, which seems to me only another 
name for authentic response to Shakespeare.55  
  
Rorty could not have read that recently published writing by Bloom, nor could he have read 
(until 1997) the second edition of Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence where Bloom adds a preface 
which magnifies the sense in which Bloomian pragmatism (if that is what Rorty would call it) 
necessarily grates against Bloomian bardolatry.  “Shakespeare invented us, and continues to 
contain us,” Bloom exclaims in the new preface.56  In Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 
                                                           
54 Nietzsche writes of Shakespeare, “He speaks out of a restless, vigorous age which is half-drunk and stupefied by 
its excess of blood and energy – out of a wickeder age than ours is:  which is why we need to first to adjust and 
justify the goals of a Shakespearean drama, that is to say, not to understand it;” see, Nietzsche, Friedrick. Daybreak 
reprinted in A Nietzsche Reader, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003, 130.  If Shakespeare’s 
“wickeder age” denotes a Nietzschean appropriation of Shakespeare as beyond good and evil, then would Rorty’s 
liberal utopia populated with liberal ironists and a few strong poets be a community beyond good and evil? 
55 Bloom, Harold. Hamlet: Poem Unlimited. (New York: Riverhead Books, 2003), 7.  Less prostrate before the 
majesty of Shakespeare, A. D. Nuttall tries to explain the same sense in which Bloom writes “you cannot get beyond 
Hamlet,” by instead writing, “Hamlet is the equivalent in literary art of a Rorschach blot – that is, it is expressly 
framed for maximum ambiguitity.”  Nuttall, A. D., Shakespeare: The Thinker. (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 201.  But Bloom and Nuttall are in great agreement about the sublime in Shakespeare.  Nuttall 
concludes that that Shakespeare “joins verisimilitude to wonder” because Shakespeare “starts so many thoughts that 
the reader is paralyzed, like Hamlet, by the excess of intellection” (383).  
56 Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, xvi. 
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Bloom expands that by writing, “Shakespeare, by inventing what has become the most accepted 
mode for representing character and personality in language, [he] thereby invented the human as 
we know it.”57 Bloom adds elsewhere,  
Wittgenstein, who disliked Shakespeare, tried to defend philosophy from the best mind 
we can know by insisting that Shakespeare was less a writer than he was a “creator of 
language.”  It would be nearer the truth to say that Falstaff, Hamlet, and Iago are creators 
of language, while Shakespeare, by their means, created us.58 
 
Rorty does not proffer a response to Bloom’s Shakespeare, who is the paradigm of strong poets.  
Rorty’s response, plausibly, would be Stanley Cavell’s Emersonian treatment of Shakespeare.  
Cavell writes, 
When the Shakespeare repertory is given preeminence, what is being granted is that 
Shakespeare is best at representing how things are because the way they impress 
Shakespeare proves to be the commonly most memorable way their impression is iterated 
in us, or say communicated among us.  His originality best discovers the originality of 
our language.59 
 
If Rorty agreed with Cavell here, he could concede to Bloom that Shakespeare invented us, while 
at the same time tearing down the wall of the sublime (which keeps contingency from going all 
the way down) that Bloom raises when he writes that “you cannot go beyond Hamlet.”  Whether 
Rorty would agree with Cavell or not does not affect the fact that Rorty and Bloom disagree on 
the sublime: Rorty’s strong poets embrace their contingency and finitude while Bloom’s strong 
poets find it, according to Bloom, “very painful to accept contingency.”60  Bloom, however, does 
concede that “Richard Rorty makes the crucial observation that only the strong poet . . . is able to 
appreciate his own contingency, and thus to appropriate it.”61   
                                                           
57 Bloom, Harold. Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human. (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998), 714. 
58 Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, xxvii. 
59 Cavell, Stanley. Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 52. 
60 Bloom, Harold. Where Shall Wisdom be Found? (New York: Riverhead Books, 2004), 236. 
61 Ibid., 233. 
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The concluding implications, here, are that Rorty’s misreading of the concept of 
misreading (e.g. that every human engine of creativity is a kind of strong poet) has two 
consequences.  First, importing Bloom’s concepts in such an expansive way threatens their 
meaningfulness with ambiguity.  This kind of ambiguity threatens the usefulness of a given 
concept (a notion both Wittgensteinians and pragmatists share).  Second, importing and 
stretching Bloom’s concepts to apply to any and all knowledge-genres in this way diminishes the 
role of any one strong poet (e.g. Shakespeare).  Consequently, the sublime is relegated to the 
eccentric.  What makes Rorty’s liberal utopia so interesting, and so unlikely, is that his strong 
poets have compartmentalized and recast their passions for sublimity into pursuits of 
eccentricity.      
 Rorty’s liberal utopia is filled with ‘liberal ironists.’  These are people who are ironic for 
this reason: they consider the meaningfulness of their lives emanating from the vocabularies they 
pick but they doubt the finality of all their expressions.62  Thus, they value new vocabularies and 
new metaphors because these add new meanings.  These new meanings open up new 
experiences.  Language both creates and filters our possible experiences.  The most important 
political experience for the liberal ironist is suffering.  According to Rorty, “Liberals are the 
people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do.”63  Cruelty has two dimensions: a 
physical dimension and a psychological dimension.  The psychological dimension is Rorty’s 
more interesting contribution.64  He writes that humiliation is the kind of cruelty that liberal 
ironists need to be politically motivated to mobilize and campaign against.   
                                                           
62 Again, Bloom’s concepts are central: “In my view, an ideally liberal polity would be one whose culture here is 
Bloom’s ‘strong poet,’ rather than the warrior, the priest, the sage, or the truth-seeker, ‘logical,’ ‘objective’ 
scientist.”  Rorty, Ibid., 53. 
63 Ibid., xv. 
64 “She [the liberal ironist] thinks that what unites her with the rest of the species is not a common language but just 
susceptibility to pain and in particular to that special sort of pain which the brutes do not share with the humans – 
humiliation.” Rorty, Ibid., 92. 
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An additional, implicit, dimension of irony is that the liberal ironist who is most likely 
motivated to mobilize and campaign politically against cruelty has as his cultural hero the strong 
poet who is in the business of humiliation.  This is circular, but it may not be a vicious circle.  
First, changes in vocabularies or additional metaphors place continuous experiences under 
redescription.  Redescription is pervasive: “Redescription is a generic trait of the intellectual, not 
a specific mark of the ironist;” albeit Rorty admits, “Redescription often humiliates.”65   
However, the strong poet who is the “cultural hero” for liberal ironists is in the business of 
humiliation.  There are tropes, as I discussed earlier, within the dynamic of strong misreading 
that included the fourth trope of a “counter-sublime” and the final trope that solidified the 
strength of the poet by impressing upon future readers that the precursor will be read in light of 
the strong poet.  These two dynamics are part of what makes humiliation essential for the strong 
poet. Thus, the literary character O’Brien in Orwell’s 1984 is “in a qualified sense . . . the last 
ironist in Europe.”66  Rorty’s description of a “qualified sense” to O’Brien’s irony is the first part 
of why the strong poet as the cultural hero of the liberal ironist (who, as a liberal ironist, is 
mobilized against the strong poet’s forms of humiliation) is not caught in a vicious circle.   
In order to resolve this vicious circle I am going to construct a distinction between the 
“invidiously strong poet” (my term) and the “strong poet.”67  O’Brien is the invidiously strong 
poet because instead of relying on the strength of poetic redescription he relies on a kind of skill 
that destroys the redescriptive powers of his precursor.  The precursor in this case is the literary 
character Winston.  O’Brien, according to Rorty, tortures Winston psychologically in such a way 
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that Winston “could never pick up those pieces again.”  In other words, Winston is brought to a 
place where he could not “weave a story around” his own ethical choices in order to keep a 
coherent self-conception.  O’Brien breaks Winston apart and, even worse, breaks his spirit in a 
way that Winston, himself, cannot feel able to redescribe.   
The distinction between the invidiously strong poet and the strong poet works nicely 
here.  O’Brien is a kind of strong poet because of his powers of redescription.  He is a paradigm 
figure of the fourth and fifth tropes of Bloom’s dynamics.  However, O’Brien is invidious 
because he denies Winston the status of the precursor by breaking him rather than redescribing 
him.  In other words, O’Brien neglects, as a strong poet, the first three tropes of Bloom’s 
conception of strong misreading.   
The second reason the distinction between invidiously strong poets and Bloom’s strong 
poet is useful distinction is that Bloom’s strong poet is battling68 with a strong precursor for the 
affections of an audience, future readers; while the invidiously strong poet is battling before no 
audience but instead wants to deceive the audience into thinking there is no one here but the 
invidiously strong poet.  The invidiously strong poet (e.g. O’Brien) hates individual difference, 
which in his organization in 1984, “Big Brother,” crashes through every social barrier and is the 
antithesis of Walzer’s conception a “world of walls.”69  This is not to say that Bloom’s strong 
poet has ethical prescriptions built within it.  Indeed, as Rorty has been noted to say earlier in this 
chapter, the strong poet (on a slimmed pragmatist reading) desires “isolation from common 
human concerns.”  This isolation makes it indifferent to human concerns, thus increasing the 
likelihood that the poet will humiliate.   
                                                           
68 Bloom writes, “The father [precursor] is met in combat, and fought to at least a stand-off, if not quite to a separate 
peace” (80). Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 80.  The metaphor of “father” is distinctly and explicitly a Freudian 
import; see Ibid., 90-101.  
69 “Liberalism,” Walzer writes, “is a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty.”  See, Walzer, Michael. 
“Liberalism and the Art of Separation,” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, 53. 
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Bloom’s strong poet, however, is more likely to cause humiliation than Rorty concedes.  
The particular kind of humiliation, however, is, ironically, a kind of respect.  In order for anxiety 
to overwhelm the poet he must feel that, by his reading a text, he is in the presence of a strong 
precursor who is beautiful with words.  The strong poet, as noted previously, is the liberal 
ironist’s cultural hero.  The Bloomian strong poet’s act of humiliation mixed with a kind of 
deepened respect and devotion to a precursor is a literary feat.70  Influenced by Derrida who 
famously quipped there is nothing outside the text, Bloom writes, “there are no texts, but only 
relationships between texts.”71  The “between” conveys the combative struggle for autonomy and 
singularity by strong poets.  The struggle, as Bloom describes it, is a “combat” that conveys the 
strong poet’s victory over the precursor involves the kind of redescription that humiliates 
because being redescribed is exactly what a strong precursor would not want.  Time rolls on, 
redescription is historically inevitable.  Yet, autonomy can be achieved if but for a moment.  
Even more, autonomy is rare; as Rorty writes, “Autonomy is not something which all human 
beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them.  It is 
something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a 
few actually do.”72 Alasdair MacIntyre calls the Bloomian strong poet a “somewhat aristocratic 
conception.”73  Rorty gives the strong poet his more explicitly aristocratic dimensions by 
describing the social practices involved in becoming a strong poet.  Indeed, by retaining Sellars’ 
axiom that all awareness is a linguistic affair, Rorty’s liberal ironist is in a special position to 
attend to suffering.  “pain is nonlinguistic,” Rorty writes harkening back to Sellars’ notion that 
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71 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 3. 
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experience is simple, discrete, and devoid of content, “So victims of cruelty, people who are 
suffering, do not have much in the way of language.  That is why there is no such things as the 
‘voice of the oppressed’ or the ‘language of the victims.’”  Thereby Rorty constitutes the social 
role of the intellectual who, having no privileged access to truth, has only a more diverse and 
expressive access to language.  “So the job of putting their [sufferers] situation into language is 
going to have to be done for them by somebody else.”74 Rorty writes that the people who are 
good at this are the “liberal novelist, poet, or journalist.”75  Rorty is not alone in glorifying the 
role of, for example, novelists.  Martha Nussbuam writes that the novel’s “genre itself, on 
account of some general features of its structure, generally constructs empathy and compassion 
in ways highly relevant to citizenship.”76  Lynn Hunt describes how human rights became “self-
evident” when novelists were expounding on the depths of interiority: “the epistolary novel was 
able to demonstrate that selfhood depended on qualities of ‘interiority.’”77 
Rorty is adding dimensions and extending the idea of the strong poet in ways Bloom 
never intended (as with the idea that Newton and Darwin are poets).  By this act Rorty is 
misreading Bloom.  Rorty, always looking for a redescription, describes the method of Bloom’s 
“literary criticism” as, 
placing books in the context of other books . . . this placing is done in the same way as 
we place a new friend or enemy in the context of old friends and enemies.  In the course 
of doing so, we revise our opinions of both the old and the new.  Simultaneously, we 
revise our own moral identity by revising our own final vocabulary.78 
 
Rorty, who knowingly wrote of “misreading” in his essay on textualists but failed to mention 
strong poets then, now, in this book, knowingly writes of “strong poets” but fails to mention 
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misreading.  Instead, here, he describes misreading as “placing.”  Rorty writes that “ironists read 
literary critics” like Harold Bloom, “and take them as moral advisors.”79  But if the literary 
critics are the moral advisors of liberal ironists, and if strong poets are the liberal ironist’s 
cultural hero, then what is the relationship between the moral advisor and the cultural hero?  In 
Rorty’s analysis these two are considered separately.  Yet, they seem inextricable, at least in the 
case of Bloom.  Bloom is both critic and poet on Rorty’s reading.   
 Considering Rorty and Bloom’s agreement on this final point – that the strong poet 
accepts his own vocabulary as contingent – what are the political implications?  Since our 
language does not correspond to items in the world in an atomistic way correspondence is 
relegated to a trivial position. The recognition of contingency translates into the recognition of 
the need for freedom of expression.  “An ideal liberal society is one which has no purpose except 
freedom…the idea of truth as what comes to be believed in the course of free and open 
encounters.”80  Peter Lawler interprets Rorty as concluding that, “there are no limits to what 
political reform might and should achieve, and there are no human limits to the reach of 
government inspired by therapeutic intellectuals.”81  But Rorty does not draw that conclusion.  It 
is in fact antithetical to Rorty’s entire enterprise.  This time, not in reference to a “liberal society” 
but to “liberal politics,” Rorty says, “With luck, politics doesn’t permeate all realms of human 
life.  It does in countries like China.  But in countries that are better off, it often doesn’t, and I 
don’t see why anybody would want it to.  I think of the aim of liberal politics as leaving as much 
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space for privacy as possible.”82  But if Rorty wants to leave as much space in the private realm 
as possible, why does Lawler write, “there is no human limits to the reach of government 
inspired by therapeutic intellectuals”?    Lawler is not engaged in a strong misreading of Rorty 
but rather in a misunderstanding about Harold Bloom which ends in a cluster of peculiar 
conclusions.83  Lawler’s discussion of the way Rorty treats Bloom’s ideas is peculiar.  Lawler 
writes, 
Rorty goes on to deconstruct a noteworthy quote from Harold Bloom, one that resonates 
from the philosophical and poetic traditions: “every poet begins (however 
‘unconsciously’) by rebelling more strongly against the fear of death than all other men 
and women do.”  Bloom appears to mean that all men fear death and rebel against it.  But 
poets, or great creators, rebel with special intensity.  Rorty gives a different view: “Such 
people [poets] are…to be thought of as rebelling against ‘death’ – that is, against the 
failure to have created – more strongly than most of us.”  They do not really rebel against 
the inevitable end of one’s life or existence. “Death,” for the great creator, really means 
“not having impressed one’s mark on the language,” not having distinguished oneself 
through creative transformation.  So the only “anxiety” felt by human beings and 
especially poets is that of not having any influence.84 
 
When Lawler describes that “Bloom appears to mean that all men fear death and rebel against 
it,” he is engaged in what I call “deliberate misunderstanding” as opposed to “strong 
misreading.”  Rorty is reading Bloom as a strong misreader – Rorty knowingly manipulates 
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84 Ibid., 44. 
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Bloom as part of Rorty’s acceptance of the dynamics of misreading (they are inevitable for 
strong poets who suffer from the anxiety of influence).  Lawler, however, is reading Bloom as a 
deliberate misunderstander – Lawler, as a realist, would reject Bloom’s concepts of strong poet 
and the notion of misreading and therefore does not perform a strong misreading on Bloom as a 
part of his own anxiety of influence.  The consequence is that Lawler is not misreading but 
simply misunderstanding.  I call this misunderstanding “deliberate,” because the quotation of 
Bloom that he lifts from Rorty’s book and isolates is only one page away from another quotation 
that fills out the connection between rebelling against death and the anxiety that grows from 
being in the shadow of a precursor-poet.  Lawler’s goal is to describe pragmatists like Rorty by 
saying “that the human goal must be to free human beings from being moved by death at all.”85  
Rorty and Bloom, together, are saying something much more complicated than that.  As Bloom 
writes, “Reductively, the anxiety of influence is the fear of death, and a poet’s vision of the 
vigilance of immortality includes a freedom from influence.”86  This freedom from influence is 
the crucial Bloomian trope which Lawler misses and which Rorty extends to justify limited state 
interference society’s private realm where – at long last – a sense of autonomy germinates.   
 The contrast between Lawler’s reading and my own highlights an important difference.  
Lawler summarizes Rorty as if Rorty is dismissive of Bloom, whereas I argue that Rorty has 
deeply internalized Bloom.  If I am right, and Lawler is wrong, then we must take Rorty 
seriously when he writes “I think of the aim of liberal politics as leaving as much space for 
privacy as possible.”87  Rorty elaborates on the discussion of private space by affiliating himself 
with Mill’s no-harm doctrine: “Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to 
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optimizing the balance between leaving people’s private lives alone and preventing suffering 
seems to me pretty much the last word.”88  But this balance is peculiar.  Wherever the balance is, 
that is where the sliver of light that is Rorty’s “liberal utopia” resides. 
 But this liberal utopia is peculiar indeed.  To repeat, the liberal ironist follows the mantra 
that “cruelty is the worst thing we do,” and the most relevant form of cruelty (in a liberal 
democracy) is that of humiliation.  At the same time, the liberal ironist’s cultural hero is the 
strong poet and this poet both humiliates and respects his precursors.  Thus the paradox: the 
liberal ironist wants to become the individuated hero who he is also politically mobilized in order 
to stop.  Instead of harmonizing our public moral obligations with our private sense of self, Rorty 
gives us a clash, an unending give and take:  
On the public side of our lives, nothing is less dubious than the worth of those freedoms.  
On the private side of our lives, there may be much which is equally hard to doubt, for 
example, our love or hatred for a particular person, the need (like the fact that we may 
belong to several communities and thus have conflicting moral obligations, as well as 
conflicts between moral obligations and private commitments) generates dilemmas.  Such 
dilemmas we shall always have with us, but they are never going to be resolved by appeal 
to some further, higher set of obligations.89 
 
While Nehamas agrees with my argument that there is a dimension of “cruelty involved” in 
Bloom’s notion of the anxiety of influence, Nehamas misses the full picture of the strong poet as 
both the paradigm and the problem of Rorty’s liberal utopia.  Nehamas writes, “Having denied 
that they are the same [the public realm of solidarity and the private realm of self-creation], he 
[Rorty] seems to conclude that they are totally irrelevant to one another.”90  Nehamas, like 
Lawler, misses the dynamics involved when Rorty appropriated Bloom’s concept of the strong 
poet.     
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 I want to conclude by propping up a division I already discussed in my introductory 
chapter.  It is convenient to divide Rorty’s writings into two periods: the period surrounding the 
time of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, where Rorty was in the business of providing a 
critique of philosophy; and the period after the writing of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  
This division is neither arbitrary nor highly contrastive.  However, there is one important change 
which highlights the influence of Harold Bloom.  Rorty writes in 1979, “Edifying philosophers 
want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause.”91  By 1989, 
Rorty had sided with the “liberal novelists,” over the edifying philosophers.  What Nietzsche and 
Heidegger were doing as edifying philosophers was inferior to what Proust and Orwell were 
doing as liberal novelists.  In my narrative of Rorty’s intellectual transition, pragmatism plays a 
real but diminished role.  Rorty believes that James and Dewey charted the course for a healthy 
future for American philosophy professors.92  In this sense James and Dewey are engaged in the 
same conversations as philosophers and therefore more likely to persuade them to stop taking 
philosophical problems seriously then novelists.  Yet, Rorty took a further turn, away from 
pragmatism, which he has trouble explaining.  With an ironic tone, Rorty tells of how he wanted 
to redefine the title of his last academic position, “I suggested I be called Transitory Professor of 
Trendy Studies, but nobody liked the idea.”93  Rorty has aligned himself with the poets, and 
mocks his former life. 
   
                                                           
91 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 370. 
92 See, Rorty, Richard. “Intellectual Historians and Pragmatist Philosophy,” in A Pragmatist’s Progress? Richard 
Rorty and American Intellectual History, 208. 
93 Rorty, Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies, 56. 
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Chapter 5: Rorty’s Wedge between Liberalism and 
Communitarianism 
 
 Most every conclusion that Rorty has reached has been called into question by one or 
another critic.  Rorty’s approval of John Rawls’ writings on justice is another example.  Rorty, in 
writing about Rawls, is only concerned with the question of whether or not a society can function 
with a moral standard for justice without a transcendent standard for justice that would apply to 
all societies for all times.  Once Rawls began writing such works as Political Liberalism, The 
Law of Peoples, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rorty became an advocate of Rawlsian 
liberalism.  But Rorty’s advocacy is peculiar indeed.   
 I have already cast doubt on the relative importance Rorty places on pragmatism in 
chapter two.  In my third chapter, I described how Rorty affiliation with pragmatism is in tension 
with his desire to complete the turn in linguistic philosophy to the Sellarsian conclusion that all 
awareness is a linguistic affair.  This tension was brought out by Davidson to whom Rorty 
conceded that he ought to drop the pragmatist theory of truth.  Later, Ramberg convinced Rorty 
to pick back up a pragmatist theory of truth which returned Rorty to an uncomfortable 
acceptance of some kind of minimalist correspondence-talk (Rorty would deny that there is 
anything like a “theory” which can emerge out of his concession to talking about correspondence 
like a realist).  Meanwhile, the most outstanding feature of that chapter was Rorty’s felt need to 
owe something to pragmatism.  Rorty’s sense of a need for allegiance to pragmatism struck 
Davidson as peculiar.  In chapter four, I described a group of Bloomian metaphors which most 
likely explain Rorty’s post-philosophic proposals.  Now in this fifth chapter, I am going to 
continue chartering this small map of how Rorty misreads and continue the discussion begun in 
the third chapters concerning his weakness and vacillations.     
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 In this chapter I will pursue three topics.  First, Rorty’s writings on Rawls show a strong 
misreading.  Second, Rawls’ writing on public reason seems to create the kind of discourse that 
Rorty’s liberal ironist would oppose.  Third, Rorty’s liberalism, which is a sharp division 
between the private realm of self creation and the public realm of obligation and solidarity, is 
broken by Rorty’s own narrative of American political history.  This tension both highlights 
Rorty’s wedge between liberalism and communitarianism and it calls his position into question.  
I conclude noting that Rorty’s support for democratic deliberation is basically Rawlsian 
liberalism emphasizing primarily the Deweyian notion that democratic culture does not need a 
rational basis.  What makes Rorty wedged between liberalism and communitarianism, however, 
is that the sense in which the strong poet needs strong precursors implicitly takes on the political 
dimensions of an allegiance.  Rorty’s communitarianism is a kind of collectivized and distributed 
notion of strong precursors.  This explains why Rorty glorifies the “Reformist Left” of 
Progressive Era and charters a narrative through American history that his felt need for 
allegiance would find compatible.  In other words, Although Rorty’s values stem from his 
allegiance to modern democratic liberalism (e.g. Deweyian), he values allegiance qua allegiance 
by virtue of Harold Bloom’s influence.       
Rorty’s Strong Misreading of Rawls 
 
 There are two dimensions to Rorty’s misreading of Rawls.  First, Rorty misreads Rawls’ 
entire writings as if they were in continuity, while Rawls himself believes he has altered his 
philosophical position substantively.  Second, Rorty misreads Rawls into an alliance with 
Michael Walzer.  Walzer, implicit in his writings, rejects this alliance and would, I argue, think 
that the alliance misses the more substantive debates.  If I am correct, then explaining the way 
Rorty reads John Rawls is part of the map of Rorty’s political misreading.   
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 Philip Pettit, among others, has argued that after J. S. Mill and until the late 1950s, 
political philosophy was dead and silent.  During that time political theory, “ceased to be an area 
of active exploration . . . there was little or nothing of significance published in political 
philosophy itself.”1  Pettit goes on to note watershed moments for the revival of political 
philosophy and focuses on the contribution of John Rawls.2 However, Andrew Vincent has 
responded that to characterize this period as “bereft of political philosophy” is “far-fetched and 
odd.”3  Vincent then goes on to list twenty-nine names of political philosophers who were 
significant, including, Arendt, Strauss, Voegelin, Oakeshott, and Dewey, among others.  But it 
goes without saying that the method and substance of John Rawls’ writings on justice were 
seminal.  Rorty, in particular, did not publish anything on Rawls until after Rawls had conceded 
that “Political philosophy has no special access to fundamental truths, or reasonable ideas, about 
justice and the common good, or to other basic notions.”4 The moment Rawls began to believe 
this was not part of an epiphany, but rather, it occurred to him through the give and take of 
debate with his critics like Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer.  But once Rawls did concede 
that, he became a strong-precursor for Rorty’s fodder.   
  Rawls’ early writings, in such works as A Theory of Justice, were being accused of 
prioritizing a conception of justice that focuses on the procedures rather than substance.  
Thinking about justice, then, is orientated toward the correctness of the procedures we use to 
make conclusions about justice rather than the conclusions themselves.  Rawls writes, 
 
                                                           
1 Pettit, Philip. “The contribution of analytic philosophy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. 
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3 Vincent, Andrew. The Nature of Political Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 93. 
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It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would 
acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be 
formed . . . We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good 
proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior.5  
 
The right is prior to the good.  On Sandel’s reading, Rawls’ picture carries with it a conception of 
the self.  Rawls’ famed construction of parties behind a veil of ignorance in the original position 
choosing a conception of justice is, according to Sandel, presupposing a conception of the 
autonomy of the will.  Taking care of the right procedures (e.g. a veil of ignorance) carries with 
it a conception of the self which chooses ends independent of its core constitution.  “Only if the 
self is prior to its ends can the right be prior to the good,” Sandel writes.  These selves, according 
to Sandel, are “unencumbered” and they therefore voluntarily cooperate in community settings.  
All the while, these unencumbered selves are not totally part, not completely defined by, their 
relation to a community or to any ends.  Nothing, on this reading of the self, is constitutive of the 
self, other than its capacity to will ends.  When ends are chosen, they do not become part of the 
unencumbered’s self’s definitions of him.  Charles Taylor has called this “procedural justice” 
and concludes that it is one of the “malaises” of modernity, resulting in the diminishing value of 
substantive moral arguments.6  Samuel Freeman summarizes what Taylor and Sandel share in 
common: “For communitarians our moral identity is given by the final ends and commitments 
we affirm, and these are provided to us by social contexts and the community with which we 
identify or within which we share.”7   
 Rawls, however, amended his arguments in such works as Political Liberalism and 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatment.  In the latter work, he characterized his initial flaw as 
                                                           
5 Quoted in Sandel, Michael, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” in The Public Philosophy: 
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7 Freeman, Rawls, 304-05. 
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presenting his conception of justice as a comprehensive moral doctrine.  The problem of the 
comprehensive position was that in order to adopt Rawls’ view of justice as fairness everyone 
had to affirm it in the same way.  In his latter works, Rawls adopted the view that what was 
needed for a well ordered society that affirmed justice as fairness was minimally an overlapping 
consensus between differing conceptions and standards for justice.  By requiring this minimal 
overlapping consensus Rawls is able to deflect the argument that he is presenting a conception of 
the self as unencumbered.  Rawls now offers a political conception of justice.  He writes in his 
preface to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that what is needed for a shift from justice as 
fairness as a comprehensive moral doctrine to a political conception of justice is a cluster of new 
ideas including: “overlapping consensus,” “reasonable pluralism,” “public basis of justification 
and public reason,” and “the burdens of judgment.”8   
But before Rawls developed these new concepts fully, Rorty recognized Rawls’ shift 
away from a comprehensive moral doctrine and instead of predicting that Rawls would need a 
new cluster of concepts to explain the shift, Rorty reread Rawls’ earlier works as if there was 
never a shift.  This is a Bloomian misreading.  Rorty is hoping that we will reread Rawls in light 
of his discover of, for example, a kind of counter-sublime (e.g. the acceptance of philosophical 
contingencies). 
 Rorty’s writings on Rawls occur primarily in two essays, “The priority of democracy to 
philosophy,” and “Justice as a larger loyalty.”  In his first writings on Rawls, Rorty begins, 
Rawls, following up on Dewey, shows us how liberal democracy can get along without 
philosophical presuppositions . . . But I shall also argue that communitarians like Taylor 
are right in saying that a conception of the self that makes the community constitutive of 
the self does comport well with liberal democracy.  That is, if we want to flesh out our 
self-image as citizens of such a democracy with a philosophical view of the self, Taylor 
gives us pretty much the right view.9 
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Rorty here refers to the inevitability of self-fashioning out of larger communal influences.  There 
is no analytical possibility of a pure unencumbered self purely veiled behind ignorance.  
However, Rorty’s liberal ironist (whose cultural hero is the strong poet) is, in a sense, 
unencumbered.  The liberal ironist is unencumbered by the finality of his own vocabulary.  The 
totalizing qualities of final vocabularies which refer back to first principles of justification (e.g. 
materialism or idealism) are held by Rorty’s liberals in an ironic way.  Thus in one sense the self 
is constituted by the community, in another sense no one community demarcate the liberal 
ironist’s ultimate intentions.  In other words, Rorty is wedged between communitarianism and 
liberalism.      
Rawls used the term “reasonable” to impose restriction on the knowledge of parties 
behind the veil of ignorance in the original position.  When Rorty first read that, he interpreted 
reasonable to mean “ahistorical criteria” but after Rawls’ more explicit shift away from a 
comprehensive moral doctrine, Rorty misreads Rawls’ past use of reasonable to mean “in accord 
with the moral sentiments characteristic of the heirs of the Enlightenment.”10  Rorty concludes 
this because Rawls wrote that behind the veil of ignorance in the original position the parties 
know “the general facts about society” which include “that institutions are not fixed but change 
over time” and Rawls uses that fact to persuade the parties in the original position that a “feudal 
or a caste system” will not be appropriate for a conception of justice as fairness.11  Rorty 
concludes that parties in the original position “exemplify a certain modern type of human being, 
                                                           
10 Ibid., 183. 
11 Ibid., 180. 
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not an ahistorical human nature.”12  Thus, Rorty writes, “Rawls’ writings subsequent to A Theory 
of Justice have helped us realize that we were misinterpreting his book.”13 
 In response to Sandel who writes of Rawls that if the self is prior to its ends then the right 
is prior to the good, Rorty writes, “But reading A Theory of Justice as political rather than 
metaphysical, one can see that . . . he [Rawls] need not mean that there is an entity called ‘the 
self’ that is something distinct from the web of beliefs and desires that that self ‘has.’”14  
Freeman’s reading of Rawls, on this limited point, is the same as Rorty’s reading of Rawls.15  
Freeman and Rorty agree that there is no inherent metaphysical conception of the self in Rawls 
early writings.  However, what Rorty misreads is the larger issue that the debate of the “Rawlsian 
self” plays only a part.  The question of the unencumbered Rawlsian self is a question of whether 
there is a universal standard (embedded in our nature in this instance) that our political and 
cultural institutions can and should support and reflect.  Rorty construes Rawls’ concept of 
“reasonable” to mean “in accord with the moral sentiments characteristic of the heirs of the 
Enlightenment.”16  But the real issue is neither about sentiments nor about our historical place as 
heirs of the Enlightenment. 
 Both Freeman and Rawls agree, against Rorty, that the issue is properly the status of 
trans-cultural standards which are not specific to any culture or set of historical institutions.  This 
is why Rawls refers to the doctrine he rejects as a “comprehensive moral doctrine.”  Freeman 
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1515 See Freeman, Rawls, 305-06.  Rorty reads Rawls as a cultural relativist because all Rawls is trying to describe is 
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writes, “Rawls thinks in A Theory of Justice that justice as fairness applies to ascertain the degree 
of justice or injustice in any society, regardless of how people there think of themselves.”17  
Indeed, the Rawls of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness only begins with our moral 
sentiments as heirs of the Enlightenment, but it does not remain precisely “in accord.”  Sandel, 
writing a follow-up to Rorty’s article describes the difference well. 
On [Rorty’s] view, Rawls is not “supplying philosophical foundations for democratic 
institutions, but simply trying to systematize the principles and intuitions typical of 
American liberals.”  Rorty endorses what he takes to be Rawls’ pragmatic turn, a turn 
away from the notion that liberal political arrangements require a philosophical 
justification . . . in a theory of the human subject.  “Insofar as justice becomes the first 
virtue of a society,” Rorty writes, “the need for such legitimation may gradually cease to 
be felt.  Such a society will become accustomed to the thought that social policy needs no 
more authority than successful accommodation among individuals . . . who find 
themselves heir to the same historical traditions and faced with the same problems.  In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls pulls back from this purely pragmatic account.  Although 
justice as fairness begins “by looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of 
implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles,” it does not affirm these principles 
simply on the ground that they are widely shared.  Though Rawls argues that his 
principles of justice could gain the support of an overlapping consensus, the overlapping 
consensus he seeks “is not a mere modus vivendi,” or compromise among conflicting 
views.  Adherents of different moral and religious conceptions begin by endorsing the 
principles of justice for reasons drawn from within their own conceptions.  But, if all 
goes well, they come to support those principles as expressing important political 
values.18 
 
The salience of the idea of an overlapping consensus for a political conception of justice over 
and against the comprehensive moral doctrine of A Theory of Justice means that Rorty is caught 
in a peculiar dilemma.19  If Rorty argues that Rawls should be reread (against Rawls’ way of 
reading himself) as writing a systematized, historicist description of the “principles and intuitions 
typical of American liberals” then Rawls is consequently incoherent and unsystematic 
considering his needs for a new family of concepts (e.g. overlapping consensus, public reason, 
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reasonable pluralism, burdens of judgment, etc.).  As a result, I argue that the best way to read 
Rorty’s writing on Rawls is to consider Rawls’ move to political liberalism and away from 
comprehensive liberalism as revealing Rawls’ relevance as a strong precursor for Rorty.   
On this Bloomian reading of Rorty, Rorty’s desire for us to read Rawls’ earlier works in 
light of a counter-sublime (contingency is Rorty’s counter-sublime) is akin to Bloom’s sixth 
trope in the strong poet’s drive for autonomy.  The strong poet returns to the writings of the 
precursor in order to present the precursor to a future audience as part of the strong poet himself.  
This would also explain why Rorty’s reading of the parties in the original position, who are 
“mutually disinterested,” is to be reread as mutually interested to “justify their choice to their 
fellows.”20  It could not, logically, be the case that the parties behind the veil of ignorance in the 
original position could be mutually interested to justify their choices to their fellows because as 
Michael Walzer writes, “for his [Rawls’] purposes, no more than one speaker is necessary.  What 
we hear from behind the veil of ignorance is really a philosophical soliloquy.”21   
Rorty and Public Reason 
 
Nine years after he wrote, “The priority of democracy to philosophy,” Rorty returned to 
Rawls in “Justice as a larger loyalty.”  At this later point, Rawls had already written Political 
Liberalism and The Law of Peoples.  Rorty, still largely in agreement, writes, “Practical reason 
for Rawls is, so to speak, a matter of procedure rather than substance – of how we agree on what 
to do rather than of what we agree on.”22  It makes sense that Rorty, who as an 
antifoundationalist and antiessentialist, would prioritize how we agree rather than what we agree 
(e.g. “take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself”).  This is in keeping with a kind of 
                                                           
20 Compare Rorty, “The priority of democracy to philosophy,” 184 footnote 22 with Freeman’s Rawls, 149-151. 
21 Walzer, Michael. “A Critique of Philosophical Conversation,” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, 
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liberalism.  The right is still prior to the good even if Sandel’s description of the self as prior to 
its ends has lost its import.  Stephen Mulhall writes noting how Rawls’ description of how the 
right and good are complimentary still prioritizes the right: 
Rawls in his more recent work . . . requires a societally endorsed common understanding 
of what is of value in political community.  But that common understanding is of the 
right, not the good.  It is the genuinely common good of the rule of law, or respect for one 
another’s rights as citizens, and it can form the basis of a powerful notion of patriotism.  
But such forms of procedural liberalism continue to eschew any form of citizen 
identification that is based on a broader common conception of the good life of human 
beings embodied in political institutions and actions, for any such common good would 
violate citizens’ rights to equal respect before the law.23 
 
Thus, when Rawls writes that “the right and the good are complimentary,” Mulhall responds that 
the values of the good are only the ones compatible with the right.24  Sandel adds that Rawls 
“rescues the priority of the right from controversies about the nature of the self only at the cost of 
rendering it vulnerable on other grounds.”25  Sandel argues that Rawls description of public 
discourse cannot abide certain topics.  For Sandel, the idea that “grave moral questions” are 
bracketed out of public discourse is an “unduly severe restriction” that would “impoverish 
political discourse.”26 
 Rorty has said of Walzer, “I think his take on contemporary politics and mine are pretty 
much identical.”  Yet Walzer would side here with Sandel against Rorty concerning the vacuity 
of Rawlsian public discourse.  Walzer has called into question the whole project of 
constructivism.  He calls Rawls social contract theory a “constructed conversation,” “where the 
whole purpose of the construction or design is to produce conversational endings.”27  For Rorty, 
“the point of Rawls . . . is one in which the only test of a political proposal is its ability to gain 
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assent from people who retain radically diverse ideas.”28  Therefore, for example, religion needs 
to be privatized because it is a “conversation-stopper.”29  Walzer, however, is calling the whole 
Rawlsian project into question: “Rawls guarantees agreement with his veil of ignorance, which 
separates the speakers from any reasons they might have for disagreeing.”30  Rawls has called the 
veil of ignorance a “device of representation” and “a thought-experiment for the purpose of 
public- and self-clarification.”31  But these speakers behind the veil of ignorance in the original 
position can never be there – even hypothetically, the device has its heuristic limits.  Parties in 
the original position “cannot be there,” Walzer writes, “even hypothetically, lest they gather 
information for themselves and make mistakes.”  Rorty’s allegiance to Rawls in support of a 
kind of political liberalism works against Rorty’s belief that public discourse should never end 
the conversation.   
Rorty has written glowingly that Dewey has helped us see that we ought to “abandon the 
attempt to find a theoretical frame of reference within which to evaluate proposals for the human 
future . . . what he dreaded was stasis.”32 But a theoretical framework to evaluate proposals for 
the human future is exactly what parties behind the veil of ignorance in the original position are 
supposed to do as they choose based on their considered convictions which the public conception 
of justice will apply to the basic structures of society.  Writing against Rawlsian constructivism, 
Walzer describes an arrival at a conception of a just society 
Through a conversation that is constrained, indeed, by ordinary constraints of everyday 
life: the pressure of time, the structure of authority, the discipline of parties and 
movements, the patterns of socialization and education, the established procedures of 
institutional life.  Without any constraints at all, conversation would never produce even 
those conventional (and temporary) stops which we call decisions or verdicts; because of 
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the constraints, every stopping point will appear, to some of the speakers, arbitrary and 
imposed33 
 
Walzer’s descriptions of the “ordinary constraints of everyday life” grind to a halt Rorty’s hope 
that every new metaphor will receive a public hearing.  Rorty writes, “the most appropriate 
foundation of a liberal democracy is a conviction by its citizens that things will go better for 
everybody if every new metaphor is given a hearing.”34  Walzer’s response would be that giving 
every new metaphor a hearing would be like giving no metaphor a hearing; a cacophony would 
result.  Rorty’s description of the omnivorous ears who hear all metaphors is, ironically, parallel 
with what Walzer describes as Rawls’ “hypothetical conversations tak[ing] place in asocial 
space.”35  Rorty writes, “your devotion to democracy is unlikely to be wholehearted if you 
believe, as monotheists typically do, that we can have knowledge of an ‘objective’ ranking of 
human needs that can overrule the results of democratic consensus.”  But Walzer would respond 
to Rorty – your devotion to democracy is unlikely wholehearted if you believe, as Rawlsians 
typically do, that we can have knowledge of an ‘objective’ ranking of democratic values that can 
overrule the results of democratic consensus. 
 David Owen asks a good question, “Should Rorty, as a liberal ironist, accept Rawls’ 
conception of public reason, that is, the rules of preclusion which Rawls proposes on the sorts of 
reason which may be appropriately expressed in public political debates on fundamental 
matters?”36    Owen concludes that Rorty should reject Rawls rules of preclusion because it curbs 
the liberal ironist’s ability to express himself against cruelty as the summum malum.37  Rorty, in 
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his response paper is unconvinced that his liberal ironist should reject the rules of preclusion. I 
suspect that the question is correct but Owen’s argument goes in the wrong direction.  
Rorty and Narration 
 
 In order to set Owen’s question in the right direction, I want to discuss how Rawls’ rules 
of preclusion would affect what Rorty calls “we-intentions.”  Rorty argues that we-intentions is a 
metaphor for a distinction that helps separate the “ethical considerations which arise from one’s 
sense of solidarity and ethical considerations which arise from, for example, one’s attachment to 
a particular person, or one’s idiosyncratic attempt to create oneself anew.”38  What Rorty cannot 
fit within his own distinction is a way to describe a we-intention, we creates us anew.   
 Rorty begins Achieving Our Country with the pithy remark, “National pride is to 
countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement.”39  
Rorty’s reason for taking national pride is in the notion that America itself is the greatest poem.  
America is a nation of self creation.  This description that America is a creation out of nothing is 
a common refrain.  Joseph Joffe writes,  
America was practically ex nihilo the original state of nature, as in Locke's imagination, 
when he famously proclaimed in the Second Treatise: "In the beginning all the world was 
America.  The country was not in history, to use a Hegelianism; it was deployed against 
history. It was the first polity that made itself, so to speak; it was not the fruit of royal 
conquest, like England, Spain, and France, or of wars of national unification like 
Germany. It was of Europe, but it left Europe.40 
 
Walzer adds, “The members of liberal society share no political or religious traditions; they can 
tell only one story about themselves and that is the story of ex nihilo creation, which begins in 
                                                           
38 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 194. 
39 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 3. 
40 Joffe, Joseph. “A Canvas, Not a Country: How Europe Sees America,” in Understanding America: The Anatomy 
of an Exceptional Nation. Schuck, Peter H., and James Q. Wilson, eds. (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 600. 
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the state of nature or the original position.”41 In addition, Harold Bloom writes, “Something in 
the American self is persuaded that it also preceded the created world.”42  Rorty exclaims,  
Whitman thought that we Americans have the most poetical nature because we are the 
first thoroughgoing experiment in national self-creation: the first nation-state with 
nobody but itself to please – not even God.  We are the greatest poem because we put 
ourselves in the place of God: our essence is our existence, and our existence is in the 
future.43 
 
A few years before Rorty wrote those words, Bloom gave Whitman the position of first typifying 
the dueling self of the liberal ironist: a self interested in self creation and a self interested in 
obligation and solidarity. The latter is always in tension with the former.  Bloom writes,  
Walt Whitman is our Hermetic national poet, our celebrant of the American self, but he 
sings two selves at once.  One is Walt Whitman, an American one of the roughs, endless 
merging into groups, but the other is “the real me” or “me myself,” absolutely fragile, 
always standing apart.  Two American selves (at the least) . . . 44 
 
The problem, as Walzer points out, is that there is only one story Americans can tell themselves 
and that is the story of creation ex nihilo and according to Bloom and Rorty, Whitman is the 
American Adam.  This one story sustains the private realm of self creation, yet, all the while it 
preserves only the memory of a public realm of self creation.  That memory was the last moment 
of public self creation.  This is liberalism.   
 Rorty was quoted earlier to have agreed with Charles Taylor that “a conception of the self 
that makes the community constitutive of the self does comport well with liberal democracy.”45  
Now, agreeing with one dimension of liberalism, Taylor writes, “where formerly poetic language 
could rely on certain publicly available orders of meaning, it now has to consist in a language of 
                                                           
41 Walzer, Michael. “A Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, 
97. 
42 Bloom, Harold. The American Religion. 2nd ed. (New York: Chu Hartley Publishers, 2006), 15. 
43 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 22. 
44 Bloom, The American Religion, 9. He writes in the later addition of the book, “Walt Whitman was America’s 
Adam” (304). 
45 Rorty, “The priority of democracy to philosophy,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth,” 179. 
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articulated sensibility.”46  This articulated sensibility is the articulation of the poet’s “own world 
of references.”47  But this world of references is not a solipsism but rather a “subtler language” 
where we are made “aware of something in nature for which there are as yet no adequate 
words.”48  Taylor calls that “something in nature” a “moral horizon.”  Bloom too has a moral 
horizon, “You cannot get beyond Hamlet,” Bloom muses, “Hamlet himself is a frontier of 
consciousness yet to be passed.”49  Rorty, however, has no Hamlet, except maybe himself.  Rorty 
cannot embrace Taylor’s subtler language because that itself creates the kind of horizon that 
makes both a purist form of pragmatism and a purist division between public and private 
unsatisfying.   
 Back to Owen’s question now, the reason Rorty should have rejected Rawls public 
conception of reason as rules of precluding certain kinds of discourse is because the nature of the 
relationship between the poetic and the subject of poetry – the sublime – will not allow for such 
rules of preclusion.  Poetic discourse limits itself, as Walzer writes, “Poetry leaves in the minds 
of its readers some intimation of the poet’s truth.  Nothing so coherent as a philosophical 
statement, nothing so explicit as a legal injunction: a poem is never more than a partial and 
unsystematic truth [that can be] communicated but never directly implemented.”50  But as 
Walzer has also been quoted to say, liberalism can only tell itself one story, the creation of itself 
ex nihilo.  This means that there is no poetry left for the public realm of solidarity.  The role of 
poetry in the public realm will now only be the kind that rouses moral sympathies to the 
problems of cruelty and humiliation.  Poetry, after the initial act of collective self-creation, 
cannot do the same work anymore. 
                                                           
46 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 84. 
47 Ibid., 85. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Bloom, Hamlet: Poem Unlimited, 7. 
50 Walzer, Michael. “Philosophy and Democracy,” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, 4. 
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Rorty and Metaphors Revisited 
 
 In “What Metaphors Mean,” Davidson writes, “Metaphor is the dreamwork of language 
and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the 
originator.”51 Metaphors, he argues, mean their most literal interpretation, but their use is what is 
important.  “No theory of metaphorical meaning . . . can help explain how metaphor works.”52  
Kirk Ludwig summarizes Davidson writing, “It is a mistake to think that metaphors function by 
virtue of having a special kind of meaning – metaphorical meaning; instead, they function in 
virtue of their literal meanings.”53 But how then do metaphors function if not to convey their 
meaning?  Rorty concludes, “we can say that we come to understand metaphors in the same way 
that we come to understand anomalous natural phenomena.  We do so by revising our theories so 
as to fit them around the new material . . . by casting around for possible revisions in our 
theories.”54  Metaphors are a voice “from outside logical space, rather than an empirical filling-
up of a portion of that space.”55  Rorty writes, “When a metaphor is created it does not express 
something which previously existed, although, it is caused by something that previously 
existed.”56  Rorty’s rather striking political implication is, “the most appropriate foundation of a 
liberal democracy is a conviction by its citizens that things will go better for everybody if every 
new metaphor is given a hearing.”57  As I noted in the third chapter, drawing on Walzer, this is 
both impossible and not necessarily an intrinsic good.  However, I want to add, now, that the 
idea that a liberal democracy has as its foundation the premise that every new metaphor is given 
a hearing does not quite resonate with Rawls.  Rawls wrote in “The Idea of Public Reason 
                                                           
51 Davidson, Donald. “What Metaphors Mean,” in The Essential Davidson, 209. 
52 Ibid., 220. 
53 Ludwig, Krik. “Introduction,” in Donald Davidson. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, 9. 
54 Rorty, Richard. “Unfamiliar noises: Hesse and Davidson on metaphor,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 167. 
55 Rorty, Richard. “Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics,” in Essays on Heidegger and Others. 
Philosophical Papers, 13.   
56 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 37. 
57 Ibid. 
 105 
Revisited,” that new metaphors can be introduced into the realm of a public conception of justice 
so long as they are introduced under “the proviso” that they can be adjusted over time to meet the 
public minimum of a justification based on an overlapping consensus.58  This proviso will 
inevitably have a chilling-effect on the kinds of metaphors which are introduced.  How can Rorty 
justify limiting the public realm of open democratic discourse in a Rawlsian way?  I suspect that 
Rorty’s desire for a private realm of self-creation where strong poets flourish with limited 
constraints would trump his naïve view that a modern liberal democracy can or even should give 
every metaphor a chance.  Rorty would have to concede, the last metaphor for liberal democracy 
is collective self-creation, ex nihilo.  All other narratives must remain in the private realm.   
What, then, does a private realm of experimentation look like? 
 Rorty gives himself as an example of a private realm of experimentation.  Ironically 
enough, Rorty’s own experimentation with his experiences as a leftist intellectual are redescribed 
in different ways as both a form of self-expression (private self-creation) and as an attempt to 
build solidarity (public warranted-assertability).  Rorty’s pragmatism is his experimentation with 
metaphors.  Examples abound once Rorty’s writings are seen synoptically.  He labeled his view 
“epistemological behaviorism” in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  He later called himself 
a pragmatist in Consequences of Pragmatism but later called himself a “neopragmatist” in 
Philosophy and Social Hope.  In “The Unpatriotic Academy,” reprinted in Philosophy and Social 
Hope Rorty refers to “traditional American pluralism” in contrast to “multiculturalism” while in 
Achieving Our Country Rorty converted these terms to the “Reformist Left” in contrast to the 
“Cultural Left.”  In “Charles Taylor on Truth” Rorty dropped the phrase “Nature’s Own 
Language” while in “Rationality and Cultural Difference,” and “Feminism and Pragmatism,” 
                                                           
58 See, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 152. 
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Rorty borrows from Richard Dawkins the concept of a “meme” which is the “cultural 
counterpart of a gene.”59 But in Rorty’s later writings, he drops the metaphor of meme all 
together.  In “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” Rorty he will use the term “postmodernist” 
in the sense Lyotard gave it as,  
distrust of metanarratives . . . these metanarratives are stories which purport to justify 
loyalty to, or breaks with, certain contemporary communities, but which are neither 
historical narratives about what these or other communities have done in the past nor 
scenarios about what they might do in the future.60 
 
About a decade later, in a debate, Rorty retracted his statement in a radical way: “I’ve never 
known what the term ‘postmodern’ means . . . I think the term ‘postmodernism’ was a pure 
journalistic construction like ‘existentialism.’”61   Rorty wrote that the cultural hero of the liberal 
ironist is Bloom’s “strong poet” in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.  In “Philosophy as a 
transitional genre,” he argued that someone who seeks “Bloomian autonomy” can be defined as 
an “intellectual.”62  In Rorty’s essay on textualists, he called Bloom a pragmatist, later in an 
appendix to Achieving Our Country Rorty calls Bloom a “functionalist.”  It therefore seems that 
Rorty’s communitarianism revolves around his desire to have strong precursors and the uses and 
misuse of their metaphors.  A peculiar kind of communitarianism, one that favors allegiance as 
an extension of Bloom’s idea of a “precursor,” is an inevitable precondition for liberalism.   
 
 
   
 
  
                                                           
59 Rorty, Richard. “Rationality and Cultural Difference,” in Truth and Progress, 191; see also 206. 
60 Rorty, Richard. “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” in Objectivity, relativism, and truth, 198-99. 
61 Rorty, Richard, and John Searle. “Rorty v. Searle, At Last: A Debate.” Logos. 2 no. 3 (1999): 46. 
62 Rorty, Richard. “Philosophy as a transitional genre,” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 90. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
 Daniel Dennett playfully wrote that what a reader of Rorty needs was the “Rorty Factor.”  
To apply the Rorty Factor, “you multiply what he [Rorty] says by the number .673 then you get 
the truth.  Dick always exaggerates everything in the direction of the more radical.”1  Later, after 
Rorty’s death in 2008, Dennett remembered a conversation between them over lunch; Dennett 
writes, “I had said that it mattered greatly to me to have the respect of scientists – that it was 
important to me to explain philosophical issues to scientists in terms they could understand and 
appreciate.  He replied that he didn’t give a damn what scientists thought of his work; he coveted 
the attention and respect of poets!”2  Indeed, Rorty’s language for his favorite critic of poetry 
could not be more glowing,  
Harold Bloom, by remaining sublimely indifferent to practically everything except his 
own obsessions, and in particular to the distinction between knowledge and opinion, has 
earned himself a place in Heaven at the right hand of Samuel Johnson.  Bloom is the only 
American academic of my generation whom I am convinced will still be read with 
enthusiasm in the twenty-second century.3 
 
Rorty gained the attention and respect of poets when Bloom dedicated his book Where Shall 
Wisdom Be Found? writing, “For Richard Rorty.”  But within that book, Bloom does to Rorty 
what Rorty has been doing to Bloom for years.  Rorty has called Bloom a pragmatist, and later, a 
functionalist.  Rorty uses Bloom’s “strong poet” liberally, attaching “intellectual” to those who 
read books in order to achieve “Bloomian autonomy.”  Within, Where Shall Wisdom Be Found? 
Bloom engages the same game of labeling and remaking that Rorty has been doing for over 
                                                           
1 Quoted in Ryerson, James. “The Quest for Uncertainty: Richard Rorty’s Pilgrimage,” in Take care of freedom and 
truth will take care of itself, 4.  Elsewhere, Dennett has called the Rorty Factor a modulation of “.742;” see Dennett, 
Daniel. Consciousness Explained. (New York: Back Bay Books, 1991), 461. 
2 Dennett, Daniel. “Richard Rorty: What Made him a Crucial American Philosopher? Slate Online Magazine. June 
18, 2007.  http://www.slate.com/id/2168488/pagenum/all/ (accessed June 20, 2007).  Here, too, Dennett remembers 
using the “.742” to describe the Rorty Factor. 
3 Rorty, Richard. “Tales of Two Disciplines.” Callaloo. 17. No. 2. (1994): 577. 
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twenty years.  Bloom calls Rorty an “Emersonian on the Left,” and a “post-pragmatist.”4  Years 
earlier, Cornel West labeled Rorty’s reading of Dewey “Emersonian.”5  It surely had a certain 
sweetness coming from Bloom.  However, Stanley Cavell is unsatisfied with the affiliation 
between Emerson and pragmatism: “The identification of Emerson in terms of pragmatism (a 
tendency associated with the writing of Cornel West and Richard Rorty) is, to my mind, yet one 
more form in which the distinctiveness of Emerson’s writing is repressed.”6  Cavell objects that 
an association of pragmatism with Emerson neither does justice to the distinctiveness of 
pragmatism nor to the distinctiveness of Emerson. What may save Bloom from Cavell’s criticism 
is Bloom’s criticism of Rorty.  By calling Rorty a “post-pragmatist” Bloom is both able to avoid 
Cavell’s criticism and criticize Rorty.   
 I have been arguing for the last five chapters that Rorty is a kind of post-pragmatist.  
Rorty has aligned himself with the poets all the while he has continued to talk about philosophy.  
In chapter two I described how Rorty’s pragmatism – if it can be called that – has many striking 
features.  I presented five facets of Rorty’s peculiar pragmatism.  I argue that it is reasonable to 
see Rorty’s desire to affiliate with pragmatism having less to do with the power of pragmatist’s 
arguments but rather with the sense that after Rorty’s critique of philosophy, the pragmatists 
were his strong precursors.  “Pragmatism . . . names the chief glory of our country’s intellectual 
tradition.”7  By recognizing the opportunity to revive pragmatism, Rorty sets himself poised for 
glory.  But Rorty was not satisfied with the limited subject matter of Dewey and James, or the 
banal prose of Peirce and Holmes.  Instead, Rorty embarked on a mission of self creation unusual 
for an American philosopher.  In that vein, Rorty has recreated himself following Nehamas’ 
                                                           
4 Bloom, Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?, 204. 
5 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, 199. 
6 Cavell, Stanley. Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow, 93.   
7 Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism,” in Consequence of Pragmatism, 160. 
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description of Nietzsche that “life is literature.”  Rorty has written systematic analytic philosophy 
as in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  He has written literary criticism as in Contingency, 
irony, and solidarity.  He has written political radical equivalent of Emerson’s “Divinity School 
Address” in Achieving Our Country and the essay “The Unpatriotic Academy.”8  Rorty has 
written pamphlet length descriptions of what is needed to revive humanism, in “The Humanistic 
Intellectual: Eleven Theses.”  He has written a creative autobiographical account, “Trotsky and 
the Wild Orchid,” which is not wholly consistent with his principle biographer’s account.9  He 
has even dabbled in futuristic fiction writing as in the essay, “Looking Back from the Year 
2096,” where he describes a future “Democratic Vistas Party.”10  Democratic Vistas refers to a 
paper Walt Whitman once wrote.  If the “Democrtic Vistas Party” becomes political viable, 
maybe Rorty will be due glory for having written years ago about the lamentably diminished 
position Whitman readership is in.  “It rarely occurs to present-day American leftists to quote 
either Lincoln or Whitman,” Rorty writes.11  
 Andrew Vincent, in his The Nature of Political Theory, picks up on what Rorty is doing.  
Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, according to Vincent, is a “significant Neo-
Nietzschean contribution to political theory debate.  The difference between Nietzsche and Rorty 
is that the latter is altogether more optimistic.”12  After Vincent adds that Rorty is “lighter and 
wittier” than Nietzsche, Vincent follows a Rortyian theme by writing, “if we make rather than 
                                                           
8 See for example, in Achieving Our Country, “In America, at the end of the twentieth century, few inspiring images 
and stories are being proffered.  The only version of national pride encouraged by American popular culture is 
simpleminded militaristic chauvinism.  But such chauvinism is overshadowed by a widespread sense that national 
pride is no longer appropriate” (4).  Rorty here writes with a boldness and prophetic tone unique to this book and to 
“The Unpatriotic Academy.”  His writings are usefully compared to the harder prose of his compatriot Todd Gitlin; 
see, Gitlin, Todd. Intellectuals and the Flag. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).   
9 Compare “Trotsky and Wild Orchid,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 3-20, with Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The 
Making of an American Philosopher. 
10 Rorty, “Looking Backwards from the Year 2096,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 249. 
11 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 10. 
12 Vincent, The Nature of Political Theory, 251. 
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discover truth, then imagination, aesthetics, and creativity take on a crucial role in cognition.”13  
Thus, “the poet and the aesthete take priority.”14  However, as we saw in chapter three, the 
priority of making over discovery prioritizes one point on Davidson’s theory of triangulation.  
The priority of making may be Nietzschean and Bloomian but Rorty, when pushed by critics like 
Davidson and Ramberg, has conceded that he should drop the distinction between making and 
discovering and even agree to loosen the Sellarsian distinction between indiscriminate 
experience and linguistic awareness. Consequently, Rorty’s theory of language is incoherent, not 
because it lacks a systematic response to realists but because, over time, Rorty has genuflected in 
too many directions.   
Discussing Rorty, Vincent adds, “There is only the text and nothing outside of it.”15  But 
as we have seen, Bloom’s amendment is that, “Influence, as I conceive it, means that there are no 
texts, but only relationships between texts.”16  The metaphor of “between” denotes the agonal 
spirit between poets who both need each other in order to be creative and defy each other in their 
creative misuse of each other. This relationship between texts, which is agonal in its spiritedness, 
is transmuted in Rorty’s political writings as forms of allegiance (e.g. allegiances to a legacy of 
pragmatism, a legacy of the “Reformist Left,” and a legacy to Rawlsian liberalism).  Reading 
Bloom and Rorty together, Joan Williams writes on their commonality as part of the Romantic 
period in poetry: “Mastery and autonomy were key themes in the Romantics’ celebration of the 
strong poet.  Their focus on autonomy reflected the assumption that self-creation entailed “a 
song of myself.”  This celebration of self often is interpreted as evidence of Wordsworth’s 
                                                           
13 Ibid., 253. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 251. 
16 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 3. 
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contribution in unleashing subjectivity”17  But this song to myself requires, on a Bloomian 
reading, a kind of harmony with a strong precursor, then cacophony, then lastly, a melody where 
the strong poet now leads.     
I have concluded that Rorty’s writings are, when viewed as a collection, profound yet 
inconsistent.  Coherence, though, on one reading, is overrated.  Years before Rorty began 
offering post-philosophical proposals and restricted himself to criticizing philosophy from 
within, Stanley Fish called himself an “acolyte.”18  In memorializing Rorty upon his death, Fish 
remembered,  
Once at a conference Rorty indicated agreement with an account of his work that seemed 
to me to be antithetical to its very core. I rose and said so, and he agreed with me, too. I 
thought, no, it has to be one or the other of us. I still hadn't learned the lesson he was 
teaching, and now, like everyone else, I will be trying to do so in his absence.19 
 
When I asked Fish, months later, what his current thoughts were about that moment where 
Rorty’s puzzled him, he wrote me saying “I meant that I was still imprisoned in the structure of 
linear argument and could not respond to Rorty's ecumenism and his desire to expand the 
conversation. I still can't.”20  It seems that Rorty understood that in order to expand the 
conversation we sometimes have to leave ourselves behind.  He owes a debt to Bloom for what 
he gained by being able to leave himself behind.   
Rorty’s principle biographer, Neil Gross, has argued, “My central empirical thesis is that 
the shift in Rorty’s thought from technically orientated philosopher to free-ranging pragmatist 
                                                           
17 Williams, Joan C., “Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of The Gaze,” in A Pragmatist’s Progress? 
Richard Rorty and American Intellectual History, 71.  Williams’ worry is that “By associating greatness with the 
strength and autonomy of the strong poet, the Romantics used masculine gender ideology to exclude women” 
(Ibid.). 
18 Indeed, Simon Blackburn has called Fish, Rorty’s “counterpart.”  See, Blackburn, Truth: A Guide, 162.  Fish, 
however, has, published a substantial critique of Rorty post-philosophic proposals; see, Fish, Stanley. “Almost 
Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin,” in There’s No Such Thing 
as Free Speech and it’s a Good Thing, Too. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 214-19. 
19 Fish, Stanley. “Richard Rorty: What Made him a Crucial American Philosopher? Slate Online Magazine, June 18, 
2007.  http://www.slate.com/id/2168488/pagenum/all/ (accessed June 20, 2007). 
20 Stanley Fish, email to author, April 26, 2008. 
 112 
reflected a shift from a career stage in which status considerations were central to one in which 
self-concept considerations become central.”21  Gross’ distinction between “status 
considerations” and “self-concept considerations” roughly parallels my distinctions between 
Rorty’s philosophical criticisms, on the one hand, and his post-philosophic proposals on the 
other.  One caveat, however, is that Rorty’s period of “self-concept considerations” is a new 
period of “status considerations.”  This new period is where he felt most belated by precursors.  
Moreover, in my introductory chapter, I asked a cluster of rhetorical questions.  Why is 
Rorty’s pragmatism so peculiar?  Why does Rorty affiliate himself with pragmatism at all?  
Indeed, why does Rorty drop some descriptions and pick up new ones when he has not changed 
the subject at all?  Why does he write as if he owes something to pragmatism?  More broadly, 
what are the tactics he uses to assimilate other literature into his fold?  Why does Rorty call 
himself a philosopher and at the same time reject the title?  If these questions are legitimate, I 
have proposed that reading Rorty as if he were very much influenced by Bloom’s concepts is a 
more compelling way of reading Rorty than to read him like a pragmatist.  Although Rorty’s 
values stem from his allegiance to modern democratic liberalism (e.g. Deweyian), he values 
allegiance qua allegiance by virtue of Harold Bloom’s influence.  The metaphors that best 
explain the tactics Rorty uses when addressing and assimilating other authors are properly 
Bloomian metaphors like “misreading.”  A synoptic view of Rorty’s writings convey not only a 
profound vision in metaphilosophy, they reveal inconsistent conclusions.  This incoherent may, 
in part, be accidental, resulting from an overflow of ideas.  However, this inconsistency may, 
instead, be tolerable, if vicissitude and multiplicity is a counter-sublime to a correspondence 
theory of truth. 
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